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ABSTRACT
This thesis assesses the current status of Canadian prescription drug regulation and the
policy drivers that guide this process. This analysis is accomplished by first providing a
general survey of the steps, law, and institutional players involved in the full life-cycle of
a drug. Next the evolution of current clinical trials and the gaps that the present legal
regime creates in the scientific standards employed in clinical research is reviewed. This
is followed by a discussion of how commercialization (innovation) and speed of approval
(market access) are slowly becoming the dominant policy drivers for the Canadian
regime. Finally a discussion of the proposed Progressive Licensing model, and Bill C-51An Act to Amend the Food and Drug Act, raises the concerns with a shift to a system
largely based on risk assessment and post-market monitoring (pharmacovigilence).
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Our inexhaustible supply of fact has
unexpectedly made everything true and false.
While the power of expertise has obscured
the causes of both success and failure.1
As a society we place a lot of faith in science. In making decisions we rely on it to
add weight to our choices, and to give them a layer of objective justification. Yet science
is not truth or absolute; it is merely a tool to aid reasoning. One of its core principles is
uncertainty, and the continuous need to check and modify the assumptions we draw from
observation.2 Like any tool it has its limits; when employed appropriately it is very
useful, and when employed improperly, its utility to aid reasoning becomes questionable.

Too often, science is employed poorly when its outcomes have economic and
political implications. Too often, observations can be manipulated to justify
(predetermined) decision-making without maintaining validity. Under these
circumstances, the value of science becomes negligible. In those situations where
potential hazard flows from the decisions we make based on scientific observation, we
must ensure that these observations do not shade into the meaningless.

1

J. R. Saul, Voltaire’s Bastards: The Dictatorship of Reason in the West (New York: Vintage Books, 1992)
at 175.
2
See K. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Rutledge, 2004) [Popper].

1

Lessons Learned From the VIGOR Study and Vioxx
(a) The Vioxx Withdrawal

In 1999, Canada and the United States approved for sale the anti-inflammatory
drug, Vioxx (Rofecoxhib). It was heralded as a breakthrough in the treatment of arthritis,
as the first in a new generation of drugs (COX-2 inhibitors) that targeted the
physiological mechanism at the source of arthritic pain. It quickly became one of the
most widely prescribed drugs in the world. Scarcely five years later in September 2004,
Merck, the drug‟s manufacturer, announced the worldwide market withdrawal of Vioxx.

This withdrawal came after years of contradictory reports about the drug‟s safety.3
Not only had it been linked to increased intestinal bleeding, but also to the potential for
increased heart failure. Several new studies had suggested that Vioxx increases the
danger of cardiovascular complications.4 The FDA‟s own scientists speculated that it may
have caused as many as 100,000 unexpected heart attacks in the United States alone.5 Yet
despite these warnings, North American drug regulators were slow to act, arguing that the
science was equivocal and that the benefit provided by COX-2 inhibitors far outweighed
their risks.6

3

P. Juni, L. Nartey, S. Reichenbach, R. Sterchi, P. A. Dieppe & M. Egger, “Risk of Cardiovascular Events
and Rofecoxhib: Cumulative Meta-Analysis” (2004) 364 The Lancet 2021 (PUBMED).
4
Ibid.
5
J. Lenzer, “FDA is Incapable of Protecting US Against Another Vioxx” (2004) 329 BMJ 1253 [Lenzer].
6
H.A. Waxman, “The Lessons of Vioxx – Drug Safety and Sales” (2005) 352(25) NEJM 2576 [Lessons].
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(b) The VIGOR Study

One of the largest studies with the greatest potential to shed light on the effects of
long-term consumption of Vioxx was the Canadian-led VIGOR (Vioxx Gastrointestinal
Outcomes Research) study. Sponsored directly by drug manufacturer Merck, it was a
large, randomized trial designed to assess the incidence of gastrointestinal bleeding from
two NSAIDs (non-selective non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs), Vioxx and
Naproxen.7 The VIGOR study had the potential to be a very influential piece of research.
With over 8076 patients at 301 different institutions in 22 countries, it represented large
investments of time and resources by both researchers and drug manufacturers into the
long-term consequences of taking Vioxx. The study‟s outcome would have massive
potential to affect the prescribing behaviour of physicians and the overall safety
perception of the product.

As the trial progressed, several expected cases of GI distress were observed, but
surprising too was a significant increase in the incidence of heart attacks in the group
taking Vioxx. When the researchers first published their data in the New England
Journal of Medicine (NEJM), they focused their findings only on the GI data,
downplaying any results suggesting Vioxx‟s relationship with increased risk of heart

7

C. Bombardier, L. Laine, A. Reicin, D. Shapiro, R. Burgos-Vargas, B. Davis, R. Day, M. B. Ferraz, C. J.
Hawkne, M. C. Hochberg, T. K. Kvien, T. J. Schnitzer, “Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of
Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis” (2001) 343(21) NEJM 1520 (PUBMED)
[VIGOR Study].

3

attack.8 The logic of the researchers was that they had only an obligation to report those
findings that were strictly within their original research protocol, regardless of the
importance of this new safety data.9

When this omission became apparent in 2005, the NEJM editors chastised the
VIGOR researchers for intentionally withholding adverse event data and other
inaccuracies in their reporting of results.10 In 2006, the NEJM issued a harsher rebuke of
the authors of the VIGOR study.11 On the basis of newly released court documents, they
asserted that at least two of the study authors knew of Vioxx-induced heart attacks and
had knowingly withheld adverse event data at the request of Merck, going so far as to
delete raw data submitted to the journal in support of the article. The NEJM editors
suggested that, “taken together, these inaccuracies and deletions call into question the
integrity of the data on adverse cardiovascular events in this article”.12

As the study‟s underlying conclusions slowly became apparent, Merck directed its
marketing representatives to “not initiate discussions on...the results of the VIGOR

8

From their final data, the VIGOR researchers intentionally excluded three participants who had
experienced heart attacks. According to their rationale, these adverse events were excluded because they
occurred soon after the date set for end of the trial, even if observations continued. See G. D. Curfman, S.
Morrissey & J. M. Drazen, “Expression of Concern Reaffirmed” (2006) 354(11) NEJM 1193 [Reaffirmed].
9
C. Bombardier, L. Laine, A. Reicin, D. Shapiro, R. Burgos-Vargas, B. Davis, R. Day, M. B. Ferraz, C. J.
Hawkne, M. C. Hochberg, T. K. Kvien, T. J. Schnitzer, “Response to Expression of Concern Regarding
VIGOR Study” (2006) 354(11) NEJM 1196 at 1198 [Response].
10
G. D. Curfman, S. Morrissey & J. M. Drazen, “Expression of Concern: Bombardier et al. „Comparison of
Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis‟” (2005)
353(26) NEJM 2813 [Concern].
11
Reaffirmed, supra note 8.
12
Ibid.
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study”.13 Worse, methods were developed to distort the results of the VIGOR study, as
one author noted:
On the basis of purely theoretical reasoning, and in the absence of any
evidence from randomized controlled trials, Merck proposed that the
explanation for the observed differences in rates of myocardial infarction
was the cardio-protective potential of the comparator drug used in VIGOR,
naproxen.14
As a result, Vioxx continued to be widely prescribed even after dangers suggested by the
VIGOR research were becoming known to researchers and industry.

(c) Science and the Law in Regulatory Decision-Making

Law and science often make poor bedfellows. Yet in most regulatory decisions
involving risk, they walk hand in hand to form the underpinnings of decision-making.
Science provides the empirical underpinning for inferential comparisons by weighing
different options with systematic observation. Appropriately applied science should be
hesitant to assert complete truth; it can be cautious and methodically slow in finding
solutions to real-world problems, and hesitant in the universal conclusions it draws from
limited observation.15 Law is a medium largely of human reasoning and experience
designed to address the immediacy of competing concerns, making value judgments, and
establishing authority16 to address broad problems in human affairs. Good science begins
with observation and tests reasoning/hypotheses related to that observation.

13

Lessons, supra note 6 at 2577.
P. A. Dieppe, S. Ebrahim & P. Juni, “Lessons from the Withdrawal of Rofecoxhib: Patients Would be
Safer if Drug Companies Disclosed Adverse Events Before Licensing” (2004) 329 BMJ 867 [Dieppe].
15
Popper, supra note 2.
16
See A. Pecezenik, Law and Philosophy Library 8: On Law and Reason (New York, Springer: 2009).
14

5

Conventionally, law begins with reasoning (sometimes compassion) and uses logic (often
doctrinal or jurisprudential analysis) to order observations. Neither is without bias or the
potential for manipulation.

In the drug regulatory process, these two systems of knowledge work together to
inform, change, and guide decisions relating to new drugs. A full perspective must take
into account the most accurate scientific data on a drug‟s safety, and value judgments
about the legal, political, and social impact of the new drug. All drug approvals are based
on the interpretation of scientific data; the law has attempted to formulate its legal
requirements based on accepted models of scientific inquiry, and these models and the
proof generated for approval have in turn adapted to meet those criteria identified as most
important by the law. Within this system, science informs legal and policy decisions; law,
in turn, adapts and adjusts its perspective to respond to the implications of science.
Science may then ask modified questions based upon these conventions established by
law. The danger in this process is that science may too easily mould itself to meet the
minimum needs established by law or policy, thereby distorting its veracity and limiting
its ultimate utility.

Wherever regulatory decision-making rests on the interpretation of scientific
evidence, it must employ science properly.17 If decision-making is to be based upon
indices derived from scientific observation, the accuracy of those decisions rests largely
on the accuracy inherent in our observations. In any regulatory system based on scientific
17

This does not mean that regulatory decisions must rely only upon science; rather that in those cases where
it employs science, it should be generated and considered using the best possible scientific norms.

6

norms, we must be ever vigilant that distortion or dilution of scientific observation does
not lead to potential harm.

In the last decade, we have seen a push for increased speed in regulatory approval
of new drugs, at the same time as an increase in the number of new products withdrawn
for safety reasons.18 It is likely that many of the difficulties observed in the approval
process stem from points at which law and science fail to function complementarily.
When science is lacking, there is no rational basis for making meaningful conclusions
about a drug‟s value; when law is not effectively used, gaps in applying safeguards arise,
and only minimal scientific standards will be applied.

The decision to release potentially dangerous products for public consumption is
never a simple task. How much risk to accept in return for benefit when dealing with a
specific drug is never reducible to an empirical formula. It involves the assessment of
competing concerns, and predictive judgments often based on unclear or ambiguous data.
Science can never determine with certainty that a particular drug is absolutely safe.
Instead it can only provide evidence that must be weighed by decision-makers. Yet, the
drug approval process is often predicated upon the provision of greater certainty than can
be gained from science. Placing a high premium on scientific observation, regulatory
decisions regarding risk often require value judgments that are hardly objective or
impartial. Instead they require projecting upon clinical data inferences and certainty that
go far beyond what can actually be observed. In formulating inferences that go beyond
18

J. Lexchin, “Drug Withdrawals from the Canadian Market for Safety Reasons, 1963-2004” (2005) 172(6)
CMAJ 765 (PUBMED) [Lexchin Withdrawals].

7

what scientific observations can demonstrate, regulators and law-makers formulate
mechanisms that have moral and ethical implications.

(d) Setting a Minimal Standard for Research

There is an assumption among the wider scientific community and the lay public
that researchers will act conscientiously in generating and reporting research findings. It
is assumed that the authors of a study submitted to the NEJM would be conscientious in
reporting their research, ensuring that all available and relevant data are included in the
study‟s results. The VIGOR study‟s authors argued that they had met their obligations by
being strictly “in line with basic clinical principles”.19 In the eyes of the authors, they had
adhered to the minimum standards of study design and trial administration. Any
inaccuracies that resulted from the following of this widely accepted methodology were
not their fault or concern. The VIGOR study authors felt no larger ethical or legal
obligation to report the potentially important adverse event data concerning Vioxx.

One might ask, where were regulators during this debate? Unfortunately,
regulators do little to dispel the notion among the drug research community that they
must meet only minimum standards. While there was mounting evidence that Vioxx was
potentially dangerous, regulators did little to help clarify the debate by calling for
research with definitive results. Instead, as one editorial in the Canadian Medical
Association Journal (CMAJ) suggests:
19

Response, supra note 9 at 1198.

8

[regulators] put their emphasis and resources into assessing drug benefits,
not harms. The bar for approval is low…Pre-marketing approval trials are
too small to flush out all of the risks of a drug. The built-in bias toward
approving drugs without adequate assurance of their safety and with only a
fragmentary and under-funded mechanism for post-approval surveillance
based on physician reporting of isolated adverse events is a fundamental and
(often literally) fatal flaw.20
Regulators play a largely passive role, relying upon mostly industry sponsored and
submitted research to form the core basis for their drug approval decisions. Yet, the
majority of industry-sponsored research on which approval decisions will ultimately be
based is far more likely to have favourable outcomes (3:1), or remain unpublished if
unfavourable.21 A recent study found that in a survey of 324 large cardiovascular trials
published in the leading peer review journals, those sponsored by industry were likely to
report a positive result 90 per cent of the time, in contrast to 50 per cent for independent
research.22

The VIGOR study was hardly an isolated incident. Current research into the
effects of drugs has come to be dominated by a strict adherence to established
methodologies, research protocols, and reduced or weakened scientific standards, even as
it is acknowledged that these practices may not be fully informative or approximate the

20

Canadian Medical Association, “Editorial: Vioxx - Lessons for Health Canada and the FDA” (2005)
172(1) CMAJ 5 at 5 [Vioxx Lessons].
21
J. Lexchin, L. A. Bero, B. Djulbegovic & O. Clark, “Pharmaceutical Industry Sponsorship and Research
Outcome and Quality: Systematic Review” (2003) 326 BMJ 1167 [Outcomes] and M. Bhadari et als.,
“Association Between Industry Funding and Statistically Significant Pro-industry Findings in Medical and
Surgical Randomized Trials” (2004) 170(4) CMAJ 477 [Bhadari].
22
P. M. Ridker & J. Torres, “Reported Outcomes in Major Cardiovascular Clinical Trials Funded by ForProfit and Not-for-Profit Organizations: 2000-2005” (2006) 295(19) JAMA 2270 (PUBMED).
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most accurate science to back the ultimate safety and utility of a drug.23 As one author
has noted:
Researchers and research institutions operate within the narrow confines of the
regulations and the landscape created by the regulations….[the result] is that
researchers will allow regulations to set minimum standards for conduct.24
When the health and safety of Canadians is based upon data generated by poor drug
research, the erosion of science to suit commercial needs places their safety at risk.
Allowing this erosion of drug research to proceed represents a “scandal in medical
science that is at least the equivalent of any of the recent corporate scandals”.25

There is a cautionary message here; all is not well in the world of prescription
drug research and new drug approvals. The past decade has witnessed an increased
percentage of new drugs pulled from the market after safety concerns came to light.26 At
the same time, we have seen regulatory emphasis shifting toward greater ties with
industry27 and a speedier approval process.28 Increasingly, scholars are becoming critical
of the Canadian drug approval process for being prone to errors due to reliance on poor
safety data.29 Other scholars have gone further, calling into question the very impartiality
and validity of the scientific research upon which these decisions are based, hinting that

23

See J. Abramson, Overdosed America (New York: Harper Collins, 2004) [Overdosed].
M. E. Wiktorowicz, “Emergent Patterns in the Regulation of Pharmaceuticals: Institutions and Interests in
the United States, Canada, Britain, and France” (2003) 28(4) Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law
615 at 618 [Wiktorowicz].
25
Overdosed, supra note 23 at xiii.
26
Lexchin Withdrawals, supra note 18.
27
Government of Canada, Canada’s Innovation Strategy (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services
Canada, 2002), online: <http://innovation.gc.ca/gol /innovation/site.nsf/en/in04113.html> [Innovation].
28
Lexchin Withdrawals, supra note 18.
29
J. Lexchin, Transparency in Drug Regulation Mirage or Oasis? (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy
Alternatives, 2004), online: <http://www.policyalternatives.ca/bookstore> [Mirage or Oasis].
24

10

gaps created in the scientific process have allowed for the health of the general public to
be put at risk.30

Research Question
In the following thesis, I will investigate the legal and policy standards imposed
on clinical research used in new drug approvals, and how potentially this has led to some
science which is less than ideal. Underlying this thesis is an assertion that in those
circumstances where science is used as a tool in regulatory decision-making, it must be
employed correctly. If methodologies or sound scientific design are allowed to degrade as
a result of low regulatory standards or poor policy, the research observations that flow
from these studies become weak and their ability to demonstrate a drug‟s safety or utility
become meaningless. It is my ultimate aim to demonstrate how poor standards of science
are being permitted by present law and policy, and how this leads to inadequate research
upon which to base regulatory decisions, which in turn puts the safety of the drugconsuming public at risk. To fully explore this problem, I will outline the present drug
regime, describe deficiencies in the law, assess some of the dominant policy motivations
driving law-makers and regulators, articulate difficulties that are common when
integrating science and law, and postulate some solutions that might address these
difficulties.

30

Overdosed, supra note 23 & J. Lexchin & D. W. Light, “Commercial Influence and the Content of
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It was my original research intent to assess the approval decisions and quality of
science employed by the Therapeutics Products Directorate (TPD) at Health Canada in
the course of considering applications for new drug approvals. Unfortunately, analysis of
this point in the drug life-cycle is hampered by limited and restricted access to industry
data at Health Canada for external researchers. As a result, it was decided that a more
useful approach would be to look further back in the process at that point where the
science for approval decisions is generated. My focus has shifted to the law and policy
governing the clinical trial process and the generation of research results that are
ultimately used in approval decisions. It can be assumed that if the research which
generates data used in the approval process is flawed, then the ultimate approval
decisions may also be flawed.

In the first chapter, I will provide some background on the drug regulatory regime
in Canada. I will first briefly outline the history of drug regulation in Canada. I will also
identify many of the important institutional actors and laws which impact on this process.
Next, I will describe a drug‟s legal life-cycle in detail, to serve as a backdrop for the
assessment of issues raised. Finally, I will show how science, law, and policy are
operating throughout this life-cycle to influence the outcome of regulatory decisions.

In the second chapter, I will look more closely at the law governing the clinical
trial process. I will first describe the operation of the clinical trial process, and then
survey some of the criticisms that have been raised regarding the veracity and
methodology of modern drug research. I will next survey the law which impacts on
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clinical trials, and identify the breadth and force of these various provisions. I will then
demonstrate how this law places only the most cursory obligations on researchers to
employ rigorous scientific methodology. Instead, emphasis is placed on the rational
justification of a given methodology regardless of its scientific merit.

In the third chapter, I examine how misdirected policy considerations have led
regulators away from the original policy objectives of ensuring that drugs are safe and
effective. A legitimate drug regulatory system must account for safety, efficacy,
innovation, and access. I will describe how increasingly, innovation and access are
coming to dominate the policy behind new drug approvals to the potential detriment of
safety and efficacy. I will then appraise the modern conceptualizations of innovation as
economic value, and access as speeding up drug approvals. I will demonstrate how these
conceptualizations have the potential to degrade the quality of science used in the
development and approval of new pharmaceuticals.

I will next turn my attention to some of the emerging drivers of risk regulation
and policy in Canada. There has been a shift toward increased use of post-market safety
measures and the introduction of risk-benefit analysis as a standard for drug approvals.
Embodied in the Progressive Licensing life-cycle model, these new trends have great
promise but must be implemented in such a way that they do not detract from the overall
safety of new drugs.
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In my conclusion, I will try to identify some solutions that can help mend the
cracks that have appeared in the regulatory process. It will consider the ethos that
currently drives actors in the drug regime and ask whether we need to consider varying
goals in the development, use, and justification of pharmaceuticals.
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CHAPTER 2: A BACKGROUND TO DRUG REGULATION IN CANADA
Introduction
In the following chapter, I will provide a background to the present drug
regulatory regime. This will include reviewing the development of drug regulation in
Canada and abroad, several of the major institutional actors and their relationship to one
another, the primary laws and statutes which regulate the system, the legal process
influencing the development of a new drug, and how science, law, and policy overlap
throughout this process.

A Brief History of Drug Regulation
The history of drug regulation in Canada and elsewhere has followed a very clear legal
evolution. It begins with manufacturing standards and laws to ensure the quality and
composition of products, progresses to include laws overseeing the general safety of
these products for consumption, and finally pairs that safety with the effectiveness of
products for intended or advertised uses. This evolution in the regulatory law, and
widening concern for oversight in the consumption of these products, often occurs in
parallel with public health disasters that produce massive public concern.

(a) Early Drug Oversight in Europe

The idea of controlling and testing what humans can or cannot consume to treat
illness is a relatively new concept. In pre-classical times, as Erwin Ackernecht notes:
15

The causes of disease and the action of a drug were considered magic [so]
there was little place for trial and error and even less for experiment to
ascertain the effects of drugs.31
The dominant Western model for most of recorded history, flowing from Hippocrates
(7th century B.C.) and Galen (2nd century A.D.), was that we should “treat the state of
the sick individual [but] not the disease”32 by balancing the body‟s humours. In this
conception, treatments needed to be tested “through experience with different patients”.33
A host of untested practices (bleedings, purges, and remedies) were applied in the hope
that a patient would become better. Each medical practitioner largely relied upon his or
her own judgment to develop a collection of treatments and medical techniques. This
allowed for the dangerous bias that these treatments were “ effective [and] gave
credentials to large numbers of useless products, some of which were also toxic”.34

A humeral conception of illness dominated medicine until the sixteenth century,
when a collection of scientists in Europe, largely at the University of Paris, began to
systematically appraise the value of existing medicines through clinical observations of
outcomes. These reappraisals lead to the removal of some of the most extreme potions
from the Paris 1758 edition of the Codex Medicamentarius including “hair, mummy,
human blood, skull, placenta and urine”.35 It was found that many long-held beliefs,
common practices, and medicinal substances used in the treatment of illness in medieval
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Europe had little value, and in some cases were even more hazardous for patients than the
illnesses themselves.

This led some local governments in Europe to pass decrees determining who may
provide medications and marking specific (often toxic) substances illegal.36 Early
legislation represented only a patchwork of disparate laws, which reflected the caprice of
local governments and varied from region to region. Wider regulation of medications
took the development of “two historical streams that came together only recently” 37 as
Avorn notes:
The first was the political evolution that gave governments the authority to
decide what products could be sold as medicines and how they could be
promoted. The second was the scientific evolution that accorded
experimental data priority over received wisdom.38
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as science pointed to the merits and
perils of certain medicines, the sale of drugs slowly came to be legislated at the national
level in continental Europe.

(b) The British Experience

Britain was slow to adopt drug regulation, remaining for an extended period a
“stronghold of staunch laissez-faire philosophies”39 where market forces determined
which cures, potions, and elixirs were sold to treat ailments. In 1860, the poisoning of
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several hundred clients by a chemist who accidentally put arsenic in peppermint lozenges
led to the passage of the Bill for Preventing the Adulteration of Articles of Food and
Drink40 by the British Parliament. The purpose of this regulation was to ensure the purity
of a product, by requiring that it was “not adulterated with poisonous or unintended
substances”.41 In 1872 further amendments were made that set more basic requirements
overseeing the fabrication and sale of medications.42 However, these regulations
remained voluntary and “left it up to local authorities whether or not to appoint inspectors
or [conduct] analysis”.43 It was not until 1875, under The Sale of Food and Drugs Act,44
that inspections became mandatory.

(c) Early Canadian Regulation: A Focus on Quality

Canadian drug regulation had its “roots in English law and arose from a common
concern about safety and fraud protection”.45 As in Britain, initial legislation focused on
ensuring the product‟s quality by preventing harmful adulteration or modification of
products sold to the public. The Inland Revenue Act46 of 1875 set the first domestic
standards determining what could be added to new products (specifically prohibiting
alcohol) before they entered the market. The Adulteration Act of 188447 set additional
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standards for strength, quality, and purity of new products to be consumed and made it a
criminal offence to manufacture or sell “adulterated food and drugs”.48

In 1919 the federal government established the Food and Drugs Division to
administer the Adulteration Act.49 The following year, in 1920, the Canadian Parliament
repealed the Adulteration Act and passed the Food and Drug Act50 (FDA). This first
incarnation of the FDA focused on the „misbranding‟ of food and drug products, and
sought to reduce the hazards posed by false and misleading claims on drug labels. In
1927 this Act was amended to include supervision of products of animal origin, vaccines
and serums and allow for the inspection of premises in which the manufacture of these
products occurs.51 In 1939 further amendments to the Food and Drug Act allowed the
federal government to make regulations related to the sale of drugs which were “likely to
be injurious to the public”.52 The government targeted potentially injurious products with
especially stringent regulations. In 1946 this power was expanded to allow for the setting
of regulations that define “the conditions of sale of any drug in the interest of or for the
protection of public health”.53
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(d) Toward Regulating Safety and Efficacy

Fears in the United States stemming from the release of several unproven and
toxic drug formulations led Congress to pass the 1938 Federal Food Drug and Cosmetics
Act.54 This legislation gave U.S. regulators the power to require that all new drug
products be tested to ensure safety. During this period there was no similar testing of all
drugs for safety in Canada. This led to concerns that “Canada was being used as a
proving ground for foreign, mostly American, manufacturers to test-market their new
drugs”.55 In 1951 the federal government passed legislation that required the
demonstration of a drug‟s safety before it could be marketed.56 For the first time, drug
manufacturers were required to submit this information to the Food and Drugs Division
of the Department of Health and Welfare.

Canada was slow to implement its own guidelines on testing for safety and
efficacy until the Thalidomide disaster of the 1960s. Up to that point Thalidomide had
been given to pregnant mothers to treat morning sickness, causing physical deformities in
their new born infants.57 After the dangers of the drug were identified, governments
worldwide scrambled to introduce legislation that required drugs to have some
demonstrated standard of efficacy (useful clinical indication) paired with safety. In 1963
Canadian law was changed to require “substantial evidence of the clinical effectiveness
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of the new drug…under the conditions of use recommended”.58 In 1967 the standard was
enhanced to require the submission of a product monograph, which gave detailed
information about the manufacture, composition, risks, benefits, and recommended uses
of the product.59

The 1951 and 1963 changes to the law pairing safety with demonstrations of
efficacy led to the modern clinical trial.60 Prior to these legislative initiatives, drugs had
been tested mainly through case studies and trial and error. The 1963 amendments
required that systematic tests be conducted in a manner that demonstrates clinical
effectiveness, a standard that required that new trials provide a comparison with some
existing treatment or to no treatment at all. These amendments also ushered in the era of
the modern, large, and multi-phased clinical trial. The resulting research model was the
randomized control trial, in which participants were randomly assigned to either a
treatment group administered the new product, a treatment group administered an
existing product, or to a placebo group.61
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(e) The Arrival of Clinical Trials and Ethical Guidelines

Initially there were few coherent standards overseeing how clinical trials were
conducted. Early clinical trials were criticized for their organization and administration.
As Health Canada itself admits:
The regulatory requirements respecting…clinical trials were originally
developed in the early 1960s under the Food and Drugs Act (FDA). Over
time, the Act and attendant regulations became layered with a series of
policy and guidance documents, which contained some gaps in
enforcement, scope and process given the changing environment of clinical
trials and drug development in Canada.62
These gaps did little to ensure the quality of the clinical trial conducted or codify the
research done to establish safety and the rights of participants.

The 1948 Nuremberg Code63 established “the requirement of voluntary informed
consent of the human subject that protects the right of the individual to control his own
body”.64 This ethical requirement was reinforced by the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki,65
which sought to protect the basic rights of research participants and ensure that science
was not conducted at the expense of subjects. Still, during much of this early period of
clinical testing:
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Canadian regulations [were] silent on the question of who can and cannot be
used as research subjects, and on the necessity of obtaining a subject‟s
informed consent prior to participation in a drug study.66
This led to a gap in the rights of those participating in clinical research.

In 1979, the U.S. Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioural Research released the Belmont Report,67 which called for
recognition of human subjects in research, beneficence (securing of the subject‟s ethical
and physical well-being), and justice (requiring that the benefits and burdens of research
be equitably distributed). This report had a widespread effect on health research
regulators and ethicists around the world. In Canada, a variety of institutions and
researchers began to incorporate these ethical recommendations into practice. In 1987 the
Medical Research Council (MRC) of Canada produced the Guidelines on Research
Involving Human Subjects.68 In 1998 many of these practices were incorporated into the
Tri-Council Policy Statement on Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans
(TCPS).69 One of the major stipulations of the TCPS was to make explicit that all
research conducted in institutions receiving funding from the three national research
funding agencies be reviewed by Research Ethics Boards (REB) which oversee the safety
and consent rights of study participants.
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Partially in response to international pressure to harmonize their approval
process,70 and partially in recognition of the remaining gaps, the Food and Drug Act
Regulations71 (FDAR) were amended on September 1, 2001 by the addition of the
Division 5 - Clinical Trial Regulations.72 These changes had the objectives of
“strengthen[ing] protections for human research participants; and attract[ing] sustained
investment in research and development in Canada”.73 They set out in detail the
administrative and data submission processes that were required of clinical trial
researchers, and attempted to standardize the methods for meeting safety and efficacy
standards.

(f) Present Policy Initiatives and the Future of Drug Regulation

In 2002 the federal government pledged $190 million over five years to “speed up
the regulatory process for drug approvals to ensure that Canadians have faster access to
the safe drugs they need”.74 This funding introduced the Therapeutic Access Strategy
(TAS) as well as a push toward greater integration with international approval standards.
The majority of the funds that have been allotted toward the TAS have gone to speeding
up approval times and increasing the availability of new drugs.
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In April 2004 Canada and the United States signed a memorandum of
understanding that pushed for a closer association and a common process of drug
review.75 As one author has noted:
The agreement is intended to reduce bureaucratic hurdles for manufacturers
applying to have new drugs approved in both jurisdictions, and to bring new
drugs to market faster.76
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade
Organization (WTO) have limited the ability of Canada to produce approval standards
which are greater than other G8 trading partners.77

Under the new Government of Canada (the Conservative minority mandate began
in 2006), several broad health reforms have been initiated which have the potential to
influence drug regulation.78 The Blueprint for Renewal: Modernizing Canada’s
Regulatory System for Health Products and Food (Blueprint for Renewal) is a broad
policy mandate that Health Canada has undertaken which seeks to overhaul much of its
present regulatory oversight.79 With over thirty separate initiatives, it touches on a broad
collection of mandated activities, the core objectives being to modernize and integrate
these practices with other global partners. Two of these initiatives have specific
relevance for the present discussion. The Progressive Licensing Framework80 (PLF) is an
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initiative currently underway to revamp the approval process of new drugs to account for
“the full life-cycle of a drug, rather than placing the focus primarily upon pre-market
assessment”.81 The Review of the Clinical Trial Regulatory Framework82 (CT-Div 5
Review) is a mandated review to “ensure that the clinical trial regulatory framework is
flexible, robust, and able to respond to emerging scientific trends”.83

The expectation is that these policy changes will increase the accuracy of the
safety and efficacy data from clinical trials while enhancing the protections accorded to
participants, but this is not certain. As the editors of the CMAJ note:
[Health Canada‟s] current emphasis on partnerships with industry and rapid
drug approval conflicts with the public‟s expectation that these agencies
exist to protect them by restricting approval to drugs that have been
thoroughly tested and are likely to be free of serious risks.84
As the VIGOR example shows, there is still a broad capacity for researchers to seek and
regulators to allow approval on the basis of poor data and research.85

Setting the Stage: The Law and Institutional Players in Drug Approval
A starting point for any critical analysis of difficulties facing the modern drug
review procedure is to introduce some of the institutions, laws, and supporting materials
that create the context in which this process unfolds. From their earliest development,
pharmaceuticals are subject to a set of rules (laws and policy) and actors (institutional and
regulatory) that guide how drug science and approvals unfold. As Dr. Jerry Avorn states
81
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in his critical analysis of drug regulation, Powerful Medicines: The Benefits, Risks, and
Costs of Prescription Drugs:86
…the system shapes decisions for good or for ill – the incentives that drive
behavior, the culture of expectations about information or standards of practice,
the regulations that do or don‟t exist and how thoughtfully they‟re enforced.87
Government and regulators play a key role in the system by establishing and reinforcing
the parameters under which this process unfolds. As Wiktorowicz notes:
… by facilitating some courses of action or making others more difficult,
government institutions shape the manner and degree to which organized
interests exert influence and thus determine where the balance lies between
interest group demands and the programmatic goals of government.88
This structure has been created by rational actors through intentional decision-making,
and in the process has allowed for the institutionalization of biases that distort the
assessment of new drugs.

(a) Law Overseeing Drug Regulation

The law governing pharmaceuticals is a patchwork of provincial and federal
legislation and regulations. Provincial governments generally regulate the prescribing
and pricing of new drugs while federal law oversees the production, approval, and
marketing of pharmaceuticals. The FDA89 is the central piece of federal drug legislation.
The FDA sets standards for the marketing, production, advertising, and enforcement of

86

Avorn, supra note 34.
Ibid. at 18.
88
Wiktorowicz, supra note 24 at 618.
89
Food and Drug Act, (1985) R.S.C. c. F-27 s. 30 [FDA].
87

27

safety criteria. The FDA is supplemented by the FDAR.90 Part C of the FDAR addresses
the administration, institutional oversight, classification, and marketing of drug products.
The Patent Act91 outlines the considerable intellectual property rights accorded
pharmaceutical products. The Notice of Compliance Regulation92 (NOCR) tries to
balance the exclusive marketing period of first-entry patent applicants against the rights
of generic manufacturers to produce these drugs once patent periods expire. The Patented
Medicines Regulations93 (PMR) give guidance on the reporting of pricing and
expenditures related to research and development undertaken on drugs in Canada.

(b) Defining a Drug

A wide variety of products could be considered drugs for the purpose of this
thesis. The FDA specifies that a drug is:
Any substance or mixture of substances manufactured, sold or represented
for use in:
the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention of a disease, disorder,
abnormal physical state, or its symptoms, in human beings or animals,
restoring, correcting or modifying organic functions in human beings or
animals, or
disinfection in premises in which food in manufactured, prepared or
kept.94
This definition encompasses almost any product that can be introduced into the human
body for medicinal or therapeutic purposes. For the purpose of my thesis, I will limit the
definition of „drug‟ to include only pharmaceuticals for which pre-approval clinical trials
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are required, in order to focus on the difficulties that result from pre-approval research
into these products.

(c) Law and Supporting Materials Regulating Clinical Trials

There are several statutes and codes that touch on the administration of clinical
trials. The Regulations Amending the Food and Drug Regulations (1024 – Clinical
Trials),95 also known as Division 5, standardized the format and application requirements
for researchers conducting clinical trials. Division 5 in turn makes reference to the
International Covenant on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use96 (ICH), a set of standardized methodological
considerations for clinical trials that conform to good clinical practices. The ICH
guidelines are to be considered „non-binding‟ guidance for industry.97 The Tri-Council
Policy Statement98 (TCPS) is a set of procedural and substantive ethical rules that must be
met to receive funds from one of the three main federal governmental research granting
agencies.99 Added to these guidelines are a host of provincial and institutional rules,
policies, and practices which are applied to research.100
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(d) Institutional Actors

Health Canada is the arm of the federal government that oversees the regulation
of matters related to public health.101 Within Health Canada, the Health Products and
Food Branch (HPFB) is responsible for overseeing the safety of products consumed by
the public and meets this responsibility by “managing the health-related risks and benefits
of health products and food”.102 Four branches of the HFPB are concerned directly with
medicinal products, the Biologics and Genetic Therapies Directorate (BGTD), the
Natural Health Products Directorate (NHPD), Medical Devices Directorate (MDD) and
the Therapeutics Product Directorate (TPD). The TPD is the body that approves new
drugs and evaluates the quality of pharmaceuticals. The Marketed Health Products
Directorate (MHPD) is a directorate of the HPFB which oversees the marketing and
safety of a product once it has been approved. Industry Canada oversees the
administration of the Patent Act while the Patented Medicines and Price Review Board
(PMPRB) reports to Industry Canada regarding the appropriate pricing of new drugs.
Institutional REBs operate at diverse institutions, both private and public, to oversee the
application of the TCPS and the legislative or institutional ethics guidelines for the
conduct of research on humans.103
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From Birth to Death: The Life-Cycle of a Prescription Drug
Broadly, the release of a new drug can be conceived as occurring in three stages:
(1) research and development or „pre-approval‟, (2) regulatory assessment or „approval‟,
and (3) drug release to the market or „post-approval‟. In the initial research or preapproval stage, a product is discovered, studied for potential uses, and clinical trials are
completed in anticipation of its regulatory approval. At the assessment stage, industrysubmitted research data is reviewed before a decision is made to either approve or deny
the drug‟s release. This process occurs at the TPD. The final marketing or post-approval
stage is the extended period in which the product is released for prescription to the
general public. This phase is overseen by the MHPD, which is responsible for assessing
the occurrence of adverse events and overseeing the safety of drugs on the market.

(a) Stage 1: Pre-Approval
(i) Discovery

A new drug begins with an idea. This entails either the identification of a
potentially useful new compound (a New Chemical Entity [NCE]) or the recognition that
a drug is required to address a pressing medical need which leads to a program of
research. This „need‟ may be driven by attempts to treat a known condition or by
perceived or created demand for a new treatment.104 At this stage, funding into the
research for developing new drugs is given priority.105 Some of the funding for new drug
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identification comes from private industry but it is estimated that the majority of the
research into NCE occurs in public institutions.106 In Canada the major funding
institutions relevant to drug development include the Canadian Institute for Health
Research (CIHR), the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC),
and Industry Canada.

Once a potential NCE has been identified, a decision is made either to develop the
product or not. Most decisions as to whether or not to proceed with development of a
NCE into a drug are firmly at the discretion of manufacturers. Industry will usually
assume control of the product from the original scientist, partnering with researchers or
purchasing the product outright. Manufacturers will base this decision on the potential
value, effectiveness, marketability, and usefulness of a new drug.107 This has led to a glut
of drugs similar to those already proven profitable on the market, dubbed „me-too‟ drugs.
It is at this stage that the initial filing of a patent can occur.108 In Canada pharmaceuticals
are given a 20-year term for market exclusivity from the date of this filing.109

(ii) Pre-Clinical Testing

Once the decision has been made to develop an NCE into a new drug, it is first
chemically isolated and purified. It then proceeds into a stage of pre-clinical testing to
fully determine its chemical properties and toxicity. Studies will be conducted in vitro,
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comparing the effect of the drug on healthy and unhealthy living cells. With positive
results, animal testing will be conducted to determine the drug‟s effect on living
organisms and to further determine potential toxicity. Animal testing will also attempt to
determine whether the product undergoes any metabolic changes when introduced to a
functioning physiology in order to establish dosage-related effects and any other
unknown side effects.110

If pre-clinical trials demonstrate the potential viability of a new drug, researchers
will seek to test the safety and effectiveness of the drug in humans. Manufacturers will
submit an Investigational New Drug Submission (IND) to the appropriate branch of the
TPD (drugs may need to be submitted to the Bureau of Pharmaceutical Assessment,
Bureau of Biologics, or Bureau of Radiopharmaceuticals). The IND will need to provide
a detailed description of the intended program of research, and the conditions under
which it will be conducted. Normally, this information will include: (i) the results and
implications of all previous tests, (ii) names of institutions and qualified investigators
who will be conducting the research, (iii) approvals from institutional ethics boards, (iv)
description of the nature and design of the research to be conducted, and (v) a host of
other administrative and manufacturing details.111 Typically the TPD will approve or
reject an IND within 60 days. If approved, the manufacturers are given the right to
provide the drug directly to the researchers named in the IND.
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(iii) Clinical Trials

Traditionally, clinical trials are conducted in three or occasionally four phases.
Phase I trials are early research studies on humans that assess the effects of the drug on a
small sample of healthy volunteers. This stage seeks to determine the general absorption,
toxicity, metabolism, tolerance, dosage range, and side effects of the drug in humans. In
Phase II trials the drug is tested in a larger sample and targeted at specific conditions.
The primary aim of this phase is to determine whether the drug is effective in treating
specific illnesses, provide information as to the optimum dosage for treatment, and
identify any as yet undetermined side effects. Phase III trials are usually large-scale trials
designed to test the effect of the drug in a wider population with more participants and in
comparison with existing therapies. Phase III trials also serve as the chief demonstration
that the drug has some therapeutic value in treating a specific condition in a targeted
population. Phase IV trials will be discussed later in the post-approval stage.

(b) Stage 2: Approval
(i) New Drug Submission

Once researchers feel that they have gathered sufficient data to justify the
product‟s approval, they will file a New Drug Submission (NDS) with the Therapeutic
Products Programme‟s Submission and Information Policy Division of the TPD.
According to Health Canada, this justification is provided through evidence and/or
studies that “prove the drug has potential therapeutic value that outweigh the risks
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associated with its use”.112 The NDS must include: (i) details about the intended name,
branding, and claims to be made of the new product, (ii) reports describing the studies
conducted to establish the product‟s safety and efficacy, (iii) a description of those
overseeing the research, (iv) methods associated with the product‟s manufacturing and
chemical contents, and (v) any other details of the new product.113

The TPD will then assess submitted data to determine whether the product should
be approved or not. The mechanics and considerations employed in this process are not
fully known. Due to intellectual property law, the data submitted by industry towards
approval is protected as proprietary knowledge and as a result the process is not open to
the public. Health Canada indicates that the TPD goes through at least four stages in
considering the industry submissions.114 First the TPD reviews all of the submitted
information, calling on external experts or forming advisory committees if necessary.
Next, officials at the TPD evaluate the “safety, efficacy and quality data to assess the
potential benefits and risks of the drug”.115 They then look at the information that the
manufacturer intends to provide to health-care providers including labelling, the product
monograph, and brochure. Finally, if “at the completion of the review, the conclusion is
that the benefits outweigh the risks and that the risks can be mitigated”,116 the drug is
approved.
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(ii) Drug Identification Number and Notice of Compliance

Upon a drug‟s approval Health Canada will issue a Drug Identification Number
(DIN) and Notice of Compliance (NOC) to the manufacturers. Only one DIN can be
issued per drug and it enables the manufacturer to exclusively sell the product.117 The
NOC provides the additional protection of sole right to market the product in Canada.
The TPD can approve a drug with specific conditions that will apply to its use, called a
Notice of Compliance with Conditions (NOCc). If an application is found to be
incomplete, a Notice of Deficiency (NOD) will be issued and applicants may amend their
applications. If the application is rejected outright, a Notice of Non-Compliance (NONC)
will be issued. In the case of a NONC being issued, drug companies can re-apply for
approval by submitting an Amended New Drug Submission (ANDS) as many times as
required until approval is obtained.

(iii) Special Access and Priority Review

Drugs may be approved without a full review if they are needed to treat an
immediate or urgent medical need. Under the Priority Review of Drug Submission
Policy,118 a new product may be fast-tracked for approval if it provides treatment for a
“serious, life-threatening or severely debilitating illness or condition”119 for which there
is no existing treatment in Canada or if it has the potential to be more effective than
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existing therapies. If a drug is accepted for priority review, it will be assessed for
approval in 180 days.

Drugs may also be approved without a full review for a limited and specific use,
using the Special Access Program (SAP).120 Special access to a drug may be allowed for
patients “with serious or life-threatening conditions on a compassionate or emergency
basis when conventional therapies have failed, are unsuitable, or are unavailable”.121 The
SAP does not allow for a product to receive general approval beyond its limited use but it
may serve as a mechanism for introducing specific drug therapies.

(c) Stage 3: Post-Approval Stage
(i) Drug Pricing

Before a product is placed on the market, a determination must be made as to its
price. Pricing is set by the Patented Medicines Price Review Board (PMPRB), a quasijudicial body convened under the Patent Act.122 The five-member panel is responsible
for assessing the price at which companies propose to whole-sale drugs to pharmacies.
Section.85(1) of the Patent Act123 outlines a series of factors that the PMPRB can
consider in making its pricing decisions, including the price of similar products in Canada
and the price of the product in different countries. If the drug is relatively novel to the
Canadian market, this may lead to decisions on the basis of “the cost of making and
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marketing the medicine”.124 In theory, the PMPRB will periodically review this pricing
but seldom will it ask a drug manufacturer to reduce the price at which it is selling its
product.

(ii) Drug Scheduling

In Canada there are four different schedules for drugs. Schedule I drugs are
available only by prescription and must be provided by a pharmacist. Schedule II drugs
are available from a pharmacist but must be kept in a location without public access.
Schedule III drugs are available „over the counter‟ or without supervision in any
pharmacy.125 Unscheduled drugs can be sold in any store, without supervision. The
National Drug Scheduling Advisory Committee (NDSAC) makes recommendations to
each province on how to schedule prescription drugs and works with the National
Association of Pharmacy Regulatory Authorities (NAPRA) to establish national
standards of drug scheduling.

(iii) Listing in Provincial Formularies

Provincial governments determine whether drugs will be covered by provincial
health plans by listing them on provincial formularies. As one author has noted:
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provincial governments have no jurisdiction over market competitiveness or
pricing, yet they end up paying for most of the drug expenditures
incurred.126
What is included on a provincial formulary varies widely across the country. Many of
these decisions are guided by a “cost effectiveness analysis”127 that determines the
potential benefit of the drug offset by its cost. There is a push for drugs to undergo a
Common Drug Review (CDR) at the federal level to create recommendations as to what
should be included on provincial formularies. This process is guided by the Health
Canada-funded Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technology in Health (CADTH)
(formerly the Canadian Coordinating Office for Health Technology Assessment
[CCOHTA]), which in turn relies heavily upon recommendations from the Canadian
Expert Drug Advisory Committee (CEDAC). However, adherence is not uniform;
Quebec does not partake in the CDR process and most provinces pay only partial
attention to CADTH recommendations.128

(iv) Monitoring Drug Safety at the Marketed Health Products Directorate

Once a drug is approved and made available to the public, the MHPD is
responsible for overseeing its safety. The MHPD is charged with “post-approval safety
surveillance, assessment of signals and safety trends, and risk communications
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concerning all regulated marketed health products”.129 The MHPD is responsible for
keeping track of any significant international and domestic adverse drug reports or
product recalls, and relaying this information to medical practitioners. Additional Phase
IV Trials may be completed after a product is on the market to confirm its long-term
safety or to investigate alternative uses than those for which it was approved. Reporting
of unexpected adverse events is overseen by the Canadian Adverse Drug Reaction
Monitoring Program (CADRMP) and recorded on the Canadian Adverse Drug Reaction
Information System (CADRIS).130

(v) Prescriptions and the Administration of Release

The administration of new drug releases and the laws which oversee the
prescribing and filling of prescriptions are under provincial authority. Most medications
require a prescription, with the exception of samples which in turn will be filled by a
qualified pharmacist.131 Provincial health Acts and legislation regulating the admission to
the health professions give some guidance as to who may write and fill prescriptions, but
there is little oversight of the discretion that doctors use in deciding to prescribe a
medication.
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The prescribing practices of doctors are an intensive focus for the marketing
activities of drug companies. This marketing is usually done directly by advertising in
medical journals and to patients, as well as indirectly by educating physicians132 and
sponsoring the publication of favourable studies. Regulation of advertising is technically
under the authority of the FDA (s.9) and the TPD, but in the policy document The
Distinction between Advertising and Other Activities,133 Health Canada has limited the
nature of what it considers advertising to only the most overt forms of commercial
representation. The oversight of advertising practices is in the hands of three nongovernmental bodies: Advertising Standards Canada (ASC), the Pharmaceutical
Advertising Advisory Board (PAAB), and the pharmaceutical lobby group Rx & D
(Canada‟s research-based pharmaceutical companies).134

(vi) The Expiry of Patents and Generic Drugs

A drug‟s patent expires 20 years after its initial filing. In anticipation, s.97 of the
Patents Act allows generic companies to begin stockpiling supplies of their drug. Once
the patent period has expired, generic companies may file an Abbreviated New Drug
Submission (ANDS) which establishes the drug‟s bioequivalency to an already existing
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product.135 The thrust of an ANDS is not additional demonstration of drug safety or
efficacy but merely the demonstration that the product is chemically equivalent to the
product whose patent is about to expire. Under s.7(1) of the Patented Medicines
Regulations, an extension of 24 months may be granted to a patent holder if they object
to another manufacturer‟s ANDS. By slightly modifying their original drug (i.e.
Schering‟s Claritin, ClaritinExtra and Aerius or Wythe‟s Effexor and EffexorXR) or by
objecting to new NOC applications, drug companies are often able to extend the patent
life of their drugs by months or even years.136 This „evergreening‟ allows a
pharmaceutical company to use the patent law to perpetuate their patent exclusivity.

(vii) Disposal

The final question for any pharmaceutical product is the issue of disposal. As
pharmaceuticals make their way through the human body, they are metabolized and
eventually released into the environment.137 Similarly, unused drugs expire and must also
be disposed of in the environment. Recent research has shown that drugs have begun to
build up in potentially hazardous quantities in the environment.138 This is a potential
problem that we have hardly begun to tackle through either science or legislation.
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Science and Law in the Regulatory Process
At each stage indicated above, science, policy, and law overlap to guide and
establish the reality in which decisions are made. All three are ever present and adapt to
the other to determine how drugs are developed, approved, and ultimately released to the
public. Law and policy must look to science to define the parameters of safe practices.
Science in turn adapts its questions to suit the demands of those creating, interpreting,
and applying the law. It is impossible to separate this interaction, so we must be vigilant
that science, policy, or law is not given a position of dominance in guiding the decisions
about the ultimate approval of new drugs. We must also be mindful of the inherent biases
of these tools to ensure that they do not distort the drug approval cycle.

(a) Science in the Drug Life-Cycle

Essential to any decision-making process is the application of clear, bias-reduced
science. In theory, the only way to justify a potentially harmful drug‟s release is a
demonstration that it has potential merit that outweighs its risks. This demonstration of
merit must be based on more than unsystematic human supposition or belief. For
confidence and certainty in decision-making, we must look to systematic and long-term
observations that are bound by rules that seek to standardize results and limit the source
of human error in observation. It is hoped that these observations will be accurately
relayed to regulators to help guide and inform the review process. We can see the use of
science occurring at each of the three stages in the regulatory process.
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(i) Science in Pre-Approval

At the research stage, decisions about which drugs and research to sponsor are
continually changed by our understanding of disease and how to treat illness. The AIDS
drug AZT is a good example. Initially, it was developed for other purposes (an
anticancer drug) but was abandoned after initial pre-clinical testing proved too costly and
showed poor early results. As the AIDS epidemic came to a head in the mid-to-late
1980s, researchers were scrambling to develop new treatments. New microbiological,
metabolic, and genetic techniques in medicine enabled researchers to identify the
mechanisms of AIDS. Tackling the illness required changing the disease research
paradigm from isolation and immunization to the reduction of impairment. Medical
funding models needed to include a much broader range of research into the mechanisms
of disease.139 It was in this environment that many long abandoned NCEs were
reconsidered, such as the precursor to AZT.

(ii) Science in Approval

Science is also crucial to establishing the validity of any decision to approve a
new drug. In making these decisions, scientists at the TPD conduct a form of risk
assessment that must be based on data that establishes the drug‟s safety. When science is
ignored or undermined in this process, disastrous outcomes can result. Although the
conditions of Vioxx‟s approval in Canada are not known, in the United States, the Food
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and Drug Administration (FDA) failed to listen to the pleas of its scientists and
significant data that hinted at the drug‟s dangers.140 In Canada, in one of the few cases
where researchers have obtained the data upon which an approval decision was made,
this data was made up of a collection of studies whose methodology and results were
weak and inconclusive.141 The result was that a potentially dangerous drug was too easily
approved. Without reference to well-conducted science, any form of risk evaluation loses
its worth. Decisions become subject to political or economic justifications that have little
relation to the product‟s merit.

(iii) Science in Post-Approval

Once a product is released, it is only through systematic observation and
evaluation of its long-term safety that it may be judged worthwhile. That a product has
been used for years is no proof that it is safe.142 This product had been used for decades
and was only pulled from the market after several deaths demonstrated that the product
was potentially dangerous. This form of informed systematic observation will drive drug
availability and restriction in the market. Potentially, research and ideas about the value
of existing pharmaceuticals are adjusted as new sources of potential harm are recognized.
No product can ever be proven completely safe, and it is with vigilant observation that
the potential merits and harms of even long-familiar medications are uncovered.
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(b) Law and Policy in the Drug Life-Cycle143

Going hand in hand with the systematic observations guiding the decision-making
process are the laws and policies that clarify and solidify the rules applied to new drug
approvals. Law and policy operate at each stage of this process, creating the ways in
which regulators and law-makers have decided to address the difficulties and benefits of
new drugs. They embody the decisions, compromises, and mechanisms or institutions
through which political will is manifest. Law and policy also guide the decisions made by
those seeking the approval and marketing of new drugs, setting the stage for how science
is to be considered and which issues are assigned the greatest weight in drug safety.
Unfortunately, law and policy can often have unintended effects, creating exploitable
lacuna where it is silent or papering over areas of needed scientific inquiry.

(i) Law and Policy at Pre-Approval

At the pre-approval research stage, legal rules have served to create both the
present research environment and guide what companies consider when undertaking
clinical investigation into new drugs.144 Profitability for new drugs is tied to patent life
and marketability, and legislation guiding research funding has tended to highlight
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innovation and pairing new research with private funding.145 The sad result is that more
„me-too‟ drugs than truly novel products may be created.146 Similarly, the legal regime
has favoured increasing the speed with which new products are approved. For example,
the priority drug-approval initiative was originally designed for the speedier review of
truly novel and needed emergency treatments such as AZT.147 Unfortunately, recent
policy developments have expanded the definition of „urgent medical need‟ to include a
host of drugs which are potentially more harmful and less essential, such as Vioxx.148

(ii) Law and Policy at Approval

Laws protecting the confidentiality of data submitted for approval have created
the „black box‟ that operates at the approval stage.149 Much of the original approval data
for the 41 drugs that were withdrawn from the market from 1963 through to 2004 for
safety reasons still remains veiled.150 This has led to criticism of Canada‟s drug
regulatory process as “unnecessarily opaque”.151 Or, as one author has noted, “in
Canada, decisions to approve a drug are made behind closed doors, without public input
or access to the information used in decision-making”.152 The unconvincing reason for
this veil is tied to international trade policy protecting manufacturer data against unfair
145
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commercial use.153 International trade agreements seek to standardize the criteria that
host countries can consider when assessing new drugs for approval.154 The result is that
signatories to many international treaties are limited in the discretion that they can
exercise in developing an approval process.

(iii) Law and Policy at Post-Approval

The influence of the law is also apparent at the post-approval stage. The law is
vague about the discretion that a physician should use when prescribing a drug.
Problematically, a drug can be prescribed for any medically justifiable purpose,
regardless of whether it was approved for that purpose, in a practice called off-label
use.155 This has spawned the practice of marketing drugs for additional uses to
physicians, using a host of activities.156 Advertising is regulated by the MHPD, but they
have been slow to enforce advertising standards.157 Instead, policy interpretation of the
law has sought to rely primarily upon adverse event reporting as a barometer of
dangerous prescribing practice.

Law, policy, and science overlap continuously throughout the drug approval
process, in theory working together to put in place mechanisms to heighten the safety of
products available to consumers. Yet as will be discussed in the following chapters, there
153
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are many gaps in the use of science created by the law and many places where science
creates ambiguity such that legal and policy judgment must come to bear. It is a very
delicate balance ensuring that each is judiciously applied and adapted to the larger goal of
ensuring drug safety and efficacy.
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CHAPTER 3: REGULATING BIAS, SOUND SCIENCE AND THE CLINICAL
TRIAL

Introduction
In the following chapter, I will review the law governing the clinical trial in
Canada and demonstrate that the mechanisms in place are inadequate to ensure both
patient safety and the conduct of good, methodologically sound research. I will first
provide a brief background to the modern clinical trial. Next I will explore some of the
elements and biases that can occur in clinical research. Finally, I will appraise the law in
place to ensure that good research with robust methodology is being conducted.

TeGenero (TGN-1412): A Costly Lesson in Clinical Research
On March 13, 2006, eight healthy volunteers at the Northwick Park Hospital in
London, England took part in what was to be a routine Phase I clinical trial of a new
immunoregulatory drug TGN1412 (TeGenero[TeG]). Participants were to be
administered the first human exposure to TeG after it had previously been tested for
safety on animals. Six of the participants were given a dose of the drug, while two were
given the placebo. Within an hour all six subjects administered the drug were
experiencing horrific side effects: intense discoloration, sweating, massive swelling of the
head and neck, and finally, multiple and system-wide organ failure.158 TeG had caused an
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unforeseen physiological reaction in which the immune systems of participants began to
attack their own bodies and reject their organs.159

Few new drug products prove as lethal a toxin as TeG. It had been tested on a
variety of animals in pre-clinical trials, but since it was a drug that affected specific
human immune cells (T-cell receptors) it was difficult to extrapolate these results to
humans.160 Furthermore, researchers should have been more cautious in administering
high dosages of the drug to multiple patients in the first session without having first used
more incremental measures (i.e. as for an allergen, by scraping exposed skin).161 Yet, the
spectacular failure of TeG‟s Phase I trial has ensured that the drug will be restricted from
further development and administration to the public.162 The intended purpose of a Phase
I trial has been fulfilled, but at what cost? There are at least two lessons that can be drawn
from the TeG clinical trials. The first is that clinical testing can in fact work to detect
harm; the second is that the design of trials impacts the outcome of research.163

It would be surprising to most Canadians to learn how little is actually known
about new drugs by the time they reach their medicine cabinets. In fact, “when a new
drug is first marketed, little is [absolutely] proven about its safety and effectiveness
compared to existing alternatives”.164 We approve drugs knowing that there is a certain
degree of risk. There is no way to ensure with absolute certainty that a drug is completely
159
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safe. Instead, regulators must try to balance harm and benefit based on the best data that
is available. Even the best approval decisions must be made on a sampling of clinical
observations and, if available, data from other countries where the drug is already on the
market.165 It is impossible to capture a complete „real-world‟ picture of the effects of a
drug before it is marketed. Even accurate observations are no guarantee against isolated
adverse reactions that may occur when a drug is given to thousands or even millions of
patients.166

Obtaining the best data implies that we have the best methodology for accurately
observing the effects of drugs to approximate the conditions under which they will
ultimately be used. As Karl Popper notes in The Logic of Scientific Discovery:
There is only one way to make sure the validity of a chain of logical
reasoning. This is to put it into a form in which it is easily testable: we break
it up into many small steps, each easy to check by anybody who has learned
the mathematical or logical techniques.167
Making approval decisions as accurate as possible supposes regulatory decisions are
based on good science (i.e. making claims on safety and efficacy that are objective and
well tested, and ensuring that human reasoning is tempered by objective and systematic
observation).
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Toward a Science of Experience and Good Experimental Design
(a) The Early Evolution of Experimental Medicine

So, what are the standards for scientific validity? Even one hundred years ago a
product such as TeG might have been sold without any systematic testing for its
medicinal value or toxicity. For thousands of years, decisions about which drugs and
remedies were applied to illness came from untested experience.168 Galanic methods
relied upon the use of “bleeding, purging and drugs, often in the particularly undesirable
form of mixed drugs”169 to balance the body‟s misaligned humours. As Avorn notes:
An apprentice physician was not expected to understand data from
experiments, but to memorize concepts and recipes based on arcane humeral
relationships, regurgitating the same wrong ideas that had been passed down
from physician to apprentice over the generations.170
Under this method, there were many useless products and treatments dangerously
administered and there was little attempt to separate effective remedies from those that
might have been toxic.

Beginning with Francis Bacon in Novum Organum171 there was a “rediscovery of
the necessity of repeated experience and reporting negative facts”.172 Other theorists,
such as Locke,173 began to assert that medical practice and the administration of drugs
should be based on “actual clinical experience…a theory of experience and animal
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experimentation therapeutics”.174 The validity of claims made for treatments needed
some justification rooted in systematically repeated observations. As one author notes
during early drug use:
What was missing was a systematic way to evaluate a given treatment – not
to determine whether it makes sense, since most ineffective treatments make
sense in one system of thought or another, but whether it actually works.175
Researchers needed an easily repeatable and sound method for determining how different
treatments compared to one another.

In 1747 a Scottish naval surgeon named James Lind conducted the first recorded
comparative experiment of different treatments.176 Seeking a solution to the age-old
difficulty of scurvy (a dietary deficiency of vitamin C on long sea voyages), he decided to
try varying the diets of 12 stricken seamen. He placed two patients on six different
treatments: cider, elixir vitriol, seawater, vinegar, oranges, and lemons. In reporting his
results he observed:
The most sudden and visible good effects were perceived from the use of the
oranges and lemons, one of those who had taken them being at the end of
the six days fit for duty.177
The result was the discovery of a simple, effective, and inexpensive treatment for scurvy:
the carrying of lemons on long sea voyages.178 The genius of Lind‟s experiment was not
that he merely sought to determine the utility of a cure, but to demonstrate that it was
more useful than other existing treatments
174
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(b) Refining the Clinical Trial

It took some time for Lind‟s methods to take root. Throughout the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries there was a slow refinement of techniques used for comparing
various methods of treatment and the gradual introduction of statistics as a mathematical
method for quantifying these differences.179 In 1820, Lois introduced his influential
“métode numérique” that suggested comparisons be made between treatments to validate
their use, which codified Lind‟s methodology.180 In 1865, Claude Bernard introduced the
idea that researchers should try to hold all conditions equal and control between those
receiving different treatments, with the exception of those being tested.181 In 1923, Fisher
and Mackenzie introduced the idea that conditions being observed should be assigned
randomly to one‟s object of observation, in their case potato crops.182 In 1931, the first
wide-scale observation of varying treatments was completed using the now familiar
clinical trial format.183 Following the Second World War, it was observed that treatments
also needed to be tested against the absence of treatments (i.e., a placebo) to guard
against participants‟ expectations that a treatment is working.184
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(c) Tuskegee and the Limits of Unfettered Scientific Experimentation

While the science of clinical trials was becoming the dominant research model, a
troubling incident emerged to highlight the dangers of unfettered clinical observation. In
1932 the U.S Public Health Service (USPHS) began a clinical trial in Tuskegee,
Alabama, to determine the long-term course of untreated syphilis on black males.185 For
approximately 40 years, researchers tracked the lives of over 400 poor sharecroppers who
were suffering from the disease without providing any intervention. By the 1950s,
penicillin had become widely available and accepted as an effective treatment for
syphilis, yet researchers still did not tell subjects “they had syphilis, and [they were] not
given counselling on avoiding spread of the disease or given treatment”.186 It was only
after the press began to highlight the racist and moral exploitation of the study that it was
finally suspended in 1972.187

The course of this research suggests that unfettered scientific research on humans
cannot be justified and that “the notion that science is a value-free discipline must be
rejected”.188 Researchers had intentionally decided to observe the course of this disease in
a poor African-American population. This decision was partially based on:
speculation in the scientific literature at that time on racial differences in the
natural history of syphilis, including theories suggesting that syphilis
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affected the neurologic functions of whites and that latent syphilis impaired
the cardiovascular system of blacks.189
This rationale was contrary to the prevalent scientific literature of the day. What the
Tuskegee experiment did highlight was that sound methodology must be tempered by
moral and ethical consideration; the recognition and incorporation of these concerns into
sound experimental administration that protects participants is the second pillar upon
which good research must be based.

(d) The Modern Clinical Trial

Legislative changes in the United States and Canada requiring the demonstration
of both safety and efficacy introduced the modern era of the large drug trial.190 A clinical
trial can be defined as “a prospective study, comparing the effect and value of
intervention(s) against a control in human beings”.191 A more detailed definition is
provided by the FDAR:
a research study in respect of a drug for use in humans that involves human
subjects and that is intended to discover or verify the clinical,
pharmacological or pharmacodynamic effects of the drug, identify any
adverse events in respect of the drug, study the absorption, distribution,
metabolism and excretion of the drug, or ascertain the safety or efficacy of
the drug.192
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There are a variety of different methods for completing a clinical trial, but well designed
research shares certain qualities. As Stuart Pocock suggests:
The essence of a good clinical trial is that it provides truthful and precise
information which is relevant to the treatment of future patients…. Methods
of greatest value must be simple, reliable and readily understood by nonstatisticians.193
In formulating a clinical trial, a researcher must consider a host of factors, including but
not limited to:
(i) A written protocol
(ii) Controlled trials
(iii) Randomization
(iv) Size of trial
(v) Double blind trials
(vi) Definition of patients
(vii) Definition of treatments
(viii) End-point evaluation
(ix) Crossover trials
(x) Forms and data management
(xi) Statistical analysis
(xii) Protocols
(xiii) Monitoring of trial progress
(xiv) Ethical considerations
(xv) Multicentre trials
(xvi) Staff, responsibilities and funding
(xvii) Publication
(xviii) Truth and relevance194
The extent to which a clinical trial considers and addresses these requirements is
generally a measure of the quality of the study‟s design and the value of the conclusions
that can be drawn from its observations.
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(e) Randomized Control Trials

The most common form of clinical research used for the evaluation of new drugs
is the Randomized Control Trial (RCT). The RCT has been defined as a:
carefully and ethically designed experiment which includes the provision of
adequate and appropriate controls, by a process of randomization so that
precise framed questions can be answered.195
The RCT is seen as a good measure of a drug‟s efficacy since it enables comparisons of a
drug‟s effect with other treatments. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to go into great
detail cataloguing the variety of different methodologies employed in drug trials (i.e. case
studies, longitudinal studies, comparison group studies),196 but it will be useful to review
some of the elements of a methodologically sound RCT. Before discussing these
elements, it is essential to acknowledge that the best designed RCT usually focuses on
testing “one major objective”.197 As Pocock notes:
Of paramount importance is the need for a good idea for potential
improvement in therapy and to be able to achieve an honest and accurate
evaluation of its real worth.198
The RCT has at least three essential elements of design: randomization, blinding, and
operational variables.
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(i) Randomization

In an RCT treatment is allocated to participants by random (chance)
procedure“.199 To ensure accurate results, researchers must limit the bias that might result
from assigning participants unequally to treatments. Randomization can avoid “subjective
assignment of patients who participate in clinical trials [or limit] inequalities [in
characteristics] between treatment groups (e.g. demographic details or prognostic
variables)”.200 As Friedman notes:
Randomization tends to produce study groups comparable with respect to
known and unknown risk factors, removes investigator bias in the allocation
of participants, and guarantees that statistical tests will have valid
significance levels.201
Randomization is based on the concept that “no judgmental or systematic bias should
affect the way that patients are assigned to treatment”.202 It is based on the concept of
appropriate population sampling, where study groups are expected to encapsulate as
accurately as possible those variations which are found in the public (or a subpopulation)
at large.203

(ii) Blinding

Normally an RCT should be conducted as a double-blind procedure. This means
that neither participants nor researchers are aware of the treatments that participants are
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receiving. This is done to reduce the “bias caused by subjective judgements in reporting,
evaluation, data processing and statistical analysis due to the knowledge of the identity of
the treatments”.204 The expectation that a treatment will work can influence whether it is
perceived to be working by both researchers and participants. Allowing participants to
know that they are on a placebo or new treatment may affect their perception of its
efficacy and change measured behaviours. For some trials, such as in the case of treating
terminally ill patients, random assignment would not be ethical, and double blinding of
treatment not possible. In these instances, it may be possible to partially blind the study
by limiting the knowledge of researchers or those making clinical observations as to the
treatments assigned.

(iii) Controls

Tested control groups should be “sufficiently similar in relevant respects to the
intervention group so that differences in outcomes may reasonably be attributed to the
action of the intervention”.205 This control enables comparisons of the known to the
unknown and provides a “well-defined point, which becomes the zero or baseline of the
study”.206 It is only by including such control measures that observations can be made to
determine whether a treatment is better or equal to other treatments. For new drugs,
ideally such clinical testing should be against proven existing treatments; it is in this way
only that we can say new drugs are better than existing ones. Unfortunately, many
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clinical trials will use only a placebo (no treatment) as the control group, proving that
new drugs are only better that “no treatment at all”.207

(iv) Measurable Variables or End Point Variables

In order to determine the usefulness of a treatment it must be measured. This is
done by identifying “properties that can differentiate members of a group or set”208 and
observing how these change by varying treatment. Independent variables (IV) are
manipulated by the experimenters through assignment of participants to different drug
groups and dependent variables (DV) are measured for signs of change. When measuring
the outcome of treatment on behaviour, physiology, or illness, it is often difficult to
directly assign them a value. In these cases, a secondary measure, an end point or clinical
surrogate measure will often be used. These observations can either be qualitative (based
on observation of qualities) or quantitative (based on some measurable amount) and must
be defined before the study begins.209 End points can be a wide variety of measures
which are taken as indicators of a drug‟s effect (e.g., mobility for arthritis, blood levels
of certain hormones, or even changes in morbidity).
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(f) A Note on Hypothesis Testing and Valid Sampling

Ignoring ethical considerations for the moment, there are at least two other
qualities that characterize good clinical drug research that I would like to introduce: the
formulation of a valid hypothesis (using valid research questions) and accurate sampling.
Conducting worthwhile research means asking useful and purposeful questions. As one
author suggests:
In a concise format, the research question specifies which factors or
behaviors will be examined and what types of data will be collected…. they
must be defined objectively, so that their meaning within the context of the
study is clear….[the] hypothesis suggests how the variables are expected to
be related. This hypothesis guides the investigation and subsequent analysis
of data.210
The hypothesis and intended analysis must be defined before the commencement of the
study qualitative or exploratory research may supplement the refinement of data.211 As
Anderson notes:
the classifications of research projects into hypothesis testing and
hypothetico-deductive is of crucial importance in evaluating the reliability
of conclusions….medical investigators need to be warned against re-use of
observations. Whenever data through inductive reasoning have been used to
propose a hypothesis, new and independent observations are necessary to
test it. If data through statistical analyses are re-used to test the very
hypothesis which they served to generate, circularity and erroneous
conclusions may result.212
Science requires this form of inferential hypotheses testing; merely tailoring
interpretation after the fact does not meet a basic threshold for inductive scientific
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reasoning.213 Even worse, conducting research which addresses no hypothesis, or is so
methodologically flawed that it generates a predetermined result, is pointless and
needlessly puts the health of test subjects at risk.214

Valid sampling can best be conceived as ensuring that the subjects being observed
approximate those in the real world. As Portney notes, “an important goal of clinical
research is to make generalizations beyond the individuals studied to others with similar
conditions or characteristics”.215 Every experiment is “based on limited experience and
measurements”216 so it can only generalize its conclusion to the real world. The greater
extent to which subjects are drawn from diverse and representative populations who will
consume a drug, the more accurate the conclusions drawn regarding that drug‟s efficacy
in a given population.217 Testing an arthritis medication on healthy young volunteers
does not approximate the vast majority of those who will ultimately use the product.218
Sampling is also affected greatly by the size of a representative sample that is observed,
the general rule being, the larger the sample the better it approximates the actual
population.219
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(g) A Note on Ethical Refinement of Research

At this time I would like to caution the reader that the above described
methodologies do not operate in an ethical vacuum. All of the approaches described
above need to be modified if they are likely to produce undue harm for participants.220
Justifying a Phase I TeG trial merely because it stops a dangerous product from reaching
the larger public does not validate the harm done. Instead, it hints to the need for
refinement of elements in the research‟s design, perhaps by incremental testing.221
Likewise, randomization, blinding, end points, and tested hypotheses may also need to be
adjusted to meet ethical considerations. Randomization will often need to be modified if
over the course of a trial it is observed that some treatments represent vastly inferior or
superior treatments, or induce irreversible harm.222 Blinding may not be practical if it
unduly places psychological or emotional distress on research participants, improper
consent is not obtained or explained, or a serious adverse event is observed. End point
measures need to take into account the health of participants and be as minimally
intrusive as possible; using morbidity as an end point is not always acceptable.
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(h) Sources of Research Bias

Even with these tools of research available, there are still a host of methodological
errors that can occur during clinical research. Researchers must be ever vigilant against
bias in the generation of research models. Bias can basically be explained as “any effect
at any stage of investigation or inference tending to produce results that depart
systematically from the true values”.223 It is any factor which “deprives a result of
representative [accuracy] through systematic distortion”.224 Bias can be both positive and
negative (favouring or hindering the proof of a certain hypothesis) and skewing
observation toward specific conclusions. In designing a clinical trial, researchers must
develop a strategy for each study‟s particular design to limit bias. As Murray notes:
The investigator must look at each study carefully, consider which potential
sources of bias might apply, and then develop strategies to defend against
those sources in the context of their study.225
Generally the tools described above are designed to limit the occurrence of bias, but if
they are not appropriately and conscientiously employed they lead to poor research.

(i) Common Sources of Research Error
There are several common errors that may occur during clinical research.226 I
have already mentioned sampling errors and hypothesis testing above. Subjects must be
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recruited to represent the populations who will receive a treatment. Hypotheses must be
defined and executed by predetermined rules, as one author notes:
If even the briefest glance at a study‟s results moves the investigator to
consider a hypothesis not formulated before the study was started, that
glance destroys the probability of the evidence at hand.227
Researchers must be careful in selecting variables (end points indicating therapeutic
change) beyond one-time or limited measures, and not assume that significant statistical
changes always equate significant biological or therapeutic changes.228 Researchers must
ensure that if end point measures are qualitative (observational), then there is uniformity
among researchers taking the measurements.229 Beyond randomized assignment,
researchers must be careful to avoid any other factors (historical, demographic,
maturational) that might link participants in ways not controlled for by the study.230

There is also a host of more intentional errors that researchers may induce by
favouring certain approaches to clinical research. As one author has noted:
Several kinds of widely accepted practices should be recognized as
potentially deceptive and harmful. Some of these practices also have much
value, but at times they are inappropriate and improper and, to the extent
that they are deceptive, unethical.231
Researchers have identified a wide number of errors that seem to plague drug research.232
Drug studies may compare different treatments (drugs) at varying doses that are not truly
equivalent.233 They may conduct research over time frames that are not long enough to
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observe anything but short-term effects.234 They may abort research mid-trial that looks
as if it is going to disprove a desired hypothesis, while sponsoring those experiments
which seem to support a desired hypothesis. Researchers may analyze and report only
that data which supports their hypothesis, or test only for certain variables (e.g. not doing
liver tests in the Olivieri-Apotex study meant they would not find evidence of liver
fibrosis).235

(j) Error in the Data used in the Approval Process

One could argue that poor methodological research is not occurring in those
studies that the TPD uses for approval; but because the approval process and industrysubmitted data is not generally available for scrutiny, the truth is that we simply do not
know. In 2002, via a freedom of information request, the CBC obtained the research data
upon which the withdrawn drug Diane-35 had originally received Health Canada
approval.236 In reviewing this data, Barbra Mintzes observed:
Health Canada approved Diane-35 although it was not tested in the patient
population it was approved to treat. Nor was it tested against a placebo on
any other [comparable] treatments. Thus studies submitted … did not
establish Diane-35‟s effectiveness for its approved use.237
Of the five studies submitted for approval, only three were double blinded and two were
open label. Of the open label studies, one was merely observational of a group of
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patients on the drug, while the other was an RCT without blinding procedures. Of the
three studies conducted using double-blind procedures, two compared Diane to a control
group at an incomparable dose, while the third compared it to a contraceptive drug (not
the use for which it was seeking approval). None of these three trials included a placebo
group, tested the treatment on a group comparable to one whom the medication was
intended for, or reported outcomes for patients who withdrew early (12%-33%).238 All of
these methodological flaws weaken the conclusions that could be drawn about the drug‟s
safety and efficacy.

In 1966, JAMA ran a simple experiment. Drawing 149 articles from the most
respected medical journals, it asked statisticians to review the studies based on whether
“the conclusions drawn were valid in terms of the design of the experiment, the type of
analysis performed, and the applicability of the statistical tests used”.239 Only 44 studies
passed (28%).240 A similar study conducted 20 years later found the same result, with
only 24% of the studies surveyed passing.241 A similar study a decade later found that
only 6.8% met criteria for robust research methodology.242

Trying to limit this error is one of the essential elements of conducting ethical and
worthwhile research. As one author notes:
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No amount of statistical analysis or interpretation can overcome a design
flaw, data that results from flawed design are virtually useless, and using
them can be unethical. Obtaining useless data wastes time, money, and
effort and it can also involve the unnecessary use of human or animal
subjects.243
Just as problematic is the effect that poor research may have on treatment practice and
decisions about whether a drug should be available to the consuming public. As
Anderson suggests, “with methodologically flawed studies there is always the risk that
conclusions will not hold for future patients”.244 To the extent that approval decisions are
based on this flawed methodology, they cannot effectively be predictive of a drug‟s
safety when released to the public. Without robust scientific inquiry backing up
decisions related to risk, these decisions become meaningless.

The Law and the Regulation of the Clinical Trial
While we cannot assess the criteria and science that the TPD applies to the data it
receives with an NDS, we can look back in the process at the point where rules are
applied in governing clinical trials. Having established some of the criteria of good
research design, we can now look at those legal standards imposed on researchers to meet
these criteria in designing and implementing drug research in Canada. There is the
potential that if these rules are weak, they will allow for the creation of poor quality
research. The result would be the production of research studies for the approval process
that are not methodologically sound and are poorly indicative of a drug‟s safety or
efficacy.
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As noted in Chapter 1, there are several legal instruments that guide the design
and administration of clinical research in Canada (i.e. the FDA, FDAR, TCPS, ICH
Guidelines, and Declaration of Helsinki). A host of institutional and a few provincial
regulations and guidelines are also in operation245 as well as some international
guidelines.246 Two basic sentiments drawn from the Declaration of Helsinki underlie
much of this guidance:
Section 5. In medical research on human subjects, considerations related to
the well being of the human subject should take precedence over the
interests of science and society.
Section 11. Medical research involving human subjects must conform to
generally accepted scientific principles, be based on a thorough knowledge
of the scientific literature, other relevant sources of information and on
adequate laboratory and, where appropriate, animal experimentation.247
Section 5 implies that research cannot be justified when it abrogates the right of subjects
simply to meet the demands of science or society. Section 6 asks researchers to be
informed and design research that “conforms to generally accepted scientific
principles”.248 The concepts that human subject rights are paramount and that research
must meet current standards of scientific convention are essential to the integrity and
value of drug research.
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(a) Statutory Authority to Legislate Clinical Trials

Parliament does not directly indicate that testing of new drugs is required in the
body of the FDA. Instead it restricts the right to market the product unless certain
conditions are met. Under section 9 of the Food and Drug Act it is prohibited to:
label, package, treat, process, sell or advertise any drug in a manner that is
false, misleading or deceptive or is likely to create an erroneous impression
regarding its character, value, quantity, composition, merit or safety.249
Determining the nature of a drug requires some form of objective testing as to its
“character, value, quantity, composition, merit or safety”.250 Character (chemical
qualities), quantity, and composition of a drug will be determined by toxicology and
quality studies that are submitted with an NDS. Character (medicinal), value, merit, and
safety will be met by the submission of studies that prove the therapeutic worth (e.g.,
safety and efficacy) of the drug.

The FDA method for ensuring compliance is to limit market access for drugs
unless certain standards are met. Under section 10(1) of the FDA:
Where a standard has been prescribed for a drug, no person shall label,
package, sell or advertise any substance….unless the substance complies
with the prescribed standard.251
In establishing this standard under s.30, the Governor in Council gives broad powers to
make regulations respecting the “sale or conditions of sale of any food, drug, cosmetic or
device”.252 It specifically allows for the setting of regulations related to “the sale or the
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conditions of sale of any new drug”.253 This includes regulation to prevent the public
(purchaser or consumer) from:
being deceived or misled in respect of the design, construction,
performance, intended use, quantity, character, value, composition, merit or
safety thereof, or to prevent injury to the health of the purchaser or
consumer.254
Under s. 30(1) (l.1) this also includes regulations:
respecting the assessment of the effect on the environment or on human life
and health of the release into the environment of any food, drug, cosmetic or
device, and the measures to take before importing or selling such
[product].255

(b) The Food and Drug Regulations

From these provisions flow the Food and Drug Regulations. Division 5 of the
Food and Drug Regulations (Drugs for Clinical Trials Involving Human Subjects)
provides the following three key features:
(ci) Clear and transparent requirements of application, information,
amendments, notification, labelling, record keeping and adverse drug reaction
reporting
(cii) Introduction of an inspection system against internationally accepted good
clinical practice principles, and
(ciii) Give clear authority to refuse an application, suspend or cancel the sale of
drugs for use in clinical trials…where they do not met the updated regulatory
requirements.256
The FDAR‟s main mode of action was to “introduce regulatory requirements for the sale
and importation of drugs for use in human clinical trials”.257
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(c) The Clinical Trial Application

Before a clinical trail can commence for a drug not approved for use in Canada,
the trial‟s sponsor258 must file a Clinical Trial Application (CTA).259 The CTA is a
request for an “authorization to sell or import a drug for the purposes of a clinical trial”
and must include:
(a) A copy of the protocol for the clinical trial
(b) A copy of the informed consent form that will be given to participants
(c) The clinical trial attestation
(d) The name and contact information of any REB that has previously refused
to sanction the study
(e) A copy of the investigator‟s brochure
(f) Proposed date for the commencement of the trial.260
The details of what is to be included within the CTA are elaborated in the policy
document Guidance for Clinical Trial Sponsors: Clinical Trial Applications,261 which
more clearly identifies administrative and clinical information, chemistry and
manufacturing details, and quality data that must be submitted. The Minister or his/her
designate has 30 days to reject the application if:
(i) the use of the drug for the purposes of the clinical trial endangers the
health of a clinical trial subject or other person
(ii) the clinical trial is contrary to the best interests of a clinical trial subject, or
(iii)the objectives of the clinical trial will not be achieved262
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(i) Investigator’s Brochure

The investigator‟s brochure is a description of the information obtained regarding
a drug to date, or “a document containing the pre-clinical and clinical data on the
drug”.263 This will include: physical and chemical properties of the drug,
pharmacological aspects from animal testing, pharmacokinetic properties from animal
testing, toxicological effects from animal testing, carcinogenicity from animal testing,
and information obtained from previous clinical trials (safety, efficacy, dose response,
etc.). The brochure is intended to provide all pre-clinical tests (including animal tests and
chemical tests) and details of previously conducted clinical trials.

(ii) Clinical Trial Attestation

The clinical trail attestation provides administrative details regarding the drug and
execution of the clinical trial. These details include: title of the protocol, chemical and
brand names of the drug, therapeutic classification of the drug, medicinal ingredients of
the drug, dosage form, contact information for the sponsor (or Canadian representatives),
contact information for qualified investigators, contact information for REBs which have
given the study approval, and a statement from the sponsor. The qualified investigator
(QI), normally a physician or dentist, is:
the person responsible to the sponsor for the conduct of the clinical trial at a
clinical trial site, who is entitled to provide health care under the law of the
province where the clinical trial site is located.264
263
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The attestation statement includes undertakings that “the clinical trial will be conducted
in accordance with good clinical practices“.265

(iii) The Protocol

The protocol is a description of the study‟s scientific rationale and intended
organization. The Act defines a protocol as “a document that describes the objectives,
design, methodology, statistical considerations and organization of a clinical trial”.266
A protocol is described in the medical literature as:
a plan that details how a clinical trial is to be carried out and how data are to
be collected and analyzed. It is an extremely critical and most important
document, since it ensures the quality and integrity of the clinical
investigation in terms of its planning, execution, and conduct of the trial as
well as analysis of the data.267
It is intended to be a description of the research hypothesis, variables (measures), design
and methods, results analysis, and administrative details of the trial. As Friedman
suggests, it can be considered “as a written agreement between the investigator, the
participant, and the scientific community”.268
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(d) Good Clinical Practices

The FDAR requires that clinical trials are completed “in accordance with good
clinical practices (GCP)”.269 The Act defines good clinical practices as:
generally accepted clinical practices that are designed to ensure the
protection of the rights, safety and well-being of clinical trial subjects and
other persons, and the good clinical practices referred to in section
C.05.010.270
In defining appropriate methodology, section C.05.010 merely requires that the “trial is
scientifically sound and clearly described in a protocol”271 and conducted in accordance
with the protocol. Section C.05.010 provides some guidance as to what these acceptable
clinical practices must include. It requires written informed consent, protection of
records, REB approval, and good manufacturing and handling procedures.272 It also
requires that “medical care and medical decisions”273 are made by a qualified
investigator and that “each individual involved in the conduct of the trial is qualified by
education, training and experience to perform his or her task”.274

(e) Scientifically Sound and the Provision of a Protocol

Defining something as scientifically sound does not ensure that the best or even
appropriate methodology is employed. Instead it allows for a wide collection of
accepted practices that may or may not be scientifically robust. Many studies can be
269
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argued as sound, without taking into account the fact that the quality of clinical trials
can vary substantially. What is to be included in a protocol is delineated by Health
Canada in the Pre-Clinical and Evaluation Report Template (PCERT). Also known as
the protocol synopsis, the main thrust of this document is “a submission rationale and a
brief summary” 275 of the study‟s design and administration. The protocol must identify
such topics as trial objectives, study design, list of investigators, statistical analysis, but
does not require that sponsors demonstrate they have chosen those criteria that are most
likely to minimize bias and errors.

The main thrust of the contents of the protocol is the identification of a
justifiable methodology, rather than adherence to the most sound or accurate
methodologies in research design.276 Sponsors are asked to demonstrate that the “design
of the study should be able to support any claims related to the proposed study”.277 This
includes “the method of randomization, blinding, and the comparative agents, if
applicable”.278 It also includes identifying a sample size to be used, patient populations,
inclusion/exclusion criteria and efficacy variables (end points), but asks for little more
than a “description and validation”279 of selected criteria. Studies may appear to contain
all the properties and elements of a good protocol and still be “tainted by dubious
premises, invalid designs, unreliable data, violated assumptions, bias, erroneous
methods or faulty reasoning…. [and] faulty logic”.280
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(f) Study Protocol, Good Clinical Practices and the ICH Guidelines
(i) ICH Guidelines

Instead of specifying which methodologies are most appropriate for researchers,
Health Canada directs sponsors to the International Conference on Harmonization
(ICH) Guidelines to:
define parameters of the design, conduct, performance, monitoring, auditing,
recording analysis, and reporting of clinical trials [as a set of]
recommendations on ways to achieve greater harmonization in the
interpretation and application of technical guidelines and requirements for
product registration.281
There are three sections of the ICH guidelines which bear directly on the appropriate
methods that should be employed in clinical trials: ICH Topic E6: Good Clinical
Practices,282 ICH Topic E8: General Considerations for Clinical Trials,283 and ICH
Topic E9: Statistical Principles for Clinical Trials.284

The ICH guidelines are not law. Instead, they have been „adopted‟ by Health
Canada but are not formally incorporated into statute or regulations. They are guidance
documents meant to:
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Provide assistance to industry and health care professionals on how to
comply with the policies and governing statues and regulation. They also
serve to provide review and compliance guidance to staff, thereby ensuring
that mandates are implemented in a fair, consistent and effective manner.285
As noted in the foreword to the ICH guidelines provided by Health Canada:
Guidance documents are administrative instruments not having force of law
and, as such, allow for flexibility in approach. Alternative approaches to the
principles and practices described in this document may be acceptable
provided they are supported by adequate scientific justification.286
In effect the ICH guidelines are merely suggested practices that industry should adopt.
While investigators may be reviewed for compliance against these standards by the
Health Products and Food Branch Inspectorate (HPFBI), the ICH guidelines must be
followed only to the extent that „adequate scientific justification‟ cannot allow different
standards.

(ii) Defining Good Clinical Practices in the ICH Guidelines

The ICH guidelines provide a more detailed description of what is considered
good clinical practice. According to ICH E6, good clinical practices can be described
as:
A standard for the design, conduct, performance, monitoring, auditing,
recording, analysis, and reporting of clinical trials that provides assurance
that the data and reported results are credible and accurate, and that the
rights, integrity, and confidentiality of trial subjects are protected.287
Good clinical practices within the ICH have two components: (1) measures to assure
that the design of a study produces valuable data, and (2) measures to protect the rights
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of study participants. In formulating study design, researchers are reminded that the
“integrity of the trial and the credibility of the data from the trial depend substantially
on the trial design”.288 As such, in designing a study, researchers should provide
detailed „descriptions‟ of methods used to minimize or avoid bias, type or design of
trial to be conducted, descriptions of trial treatments, duration of treatments,
inclusion/exclusion criteria, assessments of efficacy and safety, and statistical methods
to be employed.

(iii) ICH Topic E8: General Considerations for Clinical Trials

ICH Topic E8 provides more specific detail about what should be included in
the completion of good clinical trials. It suggests that several “important principles
should be followed in planning the objectives, design, conduct, analysis and reporting
of a clinical trial”.289 Underlying these principles is a valid scientific approach in design
and analysis of studies, where:
Clinical trials should be designed, conducted and analyzed according to
sound scientific principles to achieve their objectives; and should be
reported appropriately. The essence of rational drug development is to ask
important questions and answer them with appropriate studies.290
ICH E8 asks that “the appropriate design should be chosen to provide desired
information”.291 It also provides more detailed considerations to be employed to ensure
accurate results. Subjects should be selected to represent target patient populations
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using selection criteria that are accurate.292 In designing studies, there needs to be “an
adequate control group…to minimize the likelihood of erroneous inference”.293
Selecting a sample size should account for the “the expected magnitude of the
treatment, the variability of the data, and the specified probability of error”.294
Response variables (end points) “should be defined prospectively [and] objective
methods of observation should be used”.295 These guidelines also specifically state that
randomization and blinding are preferred methods for reducing bias.296

(iv) ICH Topic E9: Appropriate Statistical Principles

ICH Topic E9 is very specific in defining appropriate statistical measures to be
incorporated into study design and analysis to ensure the statistical veracity of the
study. It catalogues the variety of different designs possible and the statistical
consideration that must be considered with each form of design and methodology. For
instance, it notes that global assessment variables (investigators‟ overall impressions)
are ultimately subjective in nature and can “lead to the results of two products being
declared equivalent despite having very different profiles of beneficial and adverse
effects”.297 Similarly, E9 cautions that “redefinition of the primary variable after
unbinding will almost always be unacceptable”.298 Yet in describing its scope and
direction, E9 states:
292

Ibid. at 3.2.2.1.
Ibid. at 3.2.2.2.
294
Ibid. at 3.2.2.3
295
Ibid. at 3.2.2.4
296
Ibid. at 3.2.2.5.
297
ICH E9, supra note 284.
298
Ibid.
293

82

The focus of guidance is on statistical principles. It does not address the use
of specific statistical procedures or methods. Specific procedural steps to
ensure that principles are implemented properly are the responsibility of the
sponsor.299
E9 is not to be considered an endorsement or value judgment regarding various
statistical methodologies that can possibly be employed; it simply provides a catalogue
of considerations that must be addressed in formulating the trial. Accounting for the
methods and design of the study, and the „procedural steps‟ necessary, are still the
responsibility and potential discretion of trial sponsors.

(v) The Protocol under the ICH guidelines

Under the ICH guidelines, the main method for ensuring that these methods are
met is still the existence of a protocol. The ICH E6 suggests that a protocol “usually
gives the background and rationale for the trial”.300 The ICH E6 also reinforces the
requirement that “the investigator should conduct the trial in compliance with the
protocol”,301 and cautions that “the investigator, or person designated by the
investigator, should document and explain any deviation from the approved
protocol”.302 The content of a protocol should reflect those considerations which will
ultimately appear in the Clinical Study Report provided with a new drug submission.
This report should draw on the study‟s original protocol to provide:
a clear explanation of how the critical design features of the study were
chosen and enough information on the plan, methods and conduct of the
study so that there is no ambiguity in how the study was carried
299
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out…[enough] to allow replication of the critical analyses when authorities
wish to do so.303
Again, researchers are given freedom in formulating the parameters under which
methodological considerations are addressed. In discussing randomization procedures,
ICH E6 indicates:
The investigator should follow the trial‟s randomization procedure, if any,
and should ensure that the code is broken only in accordance with the
protocol.304
Similarly, in defining the contents of a protocol, in section 6 the major requirement is
that researchers provide a description of the methods employed.

(vi) The ICH Guidelines in Perspective

Given that the ICH guidelines are only „guidance‟ which may be varied
“provided they are supported by adequate scientific justification”,305 it is difficult to
judge the extent to which they ensure good study design. ICH Topics E6, E8, and E9 do
suggest a series of „considerations‟ that research must take into account in designing
and implementing studies, but nowhere do these recommendations weigh the relative
scientific merit of various trial designs or suggest the most appropriate forms of
research. What they do is suggest once again that research should be conducted in
accordance with good clinical practices. Good clinical practices in turn call for the
adherence to a specified protocol and the protection of research participants. The
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protocol is a description of prospective research, justifying chosen criteria on existing
scientific principles. As will be described, sound scientific principles may allow for the
introduction of a wide collection of research which is weak yet maintains the
appearance and norms of accurate research.

(g) Further Guidance from the Tri-Council Policy Statement (TCPS)?

A third document which may give guidance regarding the employment of
appropriate methodologies in research is the Tri-Council Policy Statement on Ethical
Conduct for Research Involving Humans (TCPS).306 As noted in Chapter 1, the TCPS is
a set of ethical guidelines that provide direction for “the conduct of research involving
human subjects”.307 They are binding on any researcher or institution with researchers
who receives grants from one of the major federal research funding bodies (CIHR,
NSERCH, or SSHRC).308 Organizations which do not receive funding from any of the
councils, such as private Contract Research Organizations (CRO), may not be subject
to the TCPS.

(i) A Patient-Centred Perspective

The TCPS is based on a “subject-centered perspective” that places an emphasis
on “active involvement by research subjects, and ensuring that their interests are central
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to the project or study, and that they will not be treated simply as objects”.309 As such,
the TCPS embodies such principles as respect for human dignity, respect for free and
informed consent, respect for vulnerable persons, respect for privacy and
confidentiality, respect for justice and inclusiveness, balancing harms and benefits,
minimizing harm, and maximizing benefit.310In achieving these goals the TCPS
introduces a host of procedural and administrative requirements placed upon
researchers to protect the rights of the subject; these include obtaining free and
informed consent, ensuring the privacy and confidentiality of patient records, including
underrepresented populations in research, and minimizing conflicts of interest.311

As noted above, science cannot operate free of ethical restraint. Working hand
in hand with sound statistical and methodological study design is the requirement that
special consideration be given to participants when following standard research
practices will cause undue harm. Research in emergency health situations should only
be conducted “if it addresses the emergency needs of individuals involved”.312 Women
are not to be excluded from research “solely on the basis of sex or reproductive
capacity”.313 Embodied in each of these concepts is the fact that “modern research
ethics are premised on a dynamic relationship between ethical principles and
procedures”.314
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(ii) Clinical Equipoise and Accurate Study Design

The TCPS does acknowledge that changing research design for other reasons
than ethical considerations is not easily justified. The TCPS calls on researchers to
employ clinical equipoise in conducting research, requiring that:
…at the start of the trial, there must be a state of clinical equipoise regarding
the merits of regimen to be tested, and the trial must be designed in such a
way as to make it reasonable to expect that, if it is successfully conducted,
clinical equipoise will be disturbed.315
The TCPS defines equipoise as:
…a genuine uncertainty on the part of the expert medical community about
the comparative therapeutic merits of a clinical trial. The tenet of clinical
equipoise provides a clear foundation to the requirement that the health care
of subjects not be disadvantaged by research participation.316
Equipoise reinforces the concept that research should not be conducted needlessly,
without valid doubt as to outcome or without accurate methods in ascertaining one‟s
hypothesis. Conducting research to produce desired outcomes by tailoring variables, or
conducting research that does not take into account the scientific norms of medicine,
likely violates clinical equipoise.

(iii) The TCPS and Administration of Trials

While the TCPS does provide detailed instructions for review of the ethical
elements of a clinical trial, it does not provide direct instruction on trial
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methodology.317 The thrust of the TCPS is in the details of how a trial should be
administered and those protections that must be in place to ensure the safety, privacy,
and consent of participants. The TCPS patient-centered perspective is focused mainly
on protecting the rights of participants in research rather then ensuring the
demonstrated scientific merit of research. The TCPS looks to REBs to ensure that the
rights of research participants are not violated, to oversee the research merits of new
studies, and to a lesser extent to assess the validity of research. Yet it is arguable that
the quality and content of this research is less likely to be appraised than the
administrative measures in place to protect participant rights.

(h) The Assessment of Sound Scientific Methodologies
(i) Qualified Investigators

We are left with the question, who is in fact reviewing the quality of clinical
research conducted in Canada? The FDAR does require that research is overseen by a
qualified investigator. A qualified investigator is defined in the FDAR as
The person responsible to the sponsor for the conduct of the clinical trial at a
clinical trial site, who is entitled to provide health care under the laws of the
province where the clinical trial site [is located]318
The FDAR further suggests that “each individual involved in the conduct of the clinical
trial should be qualified by education, training, and experience to perform his or her
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respective tasks”.319 Yet the qualified investigator is not in a position to oversee the
study‟s design; instead their role is to “assume responsibility for the proper conduct of
the trial [and make] medical care and medical decisions”320 at the trial site; basically, to
ensure the safety and health of the participants taking part in the trial. Their main role,
as suggested in the ICH guidelines, is to ensure that the trial is completed “in
compliance with the protocol agreed to by the sponsor”321 and to monitor for adverse
events.

Yet qualified investigators are often pressured to not be impartial. As was
shown by the Nancy Olivieri case, there is potential for qualified investigators to be
improperly pressured by trial sponsors.322 In those situations where sponsors have a
significant financial stake in research outcomes, pressure will exist323 on qualified
investigators to generate studies that provide findings which reflect their interests. This
may include ignoring flaws in methodology, adjusting observations during the course
of a study, and even excluding data that runs contrary to desired conclusions. Even
more problematic are the financial links that often exist between qualified investigators
and sponsors. Many qualified investigators have direct or indirect links with industry
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sponsors who pay for studies.324 As was noted in Chapter 2, such industry links can be
problematic because they tend to:
redirect the orientation of research towards multiple ends, impede the
sharing of research results, lead to early termination of trials, suppress or
delay publication, produce publication bias that overemphasizes the positive
aspects of drugs, and systematically yield results that favor the products
being tested.325
In these situations, qualified investigators‟ motives, incentives, and impartiality can
become questionable.

(ii) Health Canada

Health Canada has the capacity and expertise to review clinical trials, yet they
have largely ceased to provide critical appraisals of trial design, and have come to focus
on the existence of a protocol rather than sound design before approving a new clinical
trial. Health Canada can provide a pre-CTA consultation meeting with trial sponsors in
which they can “provide guidance on the acceptability of the proposed trial(s)”.326 Part
of the CTA that they will review in advance includes sponsors‟:
(1) statement of trial design
(2) parameters, values, ranges or limits for indication(s) and clinical
use(s), patient study population(s) and routes of administration
(3) parameters, values, ranges or limits for dosage form(s), dosage
regimen(s) and formulation(s)
(4) proposed procedures and/or criteria for patient monitoring, clinical
efficacy and safety assessments, alternative treatments, premature
patient discontinuation and other considerations, as appropriate.327
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This allows for a thorough review of a sponsor‟s design and protocol by experts at
Health Canada before a clinical trial application is submitted.

Increasingly, however, Health Canada has started to conduct fewer presubmission evaluations of clinical trial design. Health Canada has moved away from
willingly assessing complete pre-clinical reports because of the volume of data to
review.328 Instead the regulator must look retroactively at study design at the time of
drug approval, and only at that data provided by manufacturers. Sound scientific
research has come to be equated with justified research, defendable selection of
methods, as articulated in an existing protocol. The protocol has come to be more a
listing of accepted common practices rather than application or quality assessment of
those practices.

(iii) Research Ethics Boards

According to the FADR, “for each clinical trial site, the sponsor [must] obtain
the approval of the research ethics board in respect of the protocol”.329 Under the
FDAR, an REB is a body “not affiliated with the sponsor”,330 whose:
principal mandate…is to approve the initiation of, and conduct periodic
reviews of, biomedical research involving human subjects in order to ensure
the protection of their rights, safety and well-being.331
328
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The composition of the REB is to include a range of experts in medicine, ethics, law,
external disciplines, a community member, and:
two members whose primary experience and expertise are in a scientific
discipline, who have broad experience in the methods and areas of research
to be approved.332
The main thrust of this review is the rejection or approval of a researcher‟s (clinicaltrial-qualified investigator‟s) protocol and consent materials. As part of this mandate,
the REB will generally review the proposed study design as well as the safeguards in
place to protect participants. Yet we are left asking how completely REBs assess the
quality of research design.333

Unfortunately, REBs in effect become the main point at which study design is
expected to be evaluated. We must ask how effective it is that a body chiefly charged
with “safeguarding the rights, safety, and well-being of all trial subjects”334 is the
primary body also evaluating the validity, soundness, and accuracy of study design. As
the TCPS notes, “the review is undertaken in local research institutions by independent,
multidisciplinary ethics committees that apply substantive and procedural norms”.335

REBs are not in fact positioned to provide unbiased (or independent) reviews of
study methodology. Often REBs do not have the expertise to assess methods nor the
processes for getting external help with design methodology review.336 As Hadskis has
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noted, “the regulatory framework for human research is marred by complexity and
inefficiency”.337 In fact, the extent to which an REB will exercise their responsibilities
depends upon:
the particular country or countries, province or provinces, and institution
or institutions that will host the research; the type of research being
conducted; the professional and institutional affiliations of the researchers,
the age and mental status of the participants; the type of information and
material collected from or about participants and the funding sources for
the research.338
This means that ultimately there is no uniform way in which REBs assess the scientific
soundness of a protocol. There is even debate as to whether REBs should be assessing
the scientific rigour or merit of study design or whether their main role is as a
“consultative body on research ethics”.339

It does not suffice to ask REBs to fulfill the role of determining if clinical
research design has sufficient validity. Ultimately the responsibility for ensuring good
design must fall on the regulator and/or the manufacturer. The SEQ standard is only as
good as the science that is provided to support it, demonstrating the value and safety of
each new drug. This is only accomplished by ensuring the appropriate scientific standards
are required by law and policy, or by monitoring more closely the quality of scientific
methodology employed by drug manufacturers.
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CHAPTER 4: AN IMPROPER BALANCING OF CONCERNS

Introduction
For the past 20 years, the dominant theme of policy and regulatory activities for
drug regulation has been limited to the safety, efficacy, and quality of the product, or the
SEQ standard. Before a drug could be approved, it had to be demonstrated to be “safe,
effective and of high quality”.340 Safety was assured by the prevention of human toxicity,
efficacy was assured by the demonstration of the drug‟s relative merit in treating
conditions, and quality was assured by following the standards of good manufacturing
practices.

The historical development of drug science and regulation has paralleled a
recognition that each of these standards must be met: first, by imposing quality standards
to prevent adulteration, secondly by imposing safety standards to ensure the safety of the
product in humans, and finally by imposing efficacy standards to ensure the product‟s
utility or relative merit. Under the current Food and Drug Regulations341 all new drugs
must demonstrate:
(e) details of the method of manufacture and the controls to be used in the
manufacture, preparation and packaging of the new drug;
(f) details of the tests to be applied to control the potency, purity, stability
and safety of the new drug;
(g) detailed reports of the tests made to establish the safety of the new
drug for the purpose and under the conditions of use recommended;
(h) substantial evidence of the clinical effectiveness of the new drug for
the purpose and under the conditions of use recommended.342
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In addition to these goals, we might include ensuring that Canadians have access to the
drugs they need and that the drugs being brought to market meet the most urgent needs.

Increasingly, policy considerations have begun to add on to the traditional drivers
guiding the approval process for new drugs. The process is becoming dominated by new
concerns for „access‟, „innovation‟ and „regulation proportional to risk‟. While not
inherently negative goals, unchecked these policy considerations have the potential for
undermining the overall SEQ standard and the scientific scrutiny applied to new drug
approvals. Even more drastically, they represent a shift away from a fear that we may be
approving unsafe drugs, in favour of a fear that we may not be approving enough
necessary drugs.

In the following chapter, I hope to describe the skewed policy goals that have
come to dominate regulatory concerns relating to new pharmaceutical products. Far from
a concentration on the safety and ultimate efficacy of the product, the drug regime has
come to be dominated by a drive for early access at all costs and a concentration on the
economic and commercial merit of new discoveries. By re-aligning policy goals to focus
on these new priorities, many regulatory actors may be moving away from their broader
mandate of protecting the health and safety of Canadians. Similarly, by making these
other elements the dominant policy concerns in drug regulation, we also potentially
weaken the quality and quantity of scientific evidence brought to bear on new drug
approvals.
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In brief, a slanted conception of innovation has meant a focus on sponsoring
realizable commercial discoveries and an emphasis on not „stifling innovation‟, rather
than sponsoring truly worthwhile or novel drug discoveries. A focus on increased market
access has meant that speed of approval has become the performance indicator rather
than thorough scientific review. By speeding up the time involved in review to assure
market access and qualifying new discoveries by their economic potential, we may erode
the ultimate value and safety of the products which reach the market.

A Relative Standard of Safe: The Faustian Bargain in the Use of Any Drug
Using any drug involves a number of trade offs. As Jerry Avorn suggests, “every
drug-use decision is a small Faustian Bargain, with risks and benefits”.343 In fact,
Faustian bargains must be made at each stage in the process that guides a drug to the
consumer. As Avorn describes:
A pharmaceutical manufacturer must decide whether to proceed with the
costly and cumbersome development of a new molecule that could be a
blockbuster product or dead end…An experimental subject must decide
whether to volunteer for a trial of a drug that could improve her health or
cause unknown hazard. A regulator must decide whether the new product
should then be allowed on the market. A physician must decide whether its
promised therapeutic value will outweigh its potential for harm. Ultimately,
the patient must decide (sometimes several times each day) whether it‟s
worth taking [a] drug as prescribed.344
Making these trade offs is difficult for all involved and often requires judgments where
absolute certainty is impossible. Balancing the unknown is always a “search for a way to
structure these trade offs so decisions [can] be made scientifically rather than….by
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gut”.345 Yet this balancing of concerns is always an imperfect process which is
predicated upon the priorities set and the questions asked.

Every medication has the potential for great good and great harm, and any drug
taken at too high a dosage or for too long will invariably prove toxic. Conversely, there
are many drugs which, when used correctly, contribute greatly to the lives of Canadians.
Antibiotics save thousands of lives each year.346 Developments in treatments for AIDS
have enabled us to enhance the lives of those suffering from the disease by decades.347
Diseases such as polio, malaria, and small pox have been suppressed (though not
eradicated) in the Northern Hemispheres by public health policies and the judicious
administration of medications and vaccines.348 A common perception is that there is a
never-ending need for new pharmaceuticals, and as one author notes:
people will always need medicine, and the demographic tilt of the population
promises even faster growth as more and more…reach the age of arthritis,
osteoporosis, Alzheimer‟s and other ailments.349
Drugs have the potential to treat a dizzying number of conditions and potentially address
many of the discomforts that come with being ill.

It must be remembered that drugs are foreign substances usually not naturally
found in the body in the quantities and concentrations at which they are often
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administered. Drugs can be described by their selective toxicity, hopefully targeting one
condition while minimally affecting normal functioning.350 There is great danger in
lightly tinkering with the body‟s delicate homeostasis, even when that homeostasis is out
of balance. Predicting harm can be problematic and danger may result from “an
exaggeration of the very effect the drug was intended to have, but sometimes the harm
seems to come from out of the blue”.351 There will always be a level of uncertainty
associated with the administration of a medication. It is only with caution that a
potentially toxic substance should be approved for wide-scale consumption.

In Canada it is assumed that the role of a drug regulator is to help make these
Faustian decisions more informed, based on considerations of a product‟s SEQ. Initial
activities of the regulator, rooted in the criminal power to prevent false and misleading
advertising352, have expanded (through regulation and policy guidance) to include a
broader health promotion and health protection role.353 As a trade off against immediate
access to all products, it is assumed that products available on the market have been
conscientiously reviewed for their ultimate safety and utility. It is also assumed that this
review in effect mitigates the toxicity of new drugs, by weighing their overall merit for
treatment and mitigation of disease. Without this mitigating role, the regulator‟s oversight
of new drugs becomes diminished if not meaningless.
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Balancing the Appropriate Concerns for Regulatory Oversight of New Drugs354
Traditionally the drug approval process has balanced four competing concerns:
(1) ensuring that products reaching the market are safe for consumption (safety), (2)
proving that these products have the effect claimed (efficacy), (3) sponsoring the
development of new drugs (innovation), and (4) allowing for the distribution of these
drug discoveries to the widest number of needy patients as soon as is practicable
(access).355 Safety and efficacy are generally achieved under the aegis of clinical
investigation of new products. Innovation and access should be achieved by sponsoring
valuable or needed drug discoveries and ensuring that drugs get to patients without undue
delay. Ensuring that these criteria are balanced appropriately can be very precarious.
Often efficacy and innovation will pull toward quicker access and fewer market
restrictions, while safety and efficacy will pull toward more rigorous oversight and
market restriction. While these goals may lead to different priorities, we must be careful
that no one aim comes to dominate the others. If regulators afford one of these concerns
too much importance, the approval process becomes skewed.

At its most basic, safety means demonstrating that a drug is not toxic. Regulators
must ensure that new products entering the market are not inherently noxious substances
that will overly harm the majority of those who consume them.356 In practical terms, this
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means identifying “a level of risk judged so small as to be insignificant or [at] a level of
risk deemed acceptable in a specified situation”.357 Early phase clinical trials are the
intended mechanisms for identifying the most hazardous potential outcomes for a drug
trial. Pre-clinical testing on animals will generally identify products which are outright
poisonous. Phase I studies in volunteers will help identify negative unforeseen effects the
drugs might have in humans, while Phase II and Phase III studies will demonstrate the
effects of the drug on representative populations. These studies generate surrogate end
points, or measures of the drug‟s effect over a short time, which are used to extrapolate
the long-term effects of the drug. Latent toxicity, subtle impairments, or effects which
take a longer time to manifest often will not become evident until the drug has been
consumed by a larger population.

Efficacy is the demonstration that a drug has the effects that it purports to have. It
is important that a drug not only be shown safe to consume, but also that it be shown as
effective.358 In order to show that a drug is useful it should demonstrate: “the benefit to
be achieved, a medical problem giving rise to the use of the drug, the population affected,
and conditions under which the technology is used”.359 As Henry Waxman has noted,
“safety and effectiveness are related inextricably, it is meaningless to say that a drug is
„safe‟ except in relation to a specific demonstrated benefit”.360 Safety and toxicity must
be measured partially by the justification for introducing a foreign substance to a subject.
357
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The later stage clinical trials, Phase II and Phase III, are designed to determine the
relative effectiveness of new drugs, compared to existing or no therapies. In the case of
many non-life threatening illnesses, patients receiving a new medication are simply
compared to those receiving no treatment at all, in a placebo trial.361 Demonstrations of
efficacy have also been criticized for focusing on “measures of morbidity and mortality,
with less consideration given to life expectancy or psychosocial and functional
factors”.362

As Perrin notes, “sick people need to have access to effective drugs”.363 Access
can best be described as the concern that administrative processes for new drug approvals
not be so overly convoluted or lengthy as to prevent drugs from reaching the patients who
need them. Access is a double-edged sword because it “embodies the often conflicting
interests of personal autonomy and the need to protect or promote the general good”.364
The Therapeutics Access Strategy (TAS) is a set of internal changes at the TPD designed
to streamline the approval process, by harmonizing with international standards and
placing a limit on the time that reviewers may take in evaluating NDS.365 Using the Cost
Recovery Initiative (CRI),366 industry now pays for half of the cost of new drug
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approvals,367 which in theory allows for greater investments into the infrastructure at the
TPD and speeds up approvals.

Equally important is that drug regimes sponsor the development of innovative and
needed new drugs. This requires the prioritizing of projects, sponsorship of worthwhile
research, funding for developing this work, and incentives for researchers to undertake
these tasks. Funding innovative drug research has increasingly come to be equated with
the commercial viability of the final product.368 CIHR‟s „cycle of innovation‟ seeks to
sponsor:
[a] journey from the laboratory to the marketplace, a journey that enhances
lives by offering new ways to prevent, diagnose and treat diseases
effectively and profitably.369
The incentive for innovation is found in intellectual property law which “guarantees
innovator companies ample periods of market exclusivity to recover R&D costs”.370 In
the end, innovation is seen as a mechanism that uses the market to direct researchers to
the most lucrative drugs, rather than a process for sponsoring research into the most
valued or needed new drugs.

To all of these elements we might add an additional and often overlooked goal
that binds them all together: the greater social good. In order for government to justify its
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intervention, it aims to demonstrate that it is serving those in whose interest it is
regulating. Regulators should make decisions on the basis of the safety, efficacy, and the
public interest. Presently this is not always the case. Innovation and access have come to
be played off against safety and efficacy; the drivers behind the first two are often
economic, while the drivers for the second are commonly public safety. In the following
section, I will discuss how an innovation policy that focuses purely on sponsoring
economic development is eroding drug science and public safety. Next, I will discuss
how access has come to equate less the provision of useful new drugs than the allowance
of industry and private interests to push for decreased scrutiny of new products. I will
reserve a wider discussion of safety and efficacy standards until the next chapter.

Weakening Science by Over-Emphasizing Access
Arguments around access fall along a continuum, with speed of approval traded
off against safety and efficacy assurance. At one extreme of this argument is the
libertarian, market-access belief that there should be no state-imposed intervention on the
availability of new drugs to consumers. Under this conception, free markets will
determine the success or failure, and consequently, safety, of new drugs. At the other
extreme is a full precautionary prohibition against all new drugs until it has been
conclusively demonstrated that they are safe and efficacious. It is a precarious balance
that regulators must strike, ensuring that a drug‟s safety and efficacy are adequately
reviewed while not unduly restricting access. Regardless, regulators must always be
given adequate time and sufficient evidence to ensure that they are making appropriate
decisions.
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Increasingly, the focus of access in the drug approval process means less and less
the provision of fully assessed products for SEQ; instead, it simply means speedy
approval for all drugs.371 The result is that traditional prudence in safety standards is
being pre-empted to meet targeted approval times.372 The result is a reduction in the
amount of time and scrutiny that is applied to research for approval.373 Plunging headlong
into the promise of new treatments, we may fail to ask: What exactly are the risks of
these new drugs? In exchange for what added benefit? And how do we know? How do
we judge patient need and treatment value or utility? Inherent in these questions is the
conflict of “safeguarding the consumer from potential harm against the freedom to
choose a course of treatment”.374

(a) Conceptualizing the Problems Underlying Access – A Drug Lag?

As noted in Chapter 1, the approval process for new drugs in Canada is a closed
process. New drug approvals are usually made “without public input or access to the
information used in decision-making”.375 This has led to criticisms that approvals are
“unnecessarily opaque….[and] should set new standards of access to information at all
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stages of the drug review process, enhancing transparency and public confidence”.376
Joel Lexchin has further criticized this poor access to information:
deprived of any independent access to information, health professionals and
the public must accept the TPD‟s judgments about safety and
effectiveness.377
It is difficult to determine which factors regulators are using in determining the needs of
patients to access new drugs.

Critics argue that increasingly this limited public openness means new drugs are
often approved on the basis of weak scientific evidence and less than thorough
investigation. One investigation which assessed the studies used to approve a withdrawn
product found that:
[the drug] was not tested in the patient population it was approved to treat,
nor was it tested against placebos or any other [comparable] treatment. Thus
the studies submitted to Health Canada did not establish [the drug‟s]
effectiveness for its approved use.378
Instead of focusing on science, a skewed concept of access is shifting the way in which
Health Canada reviews new drugs. As Lexchin has noted:
The organization [TD] has accepted the language and, more importantly,
the ideology of the private sector and has tailored its activities to ensure
that, in the language of its own Business Transformation Strategy „it
reduce[s] the administration burden on business‟. We need new and better
drugs to improve the treatment that people receive, but not at the expense
of downplaying safety, as is now the case.379
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What are the potential implications when a health regulator‟s policy begins to formulate
approaches to drug review and access based on the administrative burdens placed on
business?

Increasingly, business conceives of drug access in terms of the lag that occurs as a
result of the approval process. They argue that the “drug lag [represents a virtual] ban on
new drugs” 380 in Canada that prejudices the patient. At its extreme, this conception of
access involves the assertion that there should be no government barriers to patients using
those medications that they voluntarily decide to consume. Any delay in access is
inappropriate. They suggest that “manufacturers [should] have the sole responsibility of
convincing physicians and patients that they should use any new drug”.381 These
proponents of drug lag assert that the true solutions to access involve privatizing review,
speeding up approval, relying upon user fees (industry paying for approvals), and
increasing reliance on the U.S. approval process.382 Under this conceptualization, safety
and efficacy are best overseen by market forces, with informed consumers “disciplining
the pharmaceutical market”.383
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(b) Letting the Market Decide

From the perspective of many pro-industry lobbyists, “expeditious approval of
useful and safe new products…can be as important as preventing the marketing of
harmful or ineffective products”.384 John Graham of the Fraser Institute argues that postmarket approval is a virtual ban to consumers and that “lengthening the time new
medicines are automatically banned only reduces the timelines of new information about
their possible adverse effects”.385 According to this argument, the best way to determine
the safety and efficacy of new drugs is by testing them on the consuming public.
According to Graham, “informed patients could then use the drug while patients who
were ignorant or more averse to risk would veer away from it”.386 Reducing approval
times ensures that the market can make the appropriate adjustments to the demand for a
drug, based on patients‟ awareness of the drug‟s safety.

Letting the market determine drug safety and efficacy is ethically problematic for
at least three reasons. The first is the expectation that a degree of harm should be inflicted
on the consuming public to determine a drug‟s effects. If there is an opportunity to
prevent such harm a priori, there is an obligation on government to minimize it.
Secondly, there is an assumption that post-release adverse event reporting is effective in
determining the dangers of drugs on the market. Organizations such as the MHPD (the
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agency in Canada which monitors ADR) are consistently underfunded387 and adverse
events are chronically underreported.388 Finally, there is an assumption that consumers
have the capacity to inform themselves of the merits of new drugs. Aside from the host
of intentional misinformation regarding the true merits of pharmaceuticals,389 this
assertion fails to take note of the disparity in knowledge related to drug use between
those who provide medicines (physicians) and those who consume them (patients).

(c) The Government’s Strategy: Equating Access with Speedy Approval

The government has adopted a strategy which favours a definition of access
conceived in terms of a perceived drug lag. In the 2002 Speech from the Throne, the
Government of Canada pledged $190 million to help:
speed up the regulatory process for drug approvals to ensure that Canadians
have faster access to the safe drugs they need, creating a better climate for
research in pharmaceuticals while preserving the principle that safety is
paramount.390
According to Health Canada:
improving access to therapeutics in Canada is a high priority … that
includes not only getting them to market, but also removing barriers that
affect public access to health products once they make it to the
marketplace.391
387
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Yet we are left wondering whether improving access can preserve the principle that
safety is paramount. No longer is access being associated with getting safe, effective and
promising drugs to market; it is now conceived as getting all new drugs quickly to
market,392 regardless of therapeutic merit.

As articulated in the recent policy document Access to Therapeutic Products: The
Regulatory Process in Canada, it seems that policy-makers accept that rapid access is
necessary:
From a public policy perspective, the rationale for rapid access…. is simple.
Good health benefits everyone. In opinion polls, individuals say it
contributes significantly to their quality of life. And governments value it
because the nation as a whole benefits socially and economically when
everyone enjoys the best possible health.393
Does speedier access truly equate greater health benefits? Is it possible that seeking to
accelerate the rate of approval might erode the scientific scrutiny of new drugs and place
the health of Canadians at risk?

The average time for new drug approvals in Canada over the past decade has been
just under 22 months or 642 days.394 This is slightly longer than most other G8 countries
(except Italy and Japan), including the United States.395 Pro-industry lobbyists argue that
this is evidence which “shows that the policy of automatically banning new medicines
392
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harms Canadians far more than it helps them”.396 In their eyes, this delay in approval
times prevents patients “from getting medicines that are invented as quickly as they
would prefer”.397 Yet, this perspective must be tempered by a healthy scepticism, as
Lexchin notes:
From the point of view of return on investment, industry preoccupation with
time lines makes perfect sense; whether that preoccupation is warranted
from a public health point of view is another question.398
Recognizing that it takes longer to approve a drug does not equate acknowledgment that
this delay is a health crisis. It is only in the most severe cases and with the most
therapeutically meritorious new discoveries that restricting the public from immediate
access causes extensive harm, and there are mechanisms for rapid release (SAP).

(i) The Therapeutic Access Strategy (TAS)

In 2003, the federal government enacted the Therapeutic Access Strategy (TAS)
to help achieve the goal of greater public access to new drugs. The original aim of the
TAS was twofold:
(1) to ensure that human drugs and other therapeutic products are as safe
as possible, accessible, of high quality, therapeutically effective, and used
properly; and,
(2) to make access both timely and cost-effective.399
In articulating a vision for the final outcome of this process, much weight was placed
upon re-orienting the whole regulatory process toward efficiency and speed in approvals:
396
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In a shrinking world, the pace of scientific and technological change, and
the speed of innovation mean that the regulatory system must be ready to
keep up -- to ensure that Canadians have timely access to new advances in
health products, foods, therapies and health technologies, both from Canada
and around the world.
This means taking a close look at how we regulate…In the short term, we
need to focus on how to move submissions through the review process
faster, while still maintaining high standards of safety. The goal is a review
system that is timely, consistent, predictable and of the highest quality.400
These goals were gradually morphed into the concrete policy outcomes of:
(1) …improving the timelines and transparency of the review process for
therapeutic products…(2) enhancing post-market surveillance… (3)
improving access to appropriate and cost-effective drug therapies for
Canadians.401
These guidelines seem to indicate a policy shift toward quick approval followed
by determination of long-term safety on the consuming public, despite the fact
that “availability and wide use are not guarantees of a drug‟s safety”.402
Under TAS, a host of new initiatives have been introduced, such as the Drug
Products Database (DPD),403 Summary Basis of Decisions (SBD) Database,404 and ADR
Med Effects Database,405 which have the potential for increasing access to the details of
new drug discovery. Still, these efforts have been partial and incomplete. Instead the
focus of TPD‟s short term strategy has been “beating the backlog…reduce[ing] the
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backlog of new drug submissions”.406 At the same time it is readily admitted that there
are “remaining gaps” in achieving the long-term goals of “accelerating access to
breakthrough and non-prescription drugs [and] strengthening evaluation of real-world
safety and effectiveness”.407

Under the TAS, “product submissions are now managed as „projects‟… that are
planned, coordinated, and managed, to meet performance targets”.408 The main barometer
by which the success of meeting these targets is measured is speed of approval. The
Regulatory Review of Pharmaceutical, Biologics and Medical Devices 2005 Annual
Summary of Performance409 conceives of performance strictly as “significant progress
made in eliminating the review blockage and towards issuing review decisions within
performance targets”.410 Nowhere is safety mentioned. The TPD now sets a performance
target for review, including processing, screening, and review, at 180 days for standard
drug reviews.411 As noted in the introduction to the report:
Compared with the year 2003, median authorization times have improved
for new pharmaceuticals drugs, dropping by 33% and 29% respectively, for
Brand name, Priority and Standard drugs.412
This means that the average time to approve brand name standard pharmaceuticals in
2005 was 18.3 months compared with 28.8 months the year before, which represents a
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drastic drop of 10 months. One is left wondering what potential accuracy in the review
process is lost, given such a sharp drop in the time spent reviewing new drugs.

It is interesting to note that in order for the TPD to achieve its goals of reducing
the drug approval backlog, “the number of interim decisions issued increased by 53%
since 2003”.413 Interim decisions represent a form of approval with the condition that
manufacturers provide additional information at a later time. The usual reasons for
interim decisions are “deficiencies with respect to the regulatory requirements for market
authorization”.414 Still, regardless of these deficiencies, the TPD is increasingly willing to
issue approvals for incomplete applications in order to meet timelines. The ultimate
question is whether these deficiencies in product applications might represent gaps in the
proof or quality of information submitted for approval.

Part of conceiving of drug approval as a project or deliverable involves placing
part of the cost for approval on industry. In 1995, the federal government introduced
regulations to charge industry a portion of the cost for new drug approvals.415 It was
believed that these would offset labour, operations, program, and administrative overhead
costs.416 In 2004, the User Fees Act417 (UFA) was passed, which “establish[ed] a link
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between performance and new fees”.418 Section 1(f) of UFA419 required approval times
to:
establish standards which are comparable to those established by other
countries with which a comparison is relevant and against which the
performance of the regulating authority can be measured.420
In the case of drug approval times at TPD, this means comparison with international
standards, mainly those of the United States. Government bodies charging user fees were
also required to report “performance standards in accordance with 1(f) as well as the
actual performance levels that have been reached”. In 2005, 66% of regulatory decisions
were issued within targets, compared to 39% in 2004, and 13% in 2003.422 Under UFA,
the TPD is functionally trying to exponentially increase the pace of new drug approvals.

In 1999-2000, the Therapeutic Product Program Cost Recovery Initiative
accounted for over 50% to 70% ($34.7 million) of the TPD‟s cost for reviewing new
drugs.423 Under the current Drug and Medical Devices Cost Recovery Program, this
figure still accounts for a full third of TPD‟s operating costs.424 When so much of internal
revenue comes from industry, there is a temptation to view them as your clients or
stakeholders, and to forget that your true client is the public whose safety has to be
ensured.425
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If we look to the U.S., whose standards Canada is often trying to replicate,426 we
might be wary of the potential dangers of cost recovery. At the FDA, cost recovery has:
impaired reviewers‟ ability to assess drug safety impartially by fostering a
frenetic atmosphere in which the pharmaceutical industry is viewed as the
customer and scientific debate is discouraged.427
David J. Graham, the scientist who eventually exposed the dangers of Vioxx , reported
that he was repeatedly told to consider “the industry our client”428 and keep his concerns
silent. He went on to suggest that a common perspective at the regulator is to consider
themselves “not there to serve the public...[instead] an institution that has become a
factory for the approval of new drugs [where] safety is not a consideration”.429

The drive at the TPD to reduce drug approval times seems quixotic, since there
already exist two programs, the Priority Drug Review (PDR) and the Special Access
Program (SAP), whose purposes in theory are to ensure that those drugs which are most
needed or have significant therapeutic merit can reach patients quickly. Under PDR,
there is to be a fast-tracking of reviews for drugs that meet the criteria of being:
Effective treatment, prevention or diagnosis of a disease or condition for
which no drug is presently marketed in Canada; or,
A significant increase in efficacy and/or significant decrease in risk …over
existing therapies…[that]is not adequately managed by a drug marketed in
Canada.430
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Priority review of NDS is to take a maximum of 215 days, including processing,
screening, and review. The SAP is designed to ensure that specific patients can gain
quick access to drugs unavailable in Canada. As Health Canada indicates:
The Special Access Programme (SAP) allows practitioners to request access
to drugs that are unavailable for sale in Canada [for] patients with serious or
life-threatening conditions on a compassionate or emergency basis when
conventional therapies have failed, are unsuitable, or are unavailable.431
The SAP is intended as patient specific, case by case approval, and does not equate a
wider release of a drug. The PDR and SAP programs administered correctly should in
theory deal with specific cases of drug lag.

Unfortunately, neither the PDR nor SAP is being administered to meet their
original objectives. A host of new drugs which hardly represent “significant increases”
over existing therapies or valuable new managements for diseases are being approved
using the PDR. Vioxx was approved using a priority review, even though it was
demonstrated to not be a significant improvement over existing arthritis therapies.432 At
the same time, the SAP is also being exploited. In 2006 a CMAJ letter indicated that 67%
of all SAP requests are for silicon breast implants unavailable in Canada.433 At the same
time, six of the article writers‟ applications and appeals for novel HIV drug therapies
treating end-stage AIDS patients were denied. This has led the authors of this article to
plead:
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Without disparaging the difficulties experienced by women needing breast
implants, we cannot contain our moral outrage at the ineffectiveness of the
SAP in dealing with truly life-threatening matter[s].434

(ii) Is there a Drug Lag in Canada?

How great is the Canadian drug lag in the approval of essential new drug
discoveries? A 2003 study comparing drug approval times for 268 drugs in both Canada
and the U.S. from 1992 to 2002, found an average difference of a little over six months
(642 days in Canada versus 454 days in the United States).435 For those drugs which
underwent priority review in both countries (28 in total), there was a little less than three
months difference (Canada at 256 days and the US at 182 days). For those drugs that the
PMPRB would have labelled as breakthroughs or substantial improvements (26 in total),
there was a little over five months difference (Canada at 476 days and the U.S. at 318
days). While three months and five months respectively do represent a delay for essential
new discoveries, it is dubious that they truly represent a “ban on prescription drugs”.436
In fact, for four of the most prescribed classes of drugs, there was little difference in
approval times at all; for cardiovascular drugs, it was 760 days in Canada versus 722 days
in the U.S., for psychiatric drugs, 1058 days in Canada versus 1024 days in the U.S., for
central nervous system drugs, 567 days in Canada versus 554 days in the U.S., and for
anti-cancer drugs, 427 days in Canada versus 385 days in the U.S..
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(iii) Speed at the Expense of Safety?

At the same time, the U.S. withdrew twice as many of its approved drugs (12 in
total) for safety reasons as Canada (6 in total). A difference of only six drugs may seem
small, but as Lexchin reminds us:
It is necessary to look beyond the raw numbers to judge the magnitude of
the problem of unsafe drugs. Large numbers of people, including vulnerable
groups, were exposed to some of these products.437
In Canada, if only 0.1 per cent of the population used a dangerous drug, then roughly
over 400,000 patients may have been exposed to potential harm. Lexchin has also noted
that as Canada has increased the speed of its approval times over the past forty years in
general, it has witnessed an increasing number of drugs withdrawn for safety reasons (41
from 1964 to 2004, with 16 since 1993).438 Other studies have shown that “shortened
review times were associated with increases in adverse drug reaction[s], hospitalizations
and death[s]”.439 This is occurring at the same time as the number of new or truly novel
products entering the market is decreasing.440 A recent study by Lexchin, has shown that
increased speed of approval at TPD, especially for those approved near the end of the
mandatory approval time, has resulted in increased market removal of products post
market.441
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(d) True Access for Patients

The best approach to new prescription drugs is ensuring that scientific and safety
standards are not sacrificed in the pursuit of speedier access. According to Health
Canada‟s own website:
Health Canada plays an active role in ensuring that you have access to safe
and effective drugs and health products. The Department strives to maintain
a balance between the potential health benefits and risks posed by all drugs
and health products. Our highest priority in determining the balance is
public safety [emphasis added].442
Purposeful access also requires “rigid standards...to protect against serious harms”.443 As
Perrin notes, this is because “terminally or seriously ill patients are particularly
vulnerable to exploitation, especially in the absence of alternative therapies”.444 Making
determinations as to the relative value of new products involves delving deeper into the
benefits that drugs are likely to provide. Simply assuming that our regulatory structure
should allow for all drugs to be offered more expediently may skew the balance between
potential benefits and risks toward questionable benefits in favour of unnecessary risks.
Part of the access discussion should require determining the relative need and value of
new drugs.

Conceptually, the rationale behind faster approval times is to ensure that
necessary drugs reach the patients who need them. It does little good to speed up the time
in which new drugs reach the market if they do not ultimately improve the lives of
patients. Regulatory mechanisms in place (throughout Health Canada) should ensure that
442
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necessary drugs are being produced, that they are not prohibitively expensive or
inaccessible, and that patients are given a voice to influence policy-makers‟ decisions
about which drugs are important. Upon closer inspection, it is apparent that many of these
goals are not being achieved. New drugs are far more synonymous with „me-too‟
products, while drugs that are truly valued or needed are often not produced.445

(i) ‘Necessary’ or Me-Too for New Drugs

Defining necessary drugs has become a difficult task. Currently, there is a culture
in which great efforts are made “to convince health-care professionals that their products
should be used for an ever-expanding range of symptoms”.446 As Goozner notes:
Physicians prescribe medicines at a breakneck pace to an aging, overweight, and
out of-shape American people suffering from (to judge from prescription patterns)
in near epidemic proportions high cholesterol, high blood pressure, allergies,
depression, arthritis, and diabetes.447
Manufacturers strive to “change the way people think about their common ailments to
make natural processes need medical treatment”.448 This is occurring along with
additional evidence that “more care doesn‟t necessarily mean better care”.449 On the
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contrary, research suggests that “there is strong evidence that behavior and environment
are responsible”450 for most preventable illness.

There is little incentive for drug manufactures to produce drugs that treat rare
illnesses, affect only limited numbers of people, are politically controversial, or are
targeted at poor populations. A recent study looking at tropical infectious diseases, the
diseases which kill the largest numbers of people, found that of 1393 drugs developed
from 1975 to 1999, only 16 targeted these diseases.451
As the study‟s authors note:
Despite impressive advances in science, technology, and medicine, society
has failed to allocate sufficient resources to fight the diseases that
particularly affect the poor… Market prospects and return on investment
dictate the pharmaceutical industry‟s investments, leaving many medical
needs unmet.452
In those jurisdictions where Orphan Drug regulations have been introduced to sponsor the
development of needed pharmaceuticals, drug manufacturers have tended to exploit gaps
in this legislation to introduce more quickly products that have potentially large off-label
markets.453

In the case of drugs for which there is little political or financial desire to seek
approval, little can be done to force a manufacturer to introduce the drug to market. The
case of RU-486 is a good example. Listed on the WHO‟s Model List of Essential
450
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Medicines, RU-486 (Mifepristone) is an early term abortion pill that can be taken orally.
It often represents the least intrusive and safest method by which an abortion can be
completed. Unfortunately, it is unavailable in Canada simply because no drug
manufacturer is willing to submit a NDS for its use, due to fear of political and economic
reprisal. In fact, manufacturers have stated that they “won‟t apply to market the drug in
Canada until they are invited to do so by Health Canada to ensure they won‟t face a
hostile government”.454 Without a willingness from manufacturers to submit the product
for approval, there is no way to employ the regulations to gain wide-scale approval for
the drug.455

The struggle over how to define a serious illness that warrants special attention or
drugs is subject to a host of external pressures. If policy-makers are to appropriately
apply priority review or sponsor faster approval times, they must identify those drugs
which patients are actually asking for. The main groups through which these voices are
heard are Patient Advocacy Groups (PAG) or Health Advocacy Groups (HAG).
Unfortunately, it is difficult for policy-makers to determine which of these organizations
are expressing legitimate patient concerns and which are simply mirroring the desires of
industry. As Sharon Batt suggests, untangling the interests which influence the PAG and
HAG can be difficult:
The close correspondence of advocacy groups views with those of their
industry sponsors suggests this empowerment is more illusory than real….
Is it coincidental that pharma-funded groups focus their criticisms of
government on issues like „drug-lag‟, access to new drugs …while groups
independent of the industry critique government partnerships with industry
454
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that have weakened the government‟s monitoring of drug safety and
misleading claims?456
Drugs like RU-486 are unlikely to receive funded patient advocacy, compared to new
treatments for arthritis or dementia.457 This presents an uneven voice to regulators, who
may come to conceive of need purely in terms of those lobbies which are most active
and, ultimately, well-funded.

The truth is that understanding access in terms of true need means “having
independent information about diseases and their treatments, and tools to critically
analyze a problem”.458 A focus purely on the speed of approval has the potential to
reduce the quality of scrutiny that is brought to bear on new drug approvals and,
ultimately, to imperil patient safety. As Sharon Batt notes:
the push to speedy drug approvals detracts attention and resources from the
careful drug review and post-market surveillance needed to assure drug
safety.459
Conceiving of access in terms of speed is particularly problematic when we fail to
distinguish between “„breakthrough‟ drugs and those that offer little or no therapeutic
advantage over existing drugs”460 or when we are continually substituting “newer, more
expensive medications for older, less expensive ones”461 with little increase in therapeutic
merit.
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The erosion of access into a frenetic race to increase approval times for new
pharmaceuticals also means that safety potentially suffers. While it is possible that
increased approval times may be accomplished without a decrease in the scrutiny applied
to new drug approvals, the U.S. example indicates that this is unlikely. Instead,
emphasizing speed of approval and relying upon industry funding places pressures on the
TPD to favour new drug approvals. It behoves us to remember that:
All medicines can cause harm as well as benefit. Without systematic
scientific evidence of benefit, no harmful effect, however rare, is worth the
risk.462
Access that is narrowly defined in terms of speed of approval loses sight of this key
principle, and potentially favours weak science over good science.

Weakening Science by Emphasizing Innovation?
Sponsoring new drug development is essential to ensuring that the
potential benefits of prescription drugs are achieved. In principle, this means that
incentives and sponsorship should serve to encourage the research and
development of drugs that are truly novel and useful. The extent to which any
regulatory regime sponsors the development of such drugs can often be a measure
of its success at addressing pressing health and societal needs. It can also be a
measure of the degree to which it sponsors truly useful scientific discoveries and
the advancement of medicine. Yet we must be cautious about conceiving of the
value of new discoveries too narrowly; in doing so, we lose sight of the true value
of new drugs, weaken science, and imperil the safety of the public.
462
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(a) Defining Innovation

Much of our modern regulatory framework and the rationale for current
drug policy is predicated upon sponsoring „innovation.‟463 Yet it is not with ease
that we define this amorphous term in the policy context. The Oxford English
Dictionary defines innovation as:
the action of innovating; the introduction of novelties; the
alteration of what is established by the introduction of new
elements or forms; and,
the action of introducing a new product into the market; a product
newly brought to the market.464
Increasingly, the conceptualization of innovation that policy- and law-makers
have adopted has come to reflect the second definition, which reflects a narrowing
of the value of discovery to its economic and financial impact on the Canadian
economy.465 As Pazderka and Stegemann suggest, this favours a:
„linear model‟ of innovation postulat[ing] a sequence running from
basic research (science) to applied research and, eventually, product
development and marketing.466
Such a conceptualization may erode the public interest, with “the subordination of
science to the economy”.467
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On February 12, 2002, the federal government introduced Canada’s
Innovation Strategy468 with two policy documents: Achieving Excellence:
Investing in People, Knowledge and Opportunity469 and Knowledge Matters:
Skills and Learning for Canadians.470 These were the result of a policy which for
decades had been moving toward equating the value of scientific developments
with the economic product of research471 and achieving excellence focused on
“strengthen[ing] our science and research capacity…to ensure that knowledge
contributes to building an innovative economy”.472 Through the lens of this
policy, innovation became how:
knowledge is applied to the development of new products and services
or to new ways of designing, producing or marketing an existing
product or service for public and private markets. The term
“innovation” refers to both the creative process of applying knowledge
and the outcome of that process… [and] has always been a driving
force in economic growth and social development.473
Innovation in health research and development was now designed to “contribute
to the economic competitiveness, effectiveness of public services and policy, and
quality of life of Canadians”.474
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How is innovation to be measured in the development of new
pharmaceutical products? Not, as one might expect, in the novelty and utility of
the medicines produced, but rather, in the extent to which they have the capacity
to generate economic enterprise (usually new patents or commercially viable
products).475 The result has been a push for pairing funding with
commercialization of research and the belief that extensive patent terms are
required to ensure the motivation for new innovation. The commercialization
strategy is embodied in an “effort to move research from an academic setting to
the marketplace”,476 while the patent term (20 years at present) is conceived as the
best way to ensure that “innovation and creativity can flourish in a growing
Canadian marketplace”.477

(b) Patent Protections and the Incentives to Innovate?

Under this conception of innovation, patent protections are predicated
upon the incentive to innovate theory. According to this theory, by “conferring an
artificial and limited monopoly”478 for long periods, one is likely to encourage the
greatest incentive for new drug development. This theory holds that:
too few inventions will be made in the absence of the patent
protections because inventions once made are easily appropriated by
475
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competitors of the original inventor who have not shared in the cost of
invention.479
This monopoly is a trade-off that allows “the patent holder to profit from the sale
of the drug, so as to serve the public interest of having life-improving drugs
developed”.480 Pharmaceuticals are especially subject to this form of exploitation,
since the products can easily be chemically duplicated once they are on the
market.

The theory guiding the creation of incentive to innovate operates on two
core assumptions. The first is that the patenting of drugs is the best way to
encourage worthwhile drug discoveries and innovation; the second is that lengthy
patent periods are required to allow drug companies to recoup the massive cost
they incur in research and development of new drugs. These assumptions in turn
beg at least three questions. How innovative is the drug industry as a developer of
essential and needed drugs? How innovative is the Canadian pharmaceutical
industry as a driver of economic growth? Finally, how extensive are the research
expenditures that drug companies must make to develop a new drug?

How effective is the Canadian pharmaceutical industry as a driver of
valuable and novel discoveries? The PMPRB places newly patented drugs into
three categories for determining pricing. Category 1 drugs are line extensions of
existing drugs, usually measured by changes in dosage. Category 2 drugs are
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substantial improvements or „breakthrough‟ drugs classified as “the first to
effectively treat a particular illness or which provides a substantial improvement
over existing drug products”.481 Category 3 drugs are modified drugs or new
dosage forms of existing drugs that “provide moderate, little or no improvements
over existing medicines”.482 In the period from 2000 to 2005, information was
available for 342 new patented drugs reviewed by the PMPRB, out of which 179
(52%) were line extensions, 153 (45%) were category 3 modified drugs, and only
10 (3%) were category 2 breakthrough drugs.483 In fact, from the years 2002 to
2004, the PMPRB reported only one drug that they classified as a category 2
substantial innovation.

Approximately 79% of the drugs prescribed in Canada in 2005 were
introduced in the last decade. Only 35 of these drugs would be classified as
significant innovations by the PMPRB.484 Over the same period (1996-2005),
drug profits have risen from $6.6 billion to well over $11.6 billion.485 The vast
majority of these drugs have been very expensive while providing questionable
increases in therapeutic benefit.486 We are seeing the “prescribing of newer, more
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expensive drugs, in place of older, less expensive, but not necessarily less
effective ones”.487

The majority of these newer drugs are not novel discoveries, but rather
replications or modifications of already existing drugs. These „me-too‟ drugs
often afford drug manufacturers the opportunity to gain a market share or profit
from a product that has already proven successful.488 Conversely, there is little
incentive to develop drugs which treat rare diseases affecting poor or underrepresented groups, which are not frequently found in rich, Westernized countries
or which are unlikely to turn a profit.489 Such „orphan drugs‟ may be more ethical
and needed based on the harm they can prevent, but they cannot be justified on
their potential as economic innovations.490

How much economic innovation does Canadian drug development
sponsor? Drug-makers employ approximately 28,000 individuals in Canada, but
the majority of these positions are in the manufacturing sector (19,000) and
administration (6000).491 Canada spends the least of all G8 countries on the
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research and development of new drugs.492 The majority of the $1.12 billion
dollars spent on research in Canada in 2005 went toward applied research (mainly
clinical trials for approval), with only 19.7% or $221.7 million going toward basic
(chemical or biological) research. This figure has not risen significantly in the
past decade. The percentage of total profits returned to R&D in Canada (8.3%) is
the lowest of all G8 countries.493 These amounts do appear to be a significant
investment, but represent only a fraction of the funds generated in profits ($11.6
billion) as a result of patent rights. In 2005, Canada‟s foreign drug sales
accounted for only 3.2% of the international drug market.494 Conversely, we are
one of the greatest importers of drugs for our domestic market; in 2000, this
imbalance accounted for 75.5% of drug purchases in Canada. Rather than acting
as a driver of economic growth, drug expenditures suggest a drawing of capital
out of Canada‟s economy.

In fact there is little patent innovation that remains in Canada. The
moderate size of Canada‟s role as an innovator means that most new and viable
discoveries are likely to be shipped off-shore. The majority of new patents drugs,
even those developed in Canada, are filed first in larger markets such as the
United States or European Economic Union.495 As one author notes, “Canadian
inventors remain motivated to invent by obtaining patents in large foreign
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jurisdictions”.496 Most major drug manufacturers are in dire need of new
discoveries. The R&D to sales ratio of pharmaceutical patentees peaked in the
mid 1990s.497 Pharmaceutical companies are relying more frequently upon profits
and revenues from discoveries made almost twenty years ago, and whose patents
are on the verge of expiring.498 As one author has suggested:
It would be difficult to rationalize strong patent protection in Canada
on the grounds of the motivation of innovation function because the
Canadian market is too small to affect more than marginally the R&D
policies of pharmaceutical producers who invent new drugs with a
view to marketing them all over the world.499
Any truly profitable innovations made in Canada are likely to be taken abroad to
countries with larger markets and larger research infrastructures.

What of the exorbitant R&D costs that are used by industry to justify extended
patent provisions? Industry estimates place the cost to bring a new chemical entity (NCE)
to market at $802 million USD.500 Rx & D Canada projects this figure to even more at
$1.3 billion.501 Commonly quoted by both industry and policy-makers, these figures are
highly inflated by the inclusion of costs for development that would normally be
considered marketing and advertising,502 including losses due to capitalization (i.e.,
speculative revenue that could have been made investing in equity markets instead of
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R&D),503 and failing to account for tax deductions. Furthermore, the majority of new
drug patents are not novel, but rather reformulations of older existing drugs for which
scientific research costs are far lower. It is estimated that the actual out-of-pocket cash
investment in researching the most expensive new drugs is closer to $110 million
USD.504

In recovering these costs, Canada is only a minor contributor to total international
drug sales (approximately 2% of total sales),505 suggesting that our share of costs that
must be recouped amounts to approximately $20 million at most, or possibly as little as
$2.2 million per new drug. As one author notes:
when developing global R&D plans, it is unlikely that either investors or
managers in global, research-based drug-makers take Canadian policy into
account.506
In 2010, Canadians spent $24.5 billion on drugs, 507 far more than the losses that industry
could conceivable have sunk into developing new drugs for the Canadian marketplace.

(c) Commercialization, Innovation and the Degradation of Academic Science
(i) Commercialization of Research

A second consequence of conceiving of innovation purely in economic terms has
been a drive toward increased commercialization of drug research. Downie has defined
503
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commercialization as “the converting of research results into products, services, and
processes that can be the object of commercial transactions”.508 This has been marked by
both a push for the development of commercially viable products and an emphasis on
public-private partnerships in drug research. The beginning of global commercialization
of research occurred in 1980, when the U.S. passed the Bayh-Dole Act,509 which allowed
discoveries made in public institutions and universities to be patented by private industry.
Canada has taken much more of a hands-off approach to legislating commercialization,
advancing a policy that emphasizes that “partnerships [are] key to expanding innovation
opportunities and mitigating risk”.510

Much of the innovation that occurs in the development of drugs begins with
public researchers.511 As one author has noted, “innovation in the drug industry – more so
than in most other industries – depends heavily on the diffusion of knowledge from
universities and government laboratories”.512 In the U.S., the largest drug development
market in the world, only 15 per cent of new discoveries come from industry, 55 per cent
come from National Institute of Health (NIH)-funded institutions, and 30 per cent from
academic institutions.513 Similarly, in a study which assessed the number of articles cited
in new patent applications, it was found that:
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only 15 percent came from industry, while 54 percent came from academic
centers, 13 percent from government and the rest from other public and nonprofit institutions.514
In many cases it may be difficult to separate institutional funding from industry, but
regardless the majority of the initial cost are born by public institutions, until a discovery
demonstrates market potential.

In Canada, 50 per cent of drug R&D sponsorship, or approximately $1 billion per
year, is spent on research. The majority of this funding goes to applied research (clinical
trials) sponsored in public institutions (hospitals or academia).515 This is a broad trend; in
a survey of 122 top U.S. medical schools, the NEJM reported that on average, there were
103 public-private drug review partnerships.516

Over the past three decades, there has been a slow repositioning of universities
and their research as a “component of the national system of innovation”517 along with
the entrenchment of academic science as a commodity that should “contribute to national
prosperity”.518 Commercialization has two potentially limiting effects on science: (i) it
binds research closely to industry funding, and in turn, industry objectives and
motivations may come to dominate the research agenda; (ii) it operates upon the
assumption that the most fruitful scientific research has an apparent and readily realizable
market potential. In considering these two outcomes, we must ask what potential
514
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outcomes in relation to safety and access might result from passing drug research into the
hands of industry. Even more compelling is the danger that as researchers have to
commercialize their research, they will focus on marketable products (such as new drugs)
and little research will be done into areas of medicine that have no intrinsic market value
(such as health promotion).

(ii) Denigrating the Quality of Drug Research

As increased amounts of research funding comes from industry, private interests
may come to believe that their financial stake “buys them the right to set the research
agenda”.519 Critics assert that these partnerships have the potential to denigrate the
quality of academic research, discourse, freedom, and science used in drug trials. As
Sheldon Krimsky notes, one of the perils of these partnerships is that:
secrecy has replaced openness; privatization of knowledge has replaced
communitarian values, commodification of discovery has replaced the idea that
university-generated knowledge is a free good, a part of the social
commons…[and] an unprecedented rise in conflicts of interest… As universities
turn their scientific laboratories into commercial enterprise zones and as they
select their faculty to realize these goals, fewer opportunities will exist in
academia for public-interest science.520
This degradation in the ethos underlying scientific pursuit not only erodes the quality of
science which is pursued, but also limits the questions that researchers are able to ask. It
also leaves open the potential for skewing conclusions researchers may draw from
research related to safety and efficacy.
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Most clinical trials are performed to “facilitate regulatory approval of a device or
drug rather than to test a specific novel scientific hypothesis”.521 As the recent case of
Canadian researcher Nancy Olivieri shows, with increased financial and contractual ties
researchers may lose the freedom to express concerns or meet ethical obligations when
these interests conflict with those of sponsors.522 Several widely published reports have
demonstrated that studies sponsored by industry are far more likely to have favourable
outcomes (almost 4 to 1).523 Likewise, sponsored research which is unfavourable is far
more likely to remain unpublished or to not appear in peer-reviewed journals.524 These
biases led the editors of several major medical journals to issue the following statement in
2002:
Scientists have ethical obligations to submit creditable research results for
publication. As the person directly responsible for their work, researchers
therefore should not enter into agreements that interfere with their access to the
data or their ability to analyze the data independently, to prepare manuscripts,
and to publish them. Authors should describe the role of the study sponsor(s), if
any, in the study design; in the collection, analysis, and interpretation of data; in
the writing of the report; and in the decision to submit the report to
publication.525
Yet as researchers increasingly become dependent upon industry funding, there are
concerns that “economic considerations have become more important than the real
purpose of clinical trial[s]”.526 Clinical trials must be careful to not slip into the world of
pseudo-science where they are developed merely to meet the minimum requirements of
regulatory approval and serve the profit-maximization goals of the private sector.
521
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(iii) Commercialization and the Denigration of Drug Research

If we conceive of science in terms of drugs that can be commercialized, an
overemphasis on economic models will move us toward the use of mechanisms of
discovery that are the most cost-effective and provide the greatest return on investment.
This means that more costly and time-consuming discoveries will be ignored, even if they
are likely to prove more useful. The blending of commercial and academic research into
new drug discoveries has meant that NCEC research often adopts efficiency models from
business. According to one author:
This new concept [means] the critical discourse between chemists and
biologists and the quality of scientific reasoning are sometimes replaced by
the magic of large numbers.527
The development of new drugs has seen a shift in emphasis on innovation from
developing products for specific illnesses, to developing drugs that modify specific
physiological or molecular mechanisms, or modes of action (MoA). It is easy to test a
NCE‟s effect on an MoA, since large numbers of compounds can be reviewed quickly
and cheaply in in-vivo cell cultures.528

This has the result of pushing industry-funded drug research toward “focusing on
known targets [MoA] and using existing drugs in new indications”529 rather than into
novel drug development. As one author notes, this approach to drug discovery further
limits:
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the possibility of letting biology and chemistry deliver serendipitous
discoveries ... because [observation] is restricted to known mechanisms and
biological processes for which we can provide a theoretical framework for
their role in the disease.530
Understanding that a compound has the capacity to manipulate a mechanism does not
equate to a fulsome understanding of the global effect that substance has on the body.
Drugs that target mechanisms are far more likely to be “symptomatic [treat symptoms]
rather than disease modifying treatments”.531 Such drugs might be demonstrated as
effective, but may not represent optimal or even worthwhile treatments, and certainly lose
a degree of tailoring to the specific illnesses from which patients are suffering.

The reliance of drug discovery on the research into MoA has also had the effect of
decreasing research that uses other methods of drug discovery. Other approaches such as
function-based and physiology-based approaches,532 seek to identify drugs based on their
therapeutic effect and merit, and then isolate their mechanisms of action. Both of these
approaches are adaptive strategies that “allow researchers to capture rapid changes in
health care provision and their implications more quickly”.533 They are also far more
likely to generate novel drugs. Unfortunately, they are far more expensive and resourceintensive, and far less likely to be funded by industry.534

It is dangerous to believe that all worthwhile discoveries will result from the
pursuit of commercially viable products. Epistemologically, it has been suggested that
530
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there is “no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas, or a logical
reconstruction of the process”.535 It is difficult to identify a priori the method most likely
to generate new discoveries. Commercial „innovation‟ into drug research is often
retrospective. As George Hitchings, winner of the 1988 Nobel Prize for Physiology and
Medicines, notes:
Much of the basic research supported by industry is, in a sense,
retrospective. A semi-empirical discovery of a useful drug provides the
stimulus for deeper probing into how and why it works, and thus deeper
understanding of the underlying disease.536
According to this view, “basic science [is] more often the result than the cause of drug
discovery”.537 This explains the permeation of the market with „me-too‟ drugs, as initial
discoveries fuel a host of parallel discoveries that further enhance, refine, or even mimic
the initial discovery. Truly innovative discoveries are rare, and seldom the fastest way to
return investment on R&D dollars. They are also often simply harder and involve a
greater long-term investment in a broad variety of research, with many dead ends.

Discoveries may also be subject to what I call innovative lag, a period during
which the recognition of a discovery‟s value therapeutically or commercially does not
occur contemporaneously with its initial development. Often the recognition of a
discovery‟s value takes time, and comes about after the occurrence of an event such as a
new disease, or the development of new technology. This lag may cause a gap before the
new idea is disseminated or put to use by the academic community; AZT is an example.
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The pursuit of an immediate financial gain or deliverable from research ignores the
possibility that this lag may occur. Instead, research concentrates efforts into discoveries
whose applicability is immediately apparent. Not acknowledging innovative lag, and
focusing on the immediacy of gain, is far more likely to produce the refinement of a
technology rather that the discovery of a new technology. In this way, innovation ceases
to be innovative.

The reduction of drug development to economic innovation has the potential to
compromise the safety and value of drug research. As Atkinson-Grosjean has noted, “the
„social contract‟ between science and society is being rewritten around economistic
goals”.538 The search for new drugs now equates the economic impact of new discoveries
rather than their inherent therapeutic or scientific worth. This may erode both the quality
of scientific research and the quality of products that reach the market. It has also
institutionalized a paradigm of research that favours defined research which produces
immediately assessable results over exploratory drug research. As a result of this model,
safety and efficacy research that operates without the purpose of confirming drug
approvals becomes increasingly rare.539 Little funding exists for research into drug safety
and efficacy that does not serve this goal.540

Falling prey to such a limited notion of innovation brings the peril that
important research questions will not be asked or funded. As Kuhn notes in The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, dwelling too closely on one conception of
538

Atkinson-Grosjean, supra note 368 at 103.
Angell, supra note 105.
540
Ibid.
539

141

scientific advancement means that only limited questions will be asked. Research
that fits the dominant paradigm, in this case economic innovation, represents “the
only problems that the community will admit as scientific or encourage its
members to undertake”.541

The result is that “other problems, including many that had previously
been standard, are rejected as metaphysical…as just too problematic to be worth
the time”.542 Safety and efficacy do not easily translate into economic gain.
Under present circumstances, clinging to a narrow conception of innovation:
insulates the community from those socially important problems that
are not reducible to the [dominant] norm, because they cannot be
stated in terms of the conceptual and instrumental tools the paradigm
supplies.543
Where general research into safety and efficacy cannot be translated into
economic terms, it may be valued less by those in industry and government who
hold the funding purse strings.
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CHAPTER 5: THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF DRUG REGULATION IN
CANADA

Introduction
On April 8, 2008, the Conservative Government of Canada introduced Bill C-51,
An Act to Amend the Food and Drug Act and to make Consequential Amendments to
Other Acts.544 The goal of C-51 was to update the 40-year-old Food and Drug Act545
while at the same time enhancing consumer safety. As the government indicated at the
time the Bill was introduced:
Bill C-51 seeks to modernize the dated provisions of the Food and Drugs
Act and other Acts concerning the safety quality of food,
drugs...especially to strengthen compliance and enforcement measures
and empowering the government to order mandatory product recalls.546
Generally, C-51 provided for expanded inspection, enforcement powers, and broader
regulatory-making powers, actively tried to address previous regulatory gaps, and shifted
to approvals based on product risk-benefit profiles.547

The preamble to C-51 highlighted that the “objective of protecting, promoting and
improving human health”548 was still paramount and to be achieved through “a
commitment to the health and safety of the public”.549 Yet the preamble also hinted at two
additional considerations that were underlying the changes proposed by the new Act. The
544
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first was a shift to a life-cycle model of risk mitigation, recognition that:
Ongoing assessment of information about a therapeutic product over its
life-cycle is required both before and after it reaches the market in order
to support its safe use.550
The other is a shift to approval based on a product‟s risk-benefit profile where “the
assessment of benefit and risks”551 is “based on scientific and objective evidence”.552 Yet
inherent in this new risk-benefit standard is a belief that lack of scientific certainty should
not restrain approval in the case of serious or irreversible conditions:
The [government] recognizes that a lack of full scientific certainty is not
to be used as a reason for postponing measures that prevent adverse
effects on human health if those effects could be serious or
irreversible.553
Underlying these changes is a shift away from Safety Efficacy and Quality (SEQ)
standards based strictly on precautionary certainty and a „point in time‟ approach to a lifecycle model of drug oversight based on „risk assessment‟.554

This new risk-benefit life-cycle model will rely on a host of new regulatory and
scientific tools, risk-benefit assessment, pharmacovigilence planning, risk mitigation
planning, risk management plans, surrogate end points, and enhanced adverse event
reporting. Central to all of these tools is the concept of „pharmacovigilence‟.
Pharmacovigilence has been defined as a set of tools that are used to oversee a product‟s
safety throughout its development, regulatory approval and introduction, and on into use
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with the consumer.555 Competing models in the U.S. and EU have meant that the
application of pharmacovigilence can have very different implications for safety and the
level of regulatory scrutiny applied to products before they are approved. How these tools
will be applied and affect product safety still remains to be determined in Canada.

The other essential new element of the proposed new model is risk-benefit
assessment, which would supersede the traditional onus to establish certainty of SEQ.
Defining exactly what is meant by a „risk-benefit‟ analysis is a little more difficult. Health
Canada defined a risk-benefit analysis as:
A method of evaluating the usefulness of a drug for a specific indication,
taking into account the benefits and risks associated with that drug under
normal conditions of use.556
Defining the variables to be considered in a risk-benefit analysis (what is a benefit; what
is a risk) and how they are to be weighed is no simple process, and both bias and the
value assigned to variables must continually be re-evaluated and assessed. There are
methods for conducting risk-benefit analysis well, poorly, and some which will always be
prone to bias. In the case of new drug approvals, any models adopted must be careful to
rely upon clear science and SEQ concerns, rather than allowing bias or external (nonsafety-related) factors to dominate the process.

The ultimate impact of these proposed changes on the drug approval and safety
555
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monitoring process is unclear. What is clear is that these models should be adopted in
such a way as to not compromise safety or allow questionable products onto the market.
As the Progressive Licensing Project has acknowledged:
The scientific and regulatory ability to establish whether or not a drug
works and to identify risks has become complicated to the point where it
has become a field of its own, as have the instruments and methods for
monitoring drugs and managing risks once the drug is marketed.557
Ingrained in these tools is a shift for regulators from “the traditional gatekeeper role of
the past to [one] as information provider and risk manager”.558 Both pharmacovigilence
and risk-benefit models are new tools for drug regulators. There is much to appreciate in
the proposed model; at the same time, poorly designed and applied pharmacovigilence
and risk-benefit models could be disastrous. If these changes are going to underlie the
new life-cycle approach, it must be ensured that they are developed and explored by
regulators in such a way as to enhance the safety of new drugs.

The purpose of this chapter will be to explore the emerging trends in drug
regulation in Canada and to comment on the appropriate application of these new tools.
Used correctly, these tools hold promise; used poorly, they could severely hamper the role
of the federal drug regulator and ultimately, the safety of Canadians. This exploration will
begin with a brief look at the policy initiatives which have led to the development of the
proposed new drug regime. Secondly, the concrete proposals to change the Food and
Drug Act proposed by Bill C-51 will be explored. The new life-cycle drug approval
model will then be described. Next, risk-benefit assessment and pharmacovigilence as the
two key elements of the proposed new regime will be explored. The core principles
557
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underlying these models will be described, and their benefits and risks as new regulatory
tools will be analyzed. Finally, some general conclusions will be provided.

The Pull Towards a Life-Cycle Model
Bill C-51 was the final outcome of several policy initiatives that had come
together to reformulate and modernize the regulation of drugs, most notably the Health
Products and Food Branch (Health Canada) Blueprint for Renewal,559 the Progressive
Licensing Project560, and the Food and Consumer Safety Action Plan.561 The language of
each of these initiatives has moved toward increased post-market surveillance,
modernization, a life-cycle approach and empowering the consumer. The general trends
encompassed by these initiatives include a slow movement away from precautionary
principles of scientific proof toward risk-benefit analysis, and from our present point in
time model of drug approval toward a life-cycle model of drug approval.

(a) Health Canada’s Blueprint for Renewal

The Health Products and Food Branch (HPFB) began an overall review of its
regulatory structure and practices in 2006. The Blueprint for Renewal, announced
October 2006, was Health Canada‟s “approach to modernizing the regulatory system for
559
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health products and food[s]”.562 The Blueprint‟s objective is to:
Transform our legislative, regulatory, and policy frameworks [to] make
the Branch more efficient, effective, and responsive to help us meet the
evolving needs of Canadians in a world of fast-paced change.563
With over 20 separate initiatives within its ambit,564 the Blueprint represents the single
largest shift in policy initiatives for the regulation of health products in the past 30 years.

As part of this initiative, the Blueprint initially identified seven objectives directly
related to drug regulation. These included:
1. developing a life-cycle regulatory approach to health products that would
encompass all stages of product development and use;
2. developing a more transparent and consistent system of categorizing products
and assessing their risks;
3. moving away from a reactive waiting for events regulatory system and
developing a more proactive approach;
4. better generat[ing], disseminat[ing] and respond[ing] to safety and
effectiveness data for health products and food and develop[ing] a more
proactive, post-market evaluation strategy;
5. strengthening leadership on a range of health and safety issues affecting
specific populations;
6. promoting a more open and transparent regulatory system; and
7. better synchroniz[ing] the regulatory system with the objectives, policies and
practices of the health care and innovation systems.565
Overall, the initial proposed objectives centered around the life-cycle approach,
improving regulatory efficiencies, increasing the effectual use and dissemination of
information, and employing measures which categorize and assess their risks.

Consultations on these initial proposals led to a second document, Blueprint for
562
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Renewal II: Modernizing Canada’s Regulatory System for Health Products and Food,566
with the inclusion of two additional objectives:
(a) putting in place better legislative, regulatory and policy tools to better support
compliance and enforcement; and,
(b) work[ing] with partners in the health care system to make available more and
better information about health products and food to enable Canadians to
make informed decisions about their health.567
These additional considerations introduced the ideas of informed consumer choice and
increased compliance and enforcement powers and penalties.

Underlying these assumptions are several key policy changes in relation to the
way that drugs are currently regulated. The Blueprint is the first document to introduce
the concept that drugs should be assessed throughout their life-cycle, which would allow
for the “continuous evaluation of safety and effectiveness and quality of products before
and after their introduction to the Canadian market”568 and the removal of “traditional
regulatory process as a barrier to access”569 for urgently needed products. The second is a
shift based on risk where “regulatory interventions are proportional to risk and program
investments are focused on higher-risk products”.570 Third is a move toward a regulatory
system that “adapts to new science and technology [in achieving internal and]
international benchmarked performance targets for regulated products”.571 Fourth is the
concept that a key part of the drug regulatory process is ensuring that consumers have
566
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increased capacity to make “informed consumer decisions about their health”.572
Encouragingly, the Blueprint also outlines provisions for increasing openness and
transparency in regulatory decision-making and the dissemination of health information
learned to practitioners and regulators during a drug‟s life-cycle.

In articulating the objective of the Blueprint, several key critical success factors
were identified by Health Canada. These include:
(a) A 21st century toolkit of legislation, regulatory frameworks and instruments
(b) Internationally benchmarked regulatory practices, processes and risk
management
(c) A sustainable, high performance, science-based organization
(d) Strategic international regulatory cooperation
(e) Enhanced partnerships and stakeholder involvement.573
These objectives are centered on regulatory modernization through selectively applied
regulatory instruments and improved regulatory efficiencies by “meet[ing] performance
targets for all regulatory products by increasing regulatory science and foresight
capacity”.574 These measures involve increasing the degrees of regulatory cooperation,
adopting tools and standards, and increasing coordination between domestic and
international partners. In effect, this means modernizing Canada‟s regulatory system to be
reflective of international trends and norms for drug approvals and the adoption of risk
management and assessment methodologies.
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(b) The Canadian Food and Consumer Safety Action Plan (CSAP)

A second document integral to understanding the future development of the
Canadian drug regulatory regime is the Canadian Food and Consumer Safety Action
Plan575 (CSAP). The CSAP was released in 2008 as part of the Conservative
Government‟s pledge to “introduce measures on food and product safety to ensure that
families have confidence in the quality and safety of what they buy”,576 as articulated in
the 2007 Speech from the Throne. Overall, the CSAP has three principles:
(a) industry has a responsibility for the safety of products it brings onto the
market;
(b) consumers and health professionals need access to accurate information to
make informed decisions;
(c) government must have the clear authority it requires to address health and
safety risks.577
Again, the CSAP will have “a focus on active prevention, targeted oversight and rapid
response”.578

Underlying this language is the approach that “oversight should be placed where risks are
greatest over the life-cycle of a product”.579 Targeted oversight shifts the focus from “premarket review to one that continuously assesses a product‟s risks and benefits”580 with
the distribution of responsibility between government, industry, health professionals, and
the consumer, and with government intervention at those points perceived to pose the
575
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greatest risks.

The CSAP content related to drugs has much in common with the Blueprint, articulating
six specific goals related to the health products or drugs. These include:
(a) Taking a life-cycle approach through Progressive Licensing
(b) Increasing the reporting requirements on industry and health professionals
related to ADRs
(c) Improving compliance and enforcement powers in legislation
(d) Making fines and penalties more effective
(e) Improving import safety and improving information for consumers and
decision-makers.581
Again, the life-cycle model takes precedence, along with increased enforcement powers
for regulators. The focus is on enabling consumer choice and spreading oversight
throughout the life-cycle. As the report indicates:
The Action Plan aims to prevent safety problems by giving consumers and
health professionals more and better information to make informed
decisions about the safety and safe use of products and by enabling safety
planning at an early stage. Enhanced targeted oversight will be achieved
by new measures to support the ongoing assessment of the risks and
benefits of a product over its life-cycle through a progressive licensing
system and by providing modern inspection authorities.582
Increased enforcement powers will be tied to applying regulatory interventions
proportional to risks:
Risk-based decision-making requires that the regulator have a wide array of
compliance and enforcement tools at its disposal, so that it may choose the
most appropriate response to mitigate risk in any situation.583
Again, the intention is that there will be an increase in regulation where risks have been
defined as highest and potentially a pull back in regulation where risks are low.
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(c) Progressive Licensing

Flowing from the Blueprint for Renewal, the Progressive Licensing Project (now
the Office of Legislative and Regulatory Modernization [OLRM]), was established in
2006 to “develop a drug regulatory system for the future (to) ensure that Health Canada is
capable of maintaining and enhancing its reputation as a science-based and reliable
regulator”.584 The need for this new regulatory system was identified because of the
“rapid worldwide change in response to the advances in pharmaceutical sciences, drug
development, and changes in public expectations”.585 As PL has acknowledged:
The repercussions from large-scale drug withdrawals indicate potential
gaps between what the public expects of the regulatory system and what
the system can actually deliver.586
To achieve these objectives, PL will move review from “a focus on the pre-market
review...to a life-cycle approach that takes into account the entire suite of knowledge
gained throughout a drug‟s life”.587 The proposed model will rely on increased risk
management and pharmacovigilence, as well as “anticipate and accommodate changing
technologies and methodologies”588 for clinical proof of safety and efficacy.

Instead of a point in time approach, the knowledge and clinical information
gained about a product‟s safety will continue throughout the regulatory process. New
drug applicants will be expected to provide commitments for the monitoring and
evaluation of their products that will enable continuous evaluation of safety and efficacy
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throughout the drug‟s life-cycle. Approval will be dependant upon the overall risk and
benefit associated with a product, including the product‟s capacity to provide promising
therapies and the mitigation measures in place to address risks or unknowns associated
with a product. As more information is gained about the product, its risk-benefit profile
will be modified and the product‟s license and commitments placed on the manufacturer
will be re-evaluated. If, over time and with increased knowledge the risk-benefit profile
comes to weigh on the negative, the product will be removed from the market.

Figure 1: The Progressive Licensing Model589

Underlying PL is the concept that improved information related to risk will
enhance access by increasing informed consumer choice where “patients are requesting
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greater autonomy in making drug choices, including choosing their acceptable levels of
risk”.590 Approval now shifts from a point in time approach to one in which real-world
experience is essential:
rather than placing the focus primarily upon pre-market assessment, this
represents a fundamental shift from the idea that the pre-market testing
of a drug assures safety and efficacy. The new proposed model is that a
drug should be evaluated throughout its life-cycle for its benefit-risk
profile.591
Essential to the model is establishment of “expectations for identifying and managing
drug benefits and risks…ahead of marketing for each drug”.592 The life-cycle then better
mirrors the actual considerations for licensing a drug, in order:
that a favorable benefit-risk profile has been established on the basis of
sufficient evidence, a high quality has been demonstrated, and a
sufficient life-cycle management plan [pharmacovigilence] has been
filed by the manufacturer to allow for introduction of the drug to the
market.593
This represents a significant movement away from the point in time SEQ onus on
industry to prove drug safety, to ongoing risk-benefit analysis as the basis for a drug‟s
market authorization. This model has great potential to provide real-world safety and
efficacy evidence, but its success or failure will depend upon how risks and benefits are
weighed, and the tools in place to ensure the ongoing collection of safety data.

Bill C-51 and the Progressive Licensing Model
The first hint at how the life-cycle model will manifest itself, at least in law, was

590

Ibid.
PL Concept Paper, supra note 58 at 4.
592
Ibid. at 5.
593
Ibid.
591

155

provided when the Conservative Government tabled Bill C-51.594 Bill C-51 focused on
increasing legislative authorities for those regulating drugs, now called „therapeutic
products‟, shifting assessment criteria to a risk-benefit analysis, and putting in place
measures which require the continuous provision of health information.595 While not
encompassing all of the provisions of the life-cycle model which would eventually be
found in a modernized Food and Drug Regulation, it did structure the legislative
authorities that would be in place for enacting this regime.

The stated objectives of the proposed new Food and Drug Act were “protecting,
promoting and improving human health” through “a continued commitment to the health
and safety of the public”.596 This will require the “ongoing assessment of information
about a therapeutic product over its life-cycle... both before and after it reaches the
market in order to support its safe use”597 through “the assessment of benefits and
risks...based on sound scientific and objective evidence”.598 That said, the preamble is
also careful to indicate that “a lack of full scientific certainty is not to be used as a reason
for postponing measures that prevent adverse effects on human health if those effects
could be serious or irreversible”.599 It is presumed that these measures would include both
the approval of a therapeutic product and its removal from the market.

The most substantial changes to drug approvals proposed by Bill C-51 are located
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in sections 18.7 through 20.3, related to authorizations and licenses. Rather than seeking
a notice of compliance (NOC), applicants now must seek a market authorization.600
Approval of the market authorization will be provided when, on application:
the Minister is of the opinion that the person has established that the
benefits that are associated with the therapeutic product outweigh the
risks.601
Additional to the issuance of a market authorization, the Minister may deem a new
market authorization to be “subject to terms and conditions that are prescribed from time
to time”602 and “issue the market authorization subject to the additional terms and
conditions that he or she considers appropriate”.603 Unlike the conditions imposed on
applicants currently receiving a Notice of Compliance with Conditions (NOCc),
applicants now have a statutory obligation to meet the imposed condition. Under s.18.7
(4), applicants “shall comply the terms and conditions to which the authorization is
subject”.604

Incorporated within these sections are the powers for conducting a risk-benefit
analysis of new drugs (therapeutic products) superseding the regulatory provisions
currently captured in Division 8 of the Food and Drug Regulations.605 Likewise, the
provisions of s.18.7 that allow for the approval of a market authorization with conditions
and the obligation to meet these conditions, allow for the licensing of products with
continued obligation to provide safety and efficacy data (i.e., pharmacovigilence). Under
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s.18.9, the Minister may on his or her own initiative “amend a market authorization or the
terms and conditions to which it is subject”.606

Section 19(1)(c) would allow for the suspension or revocation of a market
authorization where the applicant violates the Act, a term, or condition, or “the risks that
are associated with the therapeutic product to which the authorization relates [or are later
identified to] outweigh the benefits”.607 The Minister is expected to first give the market
authorization holder an opportunity to „make representations‟ in response to the planned
revocation or suspension. Yet in the case of a suspension it should not be delayed “to
respond to a serious and imminent risk of injury to health”.608 Section 24(1), similarly,
allows for compelling a manufacturer to recall a product which “presents a serious or
imminent risk of injury to health”.609

These provisions are given a little more weight because applicants can now be
compelled to “provide the Minister with the information that is in their control and that
the Minister considers necessary for the administration of this Act”. 610This includes
“information that is in the person‟s control and that is necessary for the Minister to
determine whether it presents that risk”.611 This would include information related to
ongoing or discontinued clinical trials,612 which would enable managers to reassess
clinical evidence related to the product‟s safety and efficacy. Linked to these provisions
606
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are increased powers for Health Canada inspectors to enforce the provisions of the Bill613
and penalties for contraventions of the Bill.614

Bill C-51 did not become law before the 30th Parliament was prorogued on
September 7, 2008.615 Prior to the Bill falling off the order table, the Conservative
Government announced several proposed changes that they intended to introduce. In
response to a high level of criticism that was received in relation to how the Bill would
impact natural health products, it was announced that all measures within the Act would
now “depend on the nature of the product and its intended use”.616 The proposed new
prologue would include a statement to the effect that:
the information required to demonstrate that a therapeutic product‟s
benefits outweigh its risks depends on the nature of the product and its
intended use; and that the risk of injury to health is a factor to taking
administrative and enforcement measures.617
Risk and the Life-Cycle Model
Whatever form the new Food and Drug Act adopts, it is clear that central to the
underlying life-cycle model will be the concept of risk, conceived in terms of the
counterbalance in risk-benefit analysis, and in terms of the regulatory intervention that is
required based on the nature of the product.618 Yet quantifying this risk and giving it
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formal meaning is no easy task, and the form and measure that Health Canada gives to
risk (and benefits for that matter) will have far-reaching implications for health and
safety. As with any regulatory tool, risk-benefit analysis and risk measurement can be
adopted appropriately or inappropriately. Employed correctly, it is an effectual measure
for quantifying and documenting those criteria upon which decisions are based;
employed incorrectly, it can allow for questionable decision-making.

An essential element of the progressive licensing model will be flexible departure
from the standard requirements of approval when an urgent need is identified. PL has
defined flexible departure as:
Deviation from the standard baseline requirement for evidence supporting a drug‟s
efficacy and safety that is necessary for the drug to attain initial market
authorization. There must be a compelling reason justifying such a departure from
baseline standards.619
In effect, this would allow the granting of a license when there are extraordinary
circumstances. How a compelling reason will be determined and how the risk-benefit
assessment for products will vary during flexible departure remains to be determined. As
one author has suggested:
To „depart‟ from the baseline means that while a positive benefit-risk
profile for the particular pharmaceutical product constitutes an
important element of the standard for approval, other important
„contextual‟ evidence may counterbalance and offset the requirements
of substantial safety and efficacy evidence.620
What other contextual factors will play a role in risk assessment leading to flexible
departure remains a very large question. Some authors have already raised the potential
fear that:
619
620
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Health Canada is proposing to lower the threshold for initial market authorization
licenses in exchange for additional safety and efficacy studies as a condition for
621
continuing to sell a drug
Other authors argue that the inclusion of reasonable health and safety
considerations (in particular, increased access to urgently needed drugs) is a path down
which Health Canada has already started622 and that regulators are unlikely to use benefitrisk assessment or flexible departure for “regulatory risk-taking”623 with new products.
Teasing out the intent and implications of shifting to a risk-benefit model is an essential
step in evaluating the proposed new life-cycle model.

(a) Whither Risk-Benefit Analysis

The shift to connecting regulatory activity and regulatory interventions to
measurements and interventions based on risk is part of a general trend in Canadian
governance which is shifting toward “advancing the efficiency and effectiveness of
regulation by ascertaining that the benefits of regulation justify the costs”.624 In the health
context this has meant a shift toward ensuring that regulatory interventions are based on
sound risk-assessment principles and “focusing human and financial resources where
they can do the most good, and by demonstrating tangible results”.625 This is to be done
by assuring that decisions are made “based on evidence and the best available knowledge
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and science”.626 Decisions are to be based on quantifiable measures of cost and benefit,
or in the case of health, on particular assessments about potential risk and benefit.

(b) Cost-Benefit Analysis

Risk assessment is a branch of a wider field of regulatory-economic valuation
called cost-benefit analysis. Traditionally, cost-benefit analysis is an analytic procedure
which estimates the net economic value of a given policy or project. It converts all costs
and benefits into a monetary metric and measures whether the benefits outweigh the
costs.627 Under cost-benefit analysis, all regulatory procedures should be subject to a
quantified analysis of the benefits and cost that flow from their implementation. Those
regulations that do not pass a cost-benefit analysis “should be struck down, not enacted,
or at least undergo some further process of scrutiny”.628

Cost-benefit analysis first emerged as a regulatory tool in dealing with large
environmental projects in the United States and United Kingdom.629 It was adopted from
investment modeling, where before any investment could be undertaken, its benefits (in
monetary terms) should exceed its costs (in monetary terms). For environmental projects,
it became a decision that any long-term benefits (in terms of government expenditures)
should outweigh the costs (in terms of government expenditures).630 Initially, this was
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related to the allocation of scarce resources, but gradually it began to be quantified in
terms of the value and cost that these projects could have to long-term human health and
environmental safety.631 This required an increase in methods for quantifying the value
and costs to human health.

In the 1980s, under Ronald Reagan in the United States and under Margaret
Thatcher in the United Kingdom, cost-benefit modeling for regulatory activity became
tied into concepts of “eliminating waste and promoting efficiency in government [and]
reducing [perceived] overregulation”. 632 The basic idea was that all government activity
should be measured in quantifiable activities such that it “is well managed and
accountable and that resources [should be] allocated to achieve results”.633 As one author
has noted:
Before the 1980s, public health and environmental policies were
debated primarily on scientific, ethical and legal grounds, with less
emphasis on costs – let alone monetized benefits. More recently, it has
become the norm to assume the need for cost-benefit analysis of new
policies, comparing monetary costs and estimates of the monetary value
of benefits. Just as business should only make an investment if the
expected revenues exceed costs, the new approach suggests that
government should only adopt a new initiative if its expected benefits
exceed its costs.634

631

D. Pearce, “The Limits of Cost Benefit Analysis as a Guide to Environmental Policy” (1976) 29(1) Kylos
97 (LEXIS)
632
F. Ackerman, “Critique of Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Alternative Approaches to Decision-making: A
Report to Friends of the Earth England, Wales and Northern Ireland” (Medford, Massachusetts: Global
Development and Environment Institute, Tufts University, 2008) online: <http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/
Pubs/rp/Ack_UK_ CBAcritique.pdf>, [Ackerman].
633
Government of Canada, Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, The Programs and Activities of the
Secretariat (Ottawa: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2009), online: <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/tbssct/abu-ans/tbs-sct/paa-aap-eng.asp>, accessed July 20, 2010.
634
Ackerman, supra note 632 at page 1.

163

(c) Risk-Benefit Assessment

Traditional risk assessment is a subset of cost-benefit analysis focused on
evaluating the health or environmental risks that are associated with a particular hazard.
635

More specifically, it is a “set of techniques for quantifying the morbidity, fatalities or

fatality risks resulting from various hazards”. 636 It is a method for identifying the
potential dangers associated with a given hazard and in turn identifying those benefits
(and methods for mitigation) which would result from exposing the public to that hazard.
As one author suggests:
Estimating the benefits and costs of risk-reducing regulations (requires,
inter alia) a risk assessment that ...characterizes the probabilities of
occurrences and outcomes of interest ...[T]he risk assessment should
generate a credible, objective, realistic, and scientifically balanced
analysis; present information on hazard, dose-response, and exposure (or
analogous materials for non-health assessments), and explain the
confidence in each assessment.637
For drugs this means balancing the health and social benefits that would result from
access, versus the dangers that may result from access. As with all hazards, this will
involve detailed characterization and projection as to the nature and structure of these
hazards.

The keynote publication for government risk assessment was the 1983 Red Book
published by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to assist in toxic risk
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assessment.638 The model proposed in the Red Book envisioned four stages in a toxic risk
assessment: (i) hazard assessment, (ii) dose-response assessment, (iii) exposure
assessment and (iv) risk characterization. The first involves the establishment of toxicity
and a causal link to harm. The second seeks to quantify that toxicity in relation to human
physiological harm. The third quantifies the likely extent of that harm‟s impact on the
population. The final stage involves characterizing the effect of the combined toxicity and
likely exposure as an overall impact against “the result[s] of various regulatory
interventions”.639 While the Red Book model is no longer commonly employed, its
methodological steps of identifying a risk, measuring and evaluating the risk, gauging the
extent of impact of that risk and then weighing them against various options still forms
the basis of most risk assessment.

(i) The Health Canada Decision-Making Framework (DMF)

Health Canada has incorporated many of the elements of risk-benefit analysis and
cost-benefit analysis into its own core policy for dealing with health risks. The Health
Canada Decision-Making Framework for Identifying, Assessing, and Managing Health
Risks640 (DMF) is a tool to “improve the effectiveness of the risk management decisionmaking process”.641 It serves as a cohesive “tool which formalizes decision-making as a
consistent process with identifiable steps...to [assure] important principles and
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organizational values of decision-making”.642 Initially adopted as a tool for assessing the
health hazards of specific agents, the DMF has become a central tool to guide all Health
Canada “policy development and decision-making”.643

Evolved from the simple Red Book model, the DMF follows the same steps of
issue identification, quantification, priority setting, and strategy selection. The first stage
of the DMF is identifying the issue and the context, which basically involves collecting
and analyzing information on “the agent(s) underlying the issue; the adverse
consequences associated with the agent(s); susceptible populations; exposure to the
agent(s); and the scientific uncertainties that exist”.644 Next is the formal assessment of
risks and benefits, which involves assessing, quantifying, and characterizing the risks and
benefits (discussed in greater detail below). The next step is identifying and analyzing
options, based on “a range of risk management options”.645 Next is the selection of the
most appropriate mitigation strategy. The final step is implementing the strategy and
instituting measures to ensure that the strategies adopted are effective.
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Figure 2: The Health Canada Decision-Making Framework646 (DMF)

It is more than coincidental that the DMF model can easily be mapped onto the
Progressive Licensing model. Both are basically a feedback loop based on initial issue
characterization and health risk assessment, selection of an option, and modification of
practice based on increased knowledge. The Progressive Licensing model is likely an
attempt to adapt the DMF to drug licensing, employing many of the same risk and benefit
considerations with the addition of pharmacovigilence as the monitoring and evaluation
tool. Yet a crucial question still remains: what criteria will be considered in formulating
the risk and benefit of any new drug?

(ii) Defining Risks

Looking at the DMF, we gain insight into many of the risk assessment practices
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and tools that are likely to be used by Health Canada (TPD) in formulating any risk
assessment of a new drug. At its most basic, risk will be established by (1) identifying the
potential hazards, (2) characterizing these hazards and (3) assessing the likely effect on
the population (size of the exposure to the hazards).

Taking the DMF as a starting point, we can identify some elements that are likely
to considered in formulating risks for a cost-benefit analysis of a health issue. The first
consideration is that any harm will be weighed by the severity of the potential harms
(how harmful it is) and the extent to which the harm affects the population (extent of
exposure).647 Under the DMF, the first consideration is called characterizing the hazards
and involves “qualitatively and/or quantitatively evaluating the adverse health effect(s)
that humans may experience under expected levels of exposure to the agent(s) under
study”.648 The second consideration is called exposure assessment, which is “a process
used to develop a qualitative and/or quantitative estimate of the magnitude, frequency,
duration, route and extent of human exposure to an agent”.649

Under the DMF, hazard or risk characterization is focused on “physical health effects,
and have relied on data from toxicology and epidemiology studies and in some cases,
from surveillance”. The first phase of risk characterization involves identifying hazards
and under the DMF includes a very specific collection of steps:
1. identifying the agent(s) causing the adverse health effect(s); collecting
relevant scientific data; determining the relative weight of studies having
647
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different results; determining the relative weight of different types of studies
(e.g. epidemiology, toxicology);
2. examination of the scientific data for evidence of a relationship between the
agent(s) and the adverse health effect(s);
3. identifying the mode and mechanism of action of the agent(s);
4. identifying those dose levels that are, and are not, associated with adverse
health effects (e.g. for toxicology studies, No Observed Adverse Effect Levels
[NOAELs] or Lowest Observed Adverse Effect Levels [LOAELs]);
5. determining the critical effects associated with exposure to the agent;
6. determining the significance of a positive finding in studies having different
routes of exposure compared to the population(s) at risk;
7. deciding if the studies have any data limitations that might affect their
interpretation or invalidate their results;
8. for nonhuman studies, ensuring that adequate protocols, a sufficient number of
animals, and appropriate dose levels have been used, and determining how
different metabolic pathways or rates should be considered;
9. considering sources of uncertainty and other limitations, and how may these
impact upon the hazard identification;
10. deciding the overall weight of evidence taking into account the quality of the
data; and
11. identifying the hazard(s) of concern.650

For new drugs, this would involve focusing on the industry-submitted monograph
data on safety, efficacy, and quality, and identifying any potential risks that are identified
or implied in this data. It likely involves a degree of speculation and/or extrapolation by
drug reviewers to identify the various elements of risk that a drug could hypothetically
pose. According to the TPD‟s own Standing Operating Procedure: Using the
Pharmaceutical Safety and Efficacy Assessment Templates (PSEATs) to Prepare Reports
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on Submissions for Marketing Authorizations,651 presently the following factors will be
taken into consideration by reviewers when estimating a product‟s risk:
1. pre-clinical toxic dose levels relative to proposed maximum human dose, taking
into account toxic kinetic differences
2. adverse events in target population
3. adverse events in subpopulations
4. potential for drug interactions
5. other potential safety concerns (e.g. QT interval prolongation)
6. risk of abuse or misuse
7. information outside the submitted dossier (e.g. expert advice, medical literature,
foreign regulatory bodies) 652
According to the DMF, considering these factors “requires judgment [and] depends upon
conducting a systematic analysis that.... carefully considers scientific uncertainties,
related assumptions, and potential impacts”.653

In formulating this risk characterization, the DMF indicates a very set series of
steps. The first is a quantitative estimation of the risk. This begins with a review of all
relevant information available related to the specific hazard. This will involve
“examining, summarizing, and integrating”654 available information and considering “the
quality, completeness and relevance of [available] information”.655 The PSEAT guideline
outlines very detailed steps for reviewing the technical information in clinical and nonclinical studies. Next is the generation of a quantitative estimation of risk, to ensure that
decisions are “based on careful analysis of the weight of scientific evidence that supports
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conclusions about the risks”.656 Again, the PSEAT guideline provides detailed guidance
on how studies should be weighed and quantified for their evidential merit. The next step
is a qualitative estimation of the uncertainties that involves a description of “major
sources of uncertainty and alternative views”.657 Risks are then prioritized or compared
to “determine priority for action”658 and to “estimate the significance (or severity) of the
health effects”.659 Finally, there is a weighing of the “scientific evidence, in a qualitative
way, [in] order to determine whether there is support for the conclusion about risk”.660
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(iii) Uncertainty and Risk

The process for risk characterization above shows a gradual shift from empirical
and quantitative risk identification to a more qualitative risk measurement. What starts off
as a rather quantified exercise of risk measurement becomes a qualitative estimation of
the uncertainties of risks. As the DMF identifies, these sources of uncertainty may result
from many sources:
Uncertainties may result from: the limited availability of scientific data on
for example, exposure or intake rates; long time delays between exposure
and effect; the need to extrapolate data to predict the health consequences
of human exposures; difficulties in determining appropriate mathematical
models for extrapolation; simultaneous exposures to a variety of different
agents (making it difficult to determine the effects of a single agent); and
judgments made at each step of the process.661
In assessing the information, Health Canada scientists will be called on to “make
inferences, assumptions, and judgments”662 in order to characterize the risks.

Estimating the risk of uncertainties is in no way systematic or quantitative. While
the PSEAT does discuss listing the undetermined information flowing from submitted
data, it does not generally ask reviewers to produce a qualitative measure of unknown
health risks, or as the DMF suggests, a subjective “summary of the uncertainties that have
been noted throughout the risk assessment process, and explaining the potential impact of
the uncertainties on the risk estimates in a non-technical manner”.663 Moving from a
precautionary approach based on an SEQ standard would involve the introduction of
qualitative measures of uncertainty.
661
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A whole science has emerged for the estimation and identification of these
uncertainties (Uncertainty Analysis),664 yet ultimately it remains a speculative exercise,
one that is more often than not predicated on existing patterns (what is known) and
assumes uniformity amongst unknown risks (what is unknown). This is a very clever
trick of logic, since the ultimate truth of most unknown risks is that they will vary from
an existing pattern, and it is for that reason that they cannot be foreseen or known prior to
their occurrence.

Generating these subjective estimations of uncertainty “can strongly be affected
by the social, cultural and institutional context of a decision”.665 This qualitative
identification of unknowns or uncertainties represents potentially the greatest weakness in
all risk characterization. The DMF itself acknowledges that “numerical estimations of
risk can give the misimpression of precision, be easily misinterpreted and be misused in
the absence of information which puts them into context”.666

The existing approach to drug review has been precautionary where there is
excessive uncertainty relating to safety, efficacy, or quality, or as the DMF asserts, it
“treats the concept of precaution as pervasive”.667 This has meant that in those cases
where judgment of uncertainties is not comprehensive, there has been a “need to take
664
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timely and appropriately preventative action, even in the absence of a full scientific
demonstration of cause and effect”.668 Previously, regulators had tended to be
conservative in their request for proof of the SEQ standard, and asked for the burden to
be on manufacturers to prove through demonstrated scientific research any uncertainties
related to a product‟s SEQ.669 Yet this approach to uncertainty and the licensing of a new
drug seems to be changing, as the preamble to Bill C-51 asserts: “a lack of full scientific
certainty is not to be used as a reason for postponing measures that prevent adverse
effects on human health if those effects could be serious or irreversible”.670 Quantitatively
addressing pressing issues of uncertainty may no longer be the key elements in a drug
assessor‟s risk-benefit analysis; a host of qualitative and subjective data may come to
dominate a drug‟s risk and benefits.

(iv) Defining Benefits

Defining the benefits of a new drug can be more problematic than defining the
risks of a given product. Any new drug has a host of potential benefits that include the
obvious therapeutic merit, but as discussed in previous chapters, they may also include
668
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innovation that results from the drug patent and the meeting of patient demands. Even the
DMF is rather unclear as to what would be considered a health benefit, but asserts that
they include both “direct health benefits (e.g. relief of symptoms), or indirect health
benefits (e.g. economic, social, or cultural impacts)”.671 The PSEAT672 indicates that the
following considerations should be taken into account when weighing a drug‟s direct
benefit:
1. strength of evidence to support proposed dose in target population
2. strength of efficacy in subpopulations
3. information outside the submitted dossier (e.g. expert advice, medical
literature, foreign regulatory bodies).673
These benefits will also largely be a qualitative assessment and undertaken only “when it
is difficult or impossible for consumers to judge the benefits associated with exposure to
an agent and to compare them with associated risks”.674

Quixotically, according to the DMF, this assessment “should be done using a
societal perspective”675 and “technical specialists [in this case, economists] play the lead
role in benefit assessment and in making risk-benefit comparisons”.676 Scientists are
expected to provide evidence for technical issues and “provide guidance in the use of risk
assessment results in risk-benefit comparisons and flag additional risk information
needs”.677 For new drug reviews, this means analyses of “the adequacy of the data and
methods used for the analyses, as well as whether the analyses have addressed the
671
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appropriate concerns”.678 Yet as the DMF notes, benefit must be characterized and “may
include direct health benefits (e.g. relief of disease symptoms), or indirect health benefit
(e.g. economic, social, or cultural impacts)”.679

The DMF identifies the following steps in benefit identification:
1. identify the type(s) of benefits to be examined;
2. identify the measures to be used;
3. collect and analyze the benefit information;
4. determine how to deal with uncertainty; and
5. summarize the benefit information.680
The first step in the process involves “identifying the types of benefits examined”.681
While we have tended to limit benefits to the traditional SEQ standard, as noted above,
there is nothing to preclude additional factors such as economic, social, and cultural
impacts. These may in turn be measured not only through a drug‟s therapeutic merit, but
also “effectiveness, efficiency, quality of life, dollar values”.682 In relation to government
activity as a whole, the net benefit of action has been characterized as:
the potential positive and negative economic, environmental, and social
impacts on Canadians, business, and government of the proposed regulation
and its feasible alternatives; and how the positive and negative impacts may
be distributed across various affected parties, sectors of the economy, and
regions of Canada.683
While PLF has articulated that the new life-cycle model will only include health
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considerations684, the government‟s own approach to risk assessment has tended to
indicate that they consider benefits globally to include a whole broader range of
considerations.685
At the end of the process, the benefit assessment resolves itself down to a
subjective exercise of identifying and accessing the uncertainties related to benefits. In
the cases of most new drugs, the benefits are fairly well characterized in the clinical data
that is provided with the NDS. Likewise, there is often extensive pressure from patient
groups, industry, and interested researchers that backs the significant financial
investments that have guided a pharmaceutical drug out of the pipeline.686 There is a
tendency to see the uncertainties of benefits as far more certain, rather than to project
danger to the unknowns of potential risks. As noted in the previous chapter, there is a
policy trend to include increasingly opaque monetized benefits such as “innovation” and
economic spin resulting from patented activities.

(d) Good Risk-Benefit Analysis – Bad Risk-Benefit Analysis

Overall, risk-benefit analysis has great potential to assist in assessing new drugs,
yet it must be applied cautiously. As Avorn has noted:
It‟s easy to see how a quantitative method that claims to be both objective
and fair could seem to provide a neat road map out of the conceptual
swamp of subjective clinical judgment. A by-the-number approach to
balancing risks and benefits can seem particularly attractive as a
684
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replacement for the shriveling professional sovereignty of both physicians
and policy-makers.687
Risk assessments are not objective, scientific methodology; they are “literally, uncertain
knowledge claims – impressionistic guesses, informed estimation, and probabilistic
predictions about a future that cannot fully be known”.688 Yet they have the appearance of
objectivity and can shield policy-makers‟ decisions with objectivity. It is not surprising
then, that, as Avorn notes:
the task of assigning values to clinical conditions often embodies a set of
hidden assumptions – about methods, about values – that can sometimes
distort the supposedly objective recommendations that flow from these
methods.689
The SEQ standard cannot be abandoned in favour of non-clinical measures of benefit, or
underestimations of risk. The more that risk-benefit analysis moves away from
quantitative measures (SEQ) into qualitative or speculative measures (uncertainty), the
more it can become “automatic and self validating”690 of policy decisions.

In order to ensure that risk-benefit analysis does not become meaningless, it must
be careful to temper its own biases and be based in some form of empirical data and
measurement. Looking to the environmental realm, Frank Ackerman has identified a
number of methodological errors which plague poor risk-benefit analysis, including the
tendency to focus on monetized values of risk and benefit, the failure of uncertainty to
take account of real world problems, the failure to take into account long-term risks, and
the tendency to ignore alternatives and constrained variables in favour of a known and
687
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accepted list of risks and benefits.691

To limit these biases, any cost-benefit analysis must take into account multiple
criteria for the analysis, look at a holistic evaluation of costs and benefits, and
acknowledge the limits of uncertainty with the use of precaution where uncertainty is
prevalent.692 For the Progressive Licensing model‟s conception of risk-benefit analysis to
work, it too must ensure that it relies upon accurate quantitative data, acknowledging in
those cases where uncertainty is prevalent that a risk-benefit analysis may not be
decisive, and limit the variables that are considered at drug approval to those directly
related to clinical merit and ultimate effect on the population.

One of the initial hurdles in this regard will be ensuring that risks are
appropriately characterized and quantified with scientific information. One of the most
recent trends at the Health Protection and Food Branch of Health Canada is towards a
Risk Based Approach, or “regulation proportional to risk”.693 The basic idea is that under
an RBA, regulators:
will take into consideration such elements as the risks associated with
various product classes and the availability of supporting evidence for
safety, quality and efficacy/health claims.694
This is reflected in the proposed new wording to Bill C-51, which states that “information
required to demonstrate that a therapeutic product‟s benefits outweigh its risks depends
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on the nature of the product and its intended use”.695 If the RBA makes assumptions
about the relative safety of products or classes of products in the absence of scientific
evidence, then there is potential for distortion of those scientific standards brought to bear
on a product‟s review.

A second hurdle will be ensuring that benefits are not over-estimated as meeting
an urgent unmet medical need, i.e. flexible departure. In the United States, such benefits
resulted in „fast-track‟ legislation, allowing the FDA to:
expedite the review of [a] drug if it is intended for the treatment of a serious or
life-threatening condition and it demonstrates the potential to address unmet
medical needs for such a condition.696
The definition of what constitutes „a serious or life-threatening condition‟ and „unmet
medical need‟ has gradually led to an expansive definition that most drugs meet.697 This
law has allowed for the erosion of the minimal standards proving drug usefulness.698 In
most cases, drugs can be approved after only the first or second stage of clinical trials.
The result is that the “market [has been] flooded with poorly tested drugs of unknown
efficacy”.699

A final hurdle will involve making sure those measures of risk and benefit do not
become too encompassing and lose sight of the SEQ standard. A trend in health risk
assessment has been to monetize the values assigned to health risks and benefits; in the
case of risks, to develop measures of the financial cost of adverse drug reactions (through
695
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individual life valuations), and in the case of benefits, to factor in the market value (and
multiplier effect via innovation) of new drugs to the economy as a whole, as if they were
any consumer product.700 If these variables become criteria in new drug approvals, they
will dilute the ultimate safety goal underlying new drug evaluations. Assigning a value to
individual lives (presently around $6 million)701 allows for assessment of the cost of life
against the value of a drug‟s being on the market (often worth billions).702 If such factors
dominate risk-benefit assessment for new drugs or drugs already on the market,
regulatory intervention would become meaningless and Health Canada would be
abrogating its responsibility to protect the health and safety of Canadians.

Pharmacovigilence
The other major element of the new progressive licensing model is
pharmacovigilence. Found at the centre of the proposed model, it is designed to
supplement the knowledge and information gained by the initial risk assessment with
real-world information gained once a product has been released. As has been indicated
by Health Canada:
The central concept of Progressive Licensing is that, over time, there is a
progression in knowledge about a drug. The emphasis of the new
framework is to identify opportunities within this progression over the full
life-cycle of a drug, rather than placing the focus primarily upon pre-market
assessment.703
Achieving this goal means the establishment of more effective methods for the continual
700
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monitoring and evaluation of licensed drug safety. Planning for post-market surveillance
would become an essential part of the pre-market evaluation of a drug. As the Progressive
Licensing Concept Paper suggests:
Planning for the conduct of post-market activities...would become a
required part of the pre-market filing, so that expectations for identifying
and managing drug benefits and risks are established ahead of marketing
for each drug.704
According to the progressive licensing model, the pre-market filing would then “arguably
better mirror the actual considerations for licensing a drug ... [including ensuring] a
sufficient life-cycle management plan has been filed by the manufacturer to allow for
introduction of the drug to the market”.705

The extent to which this life-cycle management plan will affect the ultimate
decision to license a product (the product‟s risk-benefit analysis) is crucial to how the
traditional model of SEQ will be affected by pharmacovigilence. Presently there are two
emerging international models for how to incorporate risk mitigation management into
product approvals. Under the emerging U.S. model, risk mitigation planning (Risk
Evaluation and Minimization Strategies) is actively used as a benefit-risk consideration to
allow the licensing of products earlier than would be possible under previous SEQ
models.706 The more conservative EU model requires Risk Management Plans, but these
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become a supplemental element that is grafted onto the existing standard of drug safety
and efficacy approval.707 The ultimate utility and implication that pharmacovigilence has
for the new progressive licensing model will largely depend upon which of these two
models Canada adopts.

In the following section I will discuss the nature of pharmacovigilence and the
competing models of pharmacovigilence that exist in the United States and European
Union. This will enable an analysis of how these models are likely to impact upon the
proposed new drug regime and suggest which directions may be most appropriate for
Canada to adopt under its new progressive licensing regime.

(a) What is Pharmacovigilence?

At its most basic, pharmacovigilence has been defined by the WHO as “the
science and activities relating to the detection, assessment, understanding and prevention
of adverse effects or any other drug-related problem”.708 Basically, it includes any
activities undertaken to monitor the safety and efficacy of a drug post-market. Yet with
time, pharmacovigilence has come to mean much more than mere post-market
surveillance for adverse drugs events. Pre-approval clinical testing “may be sufficient to
determine efficacy, [but it] may not be sufficient to detect safety problems, particularly
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those that occur as a result of long-term use”.709

With time, pharmacovigilence has also become an umbrella term for the entire
field of activities, often called pharmaco-epidemiology, that can be put in place pre- and
post-market to monitor, mitigate, and evaluate the real-world safety and efficacy of drug
products.710 It has evolved from a system of adverse event reporting and risk
communications to a system based on a whole host of tools including risk management
plans, risk mitigation plans, secondary markers, and others. Pharmacovigilence planning
therefore becomes any “proactive approach to identifying risks associated with a product
prior to market authorization, as well as to planning for or implementing means to
investigate or mitigate those identified risks”.711

In 2007 the Institutes of Medicine (IOM) in the United States produced a report
assessing the overall drug review process in the United States.712 One of the key findings
was that the present model, based primarily on post-market research, was inadequate to
reflect the real safety and efficacy profile of products. Post-market reviews were designed
to assess a product‟s efficacy rather than safety.713 Many details about a drug‟s safety and
patterns of real-world use will only become apparent once a product is on the market,
including details such as its effect in combination with other products, how it affects
specific sub-populations, the effects of longer-term exposure, the product‟s relative
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effectiveness in customary practice or use, and low-frequency effects that can only be
detected in large populations.714 All of these observations identify the need to modify the
present one point in time regulatory review for “improvements in post-market
surveillance and [expanded] authority to require additional post-market trials or
observational studies when needed”.715

(b) The Emergence of Pharmacovigilence

In 1972, the WHO identified the need for greater “post-market” surveillance of
pharmaceuticals, and international cooperation in the sharing of information related to
post-market safety and efficacy data.716 In the report International Drug Monitoring: The
Role of National Centers, the WHO recommended “the development of systems for
detecting adverse reactions at both the national and international levels”.717

Over the next few decades, a patchwork of national methods for the detection,
reporting, and sharing of information based primarily on adverse events reports
developed.718 The system which began to emerge was one that required “health care
professionals (and consumers in a few countries) to spontaneously report [adverse events]
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with drugs”.719 These methods were hardly uniform, often poorly monitored and
evaluated, and varied greatly across national drug regimes.720

The Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS)
produced six working group reports dealing with the post-market surveillance of
pharmaceuticals. Beginning with the 1990 report on International Reporting of Adverse
Drug Reaction,721 there were increased calls for the harmonization and standardization of
AERs. Progressively the CIOMS reports have provided standards for the recognition,
reporting, and sharing of post-market adverse event data, including the 2001 CIOMS V
report Current Challenges in Pharmacovigilence: Pragmatic Approaches722 which dealt
with pharmacovigilence, and the 2005 CIOMS VI document Management of Safety
Information from Clinical Trials.723 Adopted to varying degrees by different international
regimes around the world, the CIOMS reports were crucial for the ICH and the
development of safety regulations in North America, Europe, Japan, and elsewhere.724

Much of this work on post-market drug safety surveillance and setting up the
parameters for market drug evaluation began to coalesce in the ICH guidance E2E:
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Pharmacovigilence Planning.725 Overall, the ICH E2E document and CIOMS reports
have led to market product evaluations that shift “toward earlier, proactive considerations
of risks and potential benefits of drugs in the pre- and peri-approval stages of drug
development, leading to a maturing of drug safety”.726

In 2003 the ICH produced guidance document E2E on pharmacovigilence
planning.727 E2E highlights specific processes that should be put in place for a
pharmacovigilence plan and “describes a method for summarizing the important
identified risks of a drug, important missing information, including the potential at-risk
populations and situations where the product is likely to be used that have not been
studied pre-approval”.728 This planning can then allow for the “benefit-risk balance [to]
be improved by reducing risk to patients”729 and “enable information feedback to the
users of medicines in a timely manner”.730 E2E provides some broad guidelines for
establishment of safety specification, the structure of pharmacovigilence plans, and
acceptable pharmacovigilence methods. These include passive surveillance, stimulated
reporting, active surveillance, comparative observational studies, targeted clinical
investigations, and descriptive studies.731 Each of these methods is a mechanism for
either increased collection of targeted safety data, or conducting additional post-market
surveillance studies.
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(c) Two Paths for Pharmacovigilence

Pharmacovigilence has two potential implications for new drug approvals. The
first is the establishment of tools to ensure the ongoing monitoring of drug safety and
efficacy (the life-cycle model). The second is the establishment of mechanisms that
enable the mitigation of AERs should they occur. The first would be established by a
detailed plan of post-marketing surveillance measures, and in some cases, the
establishment of specific conditions for monitoring SEQ at the time of licensing. The
second, mitigation, can either be established by measures (conditions of use) put in place
on newly licensed products, or by the establishment of risk mitigation strategies to deal
with uncertainties.

In effect, pharmacovigilence adds a new variable to the SEQ standard: a
pharmacovigilence standard (SEQ and P). The real question becomes how this additional
variable will influence the newly introduced risk-benefit analysis. Assuming that a riskbenefit analysis is still largely concerned with establishing a drug‟s safety, efficacy, and
quality, how will the presence of pharmacovigilence plans or pharmacovigilence
mitigation strategies affect the risk-benefit profile of a new drug or a promising new
therapy under flexible departure? As one author has noted, “more emphasis on postmarket safety [may] recalibrate the risk, benefit and uncertainties of therapeutic product
development”.732 This represents a shift from reliance on pre-market SEQ data to
reliance on prospective data generated on SEQ once a product is on the market.
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The current mechanism for licensing products with post-market conditions is the
Notice of Compliance with Conditions (NOCc). As noted in Chapter 1, an NOC can be
issued “to provide earlier market access to potentially life-saving drugs”.733 Specifically,
pursuant to sections C.08.004 and C.08.005 of the FDR, an NOC can be issued for:
promising new drug therapies intended for the treatment, prevention or
diagnosis of serious, life-threatening or severely debilitating diseases or
conditions for which a) there is no alternative therapy available on the
Canadian market or, b) where the new product represents a significant
improvement in the benefit/risk profile over existing products.734
In these cases NOCc allows for the approval of drugs that “have demonstrated promising
clinical effectiveness in clinical trials”.735 Under these conditions, authorization to market
a drug is given “with the condition that the sponsor undertakes additional studies to verify
the clinical benefit”.736

Increasingly, NOCc is being used as a mechanism for new drug approvals by
Health Canada.737 A recent study which reviewed the conditions of licensing for all new
drugs over a seven year period (2001-2008) found that “NOC submissions, which have
either the same or less evidentiary requirements as standard submissions with postmarket obligations, increased steeply”.738 Specifically, it was found that there has been a
gradual shift away from sponsors applying for priority review in favour of NOCc. Yet as
analogous studies from the United States suggest, there have been concerns that once
they receive marketing, drug manufacturers will fail to meet their post-market
733
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commitments.739 This is exacerbated by the fact that the Food Drug Act740 and Food and
Drug Regulations741 as they are currently drafted do not allow for the enforcement of
conditions made through a NOCc or removal of a marketed drug which fails to meet
those conditions.742

The present NOCc mechanism is clearly inadequate and pharmacovigilence as
articulated under progressive licensing would allow for the marketing of drugs with very
prescriptive and enforceable conditions. This can potentially allow for useful therapies
which would otherwise not reach the market to become available under very narrow
conditions of use, but it can also mean that drugs which have not been sufficiently proven
to be safe and effective could also reach the market with inadequate clinical research. The
ultimate question becomes how to apply pharmacovigilence in relation to the SEQ
standards. Will pharmacovigilence be used as an additional variable in the risk-benefit
assessment of new drugs (SEQ+P) or will it be used to mitigate this standard for all
promising new therapies (SEQ/P)? In effect, will pharmacovigilence planning be an
additional safety variable considered in regulatory approval, or will it become a tool to
reduce the pre-market clinical safety data required for approval?
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(i) The EMEA and US-FDA Experiences with Pharmacovigilence

There are two major regulatory jurisdictions that have already adopted
pharmacovigilence measures which can illustrate the outcomes of these two approaches:
the European Medicines Agency (EMEA) and the United States Food and Drug
Administration (US-FDA). Both are early adopters of pharmacovigilence, but each has
taken a very different approach to how it influences drug approvals. The lessons learned
from these two approaches should ultimately inform how Progressive Licensing decides
to implement pharmacovigilence in Canada.

The EMEA is responsible for “the protection and promotion of public and animal
health, through the evaluation and supervision of medicines for human and veterinary
use”743 for all countries within the EU. The EMEA‟s core mandate is to ease regulatory
burdens and duplication between EU countries; “once granted by the European
Commission, a centralized (or “Community”) marketing authorization is valid in all
European Union States”.744 This has meant a trend toward application of uniform
standards that can be used by each domestic drug regulatory authority.

The EMEA has two documents which lay out the legal requirements for
pharmacovigilence within the EU. The first is EC Regulation 726/2004, “laying down
Community procedures for the authorization and supervision of medicinal products for
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human and veterinary use”.745 In particular, the guidelines set out the procedures that are
to be implemented by the EMEA in assessing new drugs for market authorization. The
EMEA‟s responsibility is to:
Article 57(1)(c) “ensure the safe and effective use of these products, in
particular by evaluation, coordination of the implemented pharmacovigilence
obligations and the monitoring of such implementation”
Article 57(1)(i) “coordinating the verification of compliance with the
principles of good manufacturing practices, good laboratory practices, good
clinical practices and the verification of compliance with pharmacovigilence
obligations”.746
Basically, under the EMEA the responsibility is to ensure that manufacturers have a
system of pharmacovigilence in place supplementing safety and efficacy, and to ensure
that manufacturers are meeting these obligations. The drug manufacturer‟s responsibility
is outlined under Volume 9 A: Guidelines on Pharmacovigilence 2.1.1 and 2.15747 where
it is indicated that “a detailed description of pharmacovigilence planning must be
included in market authorizations”748; packages and manufacturers must guarantee that
“an appropriate system of pharmacovigilence [is] in place”.749

The EMEA adopts a perspective that pharmacovigilence or pharmacovigilence
planning should supplement the SEQ standard (SEQ+P) and not dilute the standard. As
one author has noted:
for the European Union, a pharmacovigilence system is not a risk
managements system. Details of the pharmacovigilence system must be
745
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supplied with the application for all new market authorizations, while the
details of the risk management system are required only in certain
circumstances.750
EU Risk Management Plans (EU-RMPs) are required when there is a variation to a
product‟s approved status, (i.e. a new active substance, additional risks are identified, a
significant change in conditions of use, a request from a competent authority within the
EU, or the EMEA identified a safety risk). What pharmacovigilence in the EU is not, is a
mechanism to allow for earlier market authorization or authorization of products which
have EU-RMPs to be licensed with less SEQ data.

(ii) The United States Food and Drug Administration (US-FDA)

In contrast, the US-FDA has used pharmacoviglence, and in particular mitigation
plans, as a tool to allow for the licensing of products with reduced SEQ clinical evidence.
As with most international norms, the U.S. has decided to adapt rather than adopt the
pharmacovigilence methods identified in ICH E2E751 and the CIOMS752 reports. Directly
in response to criticisms raised against the FDA and its post-market safety monitoring,753
the U.S. Congress introduced formal pharmacovigilence activities.754
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The most recent developments in U.S. drug law are the result of almost two
decades of drug reform. In 1992, Congress passed the Prescription Drug User Fee Act755
(PDUFA) that allowed the FDA to charge drug companies user fees for approvals.
PDUFA is subject to renewal every five years, and has meant that the US-FDA has a
regular window for updating its legislation and operating mandate.

In 1997, at the first of these renewals, Congress passed the FDA Modernization
Act (FDAMA).756 FDAMA reoriented the FDA‟s role to “not only prevent the
distribution of unsafe products, but also to review and approve new drugs in a timely
manner”.757 Under FDAMA, approval times were shortened, the definition of „urgent
unmet need‟ was broadened to include „serious and life threatening need‟, and outside
panels could be contracted to assess drugs on behalf of the FDA.758 The resulting fasttrack legislation allowed the FDA to:
expedite the review of [a] drug if it is intended for the treatment of a serious or
life-threatening condition and it demonstrates the potential to address unmet
medical needs for such a condition.759
Unfortunately, the definition of a serious or life-threatening condition and unmet medical
need has gradually been stretched to include most new drugs.760 Vioxx was approved
using this fast-track legislation.

In 2007 Congress once again renewed the mandate of PDUFA with the
755
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Food and Drug Administration Amendment Act761 (FDAAA). The FDAAA
introduced a host of changes related to the market authorization and conditions of
use of newly approved drugs. One of the largest changes was to Title IX Enhanced Authorities Regarding Postmarked Safety of Drugs.762 Much like the
intended C-51, Title IX gave the US-FDA much greater powers to enforce the
imposition of post-market conditions and post-market clinical research.763 For a
new drug application, the US-FDA may “require a responsible drug manufacturer
to conduct a post-approval clinical trial or trials of the drug, on the basis of
scientific data deemed appropriate”.764

While not explicitly mentioning pharmacovigilence, under s.905 of the FDAAA
the FDA can now impose active “post-market risk identification, analysis, and timelines
for reporting”.765 Specifically, this can include the “development of post-market risk
identification and analysis methods and analysis systems, advanced analysis of drug
safety data, and additional clinical trials”.766 Unfortunately, the way in which most postmarketing commitments are established by the US-FDA is not through a general postmarketing obligation to conduct pharmacovigilence activities. Instead conditions can
only be imposed where “the report and the active post-market risk identification and
analysis system [provided by the drug manufacturer] will not be sufficient to meet [postmarket monitoring]”.767
761
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The form this risk identification and analysis system takes is that of a Risk
Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS). The US-FDA will ask for REMS where it
“determines that a risk evaluation and mitigation strategy is necessary to ensure that the
benefits of the drug outweigh the risks of the drug”.768 The REMS will contain ongoing
obligations for “risk evaluation and [a] mitigation strategy”.769 The basic idea is that not
only does the REMS serve as a plan for post-market safety and effectiveness evaluation,
but that it also identifies a plan for minimizing the impact of unknown risks.

The existence of REMS then allows for an abbreviated submission for treatments
that address serious or life-threatening conditions and unmet medical needs..770 Planning
for the minimization of these risks then allows for the shifting of the risk-benefit analysis
for these drugs. In effect, the existence of post-marketing risk mitigation strategies and
monitoring activities allows for the reduction of SEQ data provided post-market. A recent
report to Congress has found that the majority of post-market commitments made in
REMS that have led to early licensing have failed to complete the required studies.771

The unfortunate result is that the U.S. has begun the marketing of “promising
therapies” on reduced pre-market safety data.772 Often drugs which show some effects at
Phase 2 clinical trials will be licensed with a promise to conduct Phase 3 trials once the
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product is on the market.773 In this case, the promise of pharmacovigilence is used to
justify merely creating contingencies to deal with unknown safety and efficacy risks.

Conclusion

(a) Taking the Measure of the Life-Cycle Model

The changes that underlie the life-cycle model hold great promise to resolve
many of the problems with current drug regulation in Canada. As has been noted by
Lemmens and Bouchard, “the current regulatory process focuses too much on short-term
efficacy and safety of drug products [and] there is little control on what happens after a
drug is approved”.774 Pharmacovigilence should, in theory, increase the requirement for
post-market surveillance of new drugs, while risk-benefit analysis could introduce a more
balanced appraisal of new drugs. This new regulatory life-cycle, as envisioned in the
2006 Progressive Licensing Framework775 (PLF) and Bill C-51,776 increases the
requirements for ongoing reporting of safety data, gives regulators more powers to
enforce post-market conditions and withdraw products, increases the flexibility of the
regulator to assess scientific data, and increases the mechanisms for marketing needed
new therapies. Yet, this model is also not without its potential pitfalls.

Many authors have been critical of the way in which PLF was developed. As the
773
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editor-in-chief of the Canadian Medical Association Journal (CMAJ) notes, “two voices
dominated the change process: the pharmaceutical industry and Health Canada”. 777 He
goes on to argue:
These voices, albeit important, are not the only stakeholders; their focus is
far too narrow and potentially self-serving. Canada‟s health professionals,
experts and the public are nowhere in the picture.778
Joel Lexchin has been even more critical, going so far as to state that:
democratic values such as openness, safety, and objective information are
being ignored as Health Canada consciously opts instead for a drug
regulatory system that reflects the interest of private industry.779
The present regulatory and operational reforms underway at Health Canada, including the
Blueprint for Renewal and Progressive Licensing, stem from the move toward „smart
regulation‟. Underlying smart regulation is the concept of:
using the regulatory system to generate social and [health] benefits while
enhancing the conditions for a competitive and involved economy that will
attract investments and skilled workers and sustain a high quality of life for
Canadians.780
This has meant that most new and existing regulatory activity has come to reflect an
agenda promoting:
international competitiveness, risk management approaches, alternative
instruments such as voluntary codes and regulatory compliance measures
that ensure transparency and (business) stakeholder engagement.781
This agenda has also become ingrained in guidance (the Cabinet Directive on
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Streamlining Regulation)782 and a policy of reducing the overall regulatory intervention
of government (see the Treasury Board‟s „change agenda‟ and „policy suite renewal‟). 783

What this means for programs such as PLF is that they may, even unintentionally,
be driven by a set of assumptions related to reduced regulatory intervention and increased
autonomy of the regulated (in this case, the pharmaceutical industry). As Lemmens and
Bouchard have noted, the question becomes “whose definition of health, safety, security
and values are to guide the government in constructing and implementing its reform
project?”784 If the project is not executed appropriately, the government “risks no longer
being a protector of public health but a cheerleader for economic growth at the risk of
public health”.785 While PLF has many of the needed elements of an improved regulatory
system, it also contains many elements that on closer examination could be considered as
diminishing of the overall scrutiny and SEQ standards imposed on new drugs.

(b) The Downside to Progressive Licensing

One of the most cited criticisms and flaws in the PLF model and
pharmacovigilence as a whole is the potential for shifting the regulatory oversight of new
drugs from a pre-market review of SEQ to one based largely on post-market surveillance.
Or as the editor of CMAJ has noted, “in exchange [for] the requirements to continuously
782
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evaluate drugs post-market [the] threshold for approval of selected new drugs is lower”.
786

As Bouchard has noted:
The thrust of this critique is that the focus of PLF will be on industrial
development rather than public protection, including a continued
preference for access, faster review times, private IPR rights, and minimal
post-marketing obligations.787

Health Canada has repeatedly asserted that this is not the intention of the PLF.788 Yet as
has been noted in a recent empirical analysis of all approvals by TPD from 2001 to 2008,
there has already been a slow shift at TPD towards “earlier access to drugs that occupy
the „extraordinary need‟ niche with emphasis on post-market surveillance”. 789 There is
already a trend toward relaxing the standards for „promising new therapies‟ that places
the burden for proving safety and efficacy of a new drug on a post-market consuming
public.

There are two dangers in moving the demonstration of SEQ to post-market
surveillance. The first is that ADRs (post-market safety events) are notoriously
underreported and Health Canada has, as yet, to demonstrate that it can effectively
receive, analyze, and disseminate adverse event information to patients and practitioners.
Worldwide ADR reporting systems consistently only capture 1 to 10 per cent of all
reactions790[and] that figure may be considerably lower”.791 As one author has noted,
much of PLF is pegged upon the quality of data that will be generated by
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pharmacovigilence, which:
implies that this will not compromise safety, because a new and enhanced
post market surveillance system will identify problems quickly and
effectively. This is speculative and is not supported by evidence or by
Health Canada‟s track record.792
At the time of drafting this thesis, Health Canada had as yet to produce a clear
articulation of what a Canadian pharmacovigilence system would look like or encompass.
Without a clear picture of how pharmacovigilence will manifest in Canada, it becomes
difficult to gauge how effective its implementation would be. The PLF, which was
already almost codified by Bill C-51, is dependent on this new post-market measurement.

No legislation should be passed without clearly identifying how
pharmacovigilence will be dealt with and defining how it will be dealt with in
regulations. There is a persistent danger that the good intentions of the legislative drafters
and legislative review team will be lost if the parameters of pharmacovigilence and its
effects on risk-benefit analysis are not spelled out well in advance. Based on the EU and
U.S. models, pharmacovigilence (or at least pharmacovigilence planning) must
supplement the traditional SEQ model, not become the deciding factor in a risk-benefit
analysis.

The second is that repeatedly in the U.S. and Canada, industry has been shown to
be slow – if not outright dilatory – to meet imposed conditions of post-market
surveillance. Once a manufacturer has a product on the market, past patterns have
suggested that there is little incentive to complete imposed conditions. A recent U.S.
792
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congressional report on the meeting of post-market conditions imposed under the USPDUFA has found that less than 10 per cent (out of over a thousand issued 2002-2005)
have yet to be met.793 Similarly, in Canada a review of post-market conditions imposed
on drugs issued an NOCc has demonstrated that the vast majority of conditions
associated with these products still remain unmet.794 Reviewing the 38 NOCcs issued as
of January 2008, Lexchin found little evidence that the majority of application sponsors
had acted on the conditions imposed on licensing, including one NOCc issued in August
2009 which had as yet to meet its imposed conditions. Any new model must impose
obligations and severe consequences, including revocation of a drug‟s license, for failure
to meet post-market commitments under very clearly defined timelines.

Another potential pitfall for PLF is how poorly it defines what will qualify as a
drug for flexible departure. Presently, Health Canada has defined flexible departure as:
Deviation from the standard baseline requirement for evidence supporting
a drug‟s efficacy and safety that is necessary for the drug to attain initial
market authorization. There must be a compelling reason justifying such a
departure from baseline standards.795
There is little clarity provided as to what would constitute a compelling reason, but PLF
has defined „extraordinary need‟ as “urgent medical need resulting from significant threat
to human health, either individual or population-wide”.796 In the U.S., the definition of a
product that meets an urgent or unmet need has been interpreted by the courts and the
FDA very broadly. This has meant that virtually all products can apply to be approved
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using an expedited process;797 Vioxx was approved this way.798 In order to ensure that
flexible departure does not become the norm for all new drugs, better parameters for
when it could be used and the understanding that it should be used as an exception must
be clearly integrated into the Progressive Licensing model.

A final difficulty for PLF is the degree to which it will be shifting the monitoring
and assessment of SEQ to industry. Pharmacovigilence, regardless of the final form it
takes, is a type of self-regulation whereby industry is given a larger role in defining its
self-monitoring standards and overseeing the implementation of those standards. Instead
of directly imposing or supervising SEQ, what Health Canada will actually oversee is that
the regulated has a plan to oversee SEQ. As Lemmens has noted:
this represents a sea change in priority-setting in terms of shifting the
focus of government from a conscious and active „gate keeping‟ or
fiduciary function in balancing public and private interest to a more
tenuous, if not naive partnership with the private sector.799
There is a danger that “over time regulators tend to become advocates for the industry
they are supposed to regulate, as a result of conflict avoidance and influence from
industry”.800 Over time it is likely that industry will push for an expanded role for
pharmacovigilence and an expanded role in self-monitoring. This drift towards increased
self-regulation means that over time it will become more difficult for regulators to impose
the conditions and standards that industry uses to self-monitor.
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(c) General Statement

In the present chapter, I have tried to demonstrate that a policy shift has occurred
in relation to pharmaceutical regulatory models. Proposed regulatory models are shifting
away from a point in time approval of new drugs based on SEQ, to a model that assesses
a drug‟s overall risk-benefit profile at the time of approval and continues to monitor the
product‟s safety over its life-cycle. Stemming from the Blueprint for Renewal801 and
Canadian Consumer Safety Action Plan,802 this policy has been embodied in the
proposed Progressive Licensing model, which has a focus on ongoing safety monitoring,
flexible departure for urgently needed new drugs, and pharmacovigilence. Much of the
intent of this model was incorporated within the proposed Progressive Licensing model
and Bill C-51803 that expanded regulator powers. Yet the form and implementation of
these changes, including regulations and a clear new model for drug approvals, still
remain largely to be determined and communicated by Health Canada.

Key to this new model of drug regulation are the ideas of risk-benefit analysis and
pharmacovigilence. Yet as I have argued above, each of these regulatory tools is not
without potential problems. Risk-benefit analysis must be applied judiciously and cannot
be allowed to supplant existing SEQ standards or be based on benefits that have little to
do with health. Pharmacovigilence also must ensure that it is not merely used as a
mechanism to allow for the establishment of post-marketing surveillance plans in
exchange for reducing pre-market SEQ data. To this effect, any new legislation must

801

Blueprint, supra note 559.
CDSR, supra note 624
803
C-51, supra note 544.
802

204

include clear language ensuring the supremacy of the SEQ standard being met as a
dominant element in any risk-benefit analysis, and that pharmacovigilence be only an
additional element required for drug approvals in addition to the demonstration of SEQ.

Designing a new drug regulatory regime is no easy process, as Lexchin has noted:
Absolute drug safety can never be achieved. The task of regulatory
authorities such as Health Canada is to identify as many as possible of
these problems before drugs are released onto the market; then to continue
to monitor drugs‟ safer approval to ensure that any new safety issues are
documented, and finally to be sure that this information is disseminated in
an effective manner so that practitioners prescribe and patients use
medicines in the safest and most beneficial way possible.804
The PLF model shows great promise for ensuring increased post-market surveillance of
new drugs but it is also not without its potential pitfalls. Regulators must be cautious as
they move forward in structuring a new drug regulatory model that consciously accounts
for some of the dangers identified above, and focuses on health and safety rather than
innovation and the pharmaceutical industry‟s needs.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

The medieval philosopher Paracelsus once stated that “all medicines are
poisonous… the right dose differentiates a poison from a remedy”.805 All medications
contain the seed for great harm and great good. For the most part, we are better off for
the existence of prescription pharmaceuticals. One author notes:
Tens of million of people are alive today who would be dead without their
medicines, and tens of millions more have far less life-crushing disabilities
because of prescriptions their doctors have written. Some others - though
mercifully a much smaller number - become disabled or die when a drug‟s
risk-benefit balance goes horribly wrong.806
The benefits from pharmaceuticals are enormous, but this must be tempered with a
realization that their uses must be justified through the provision of adequate and realistic
data on SEQ.

As was noted earlier in this thesis, we place a lot of faith in science to give our
decisions the weight of empiricism. Yet in those cases where science is used as a tool in
regulatory decision-making, it must be employed correctly. If methodologies or sound
scientific design are allowed to degrade as a result of low regulatory standards or poor
policy, the research observations that flow from these studies become weak and their
ability to demonstrate a drug‟s safety or effectiveness become meaningless.
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If those scientific standards degrade or are subject to misinformation, if the
primary policy considerations of regulators cease to be related to the health of Canadians,
and if those mechanisms in place guiding decisions lose their objectivity, then the
ultimate loser is the health of the Canadian public. Scientific observation is not infallible
or ethically neutral.

It took a development in humanist understanding to alter ancient medical models,
which eventually led to a desire to research the value of new drugs. Science cannot
operate on its own without guidance that sets limits on what it should be asking and how.
Science does not provide us with the capacity for formulating ethical or moral decisions.
Without some form of codified guidance for practices and priorities, science can become
distorted, exploitative, and even destructive. It must be the product of deliberation and the
establishment of values through human consideration. In regulatory decisions that have
ethical implications, such as drug development and approval, establishing limits on how
we use science must be the product of extended, accurate, and effectively consultative
deliberation.

Vioxx Revisited
On November 9, 2007, Merck settled the U.S. Vioxx class action suit with nearly
27, 000 plaintiffs who had alleged damages and a pay-out of 4.85 billion dollars.807 The
drug was pulled from the market in 2004, yet Merck had been aware of the dangers
associated with the drug as far back as 2001. Throughout the litigation Merck pursued a
807
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“try every case” philosophy and “backed its public litigation posture by paying millions
of dollars in legal fees and other trial expenses, while running an extensive advertising
campaign touting Merck‟s contributions to public health”.808 This enabled Merck to
settle for far less than was expected, and in fact to make a profit on its overall marketing
of Vioxx.

Vioxx was a complete regulatory failure. The mechanisms in place to assess the
safety and efficacy of this new drug failed to prevent the product from getting on the
market, failed to ensure that the drug manufacturer was providing all relevant scientific
evidence and conducting the appropriate research, and ultimately failed to ensure the
product was monitored and removed from the market once the dangers were suspected.
(Merck voluntarily removed the product.) The results of Vioxx‟s failure rest to a large
extent with the regulation failing to impose on drug manufacturers an obligation to relay
all known dangers, and partially with the regulators for fast-tracking the drug‟s release
and not monitoring the effects of the drug once it was on the market.

Yet Vioxx represents only the most recent and infamous failure of the regulatory
regime. As we have seen, all drug regulation can be seen as occurring on a pendulum
which swings from access to safety. It is characterized by a severe public health event
which is swiftly followed by increased regulatory oversight, new standards of safety, and
with time, the slow movement away from broader health concerns, until the next event.
This has occurred repeatedly; in the late 1800s with the adulteration of a simple lozenge
that led to initial manufacturing standards, in the 1900s with the sulfimide disaster that
808
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led to initial safety standards and finally the thalidomide disaster in the 1960s that led to
efficacy standards being ingrained in the modern clinical trial. From this we get the SEQ
standard. The current push towards post-market surveillance (or pharmacovigilence) is
arguably itself the product of the Vioxx debacle.

If Vioxx had been marketed under a different drug regulatory regime it is still
conceivable that it would have been marketed without accounting for its long-term
dangers. Under one potential reality, Merck would have merely been required to provide
a risk management plan and proposal for long-term safety monitoring, which may or may
not have been followed up (SEQ mitigated with PvP). Under another, it would have been
required to provide a detailed long-term safety monitoring plan, met that plan, and that
may have identified the dangers inherent in its long-term use (SEQ with added PvP).
Regardless, present safety standards are inadequate to have imposed the needed rigour on
the science used in the clinical trials and post market studies. As the present regulatory
model develops it must ensure that it moves in a direction that holds improving the health
of Canadians as its primary policy goal.

Hitting the Right Balance

Law and policy are critical in the formulation and administration of the drug
regime.809 They provide certainty to applicants and guide those seeking drug approvals.
Manufacturers will modify their behavior to meet the requirements of regulators. Where
guidance is weak or allows for too much leeway, those employing the system are apt to
809
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exploit weaknesses. Applicants will seek to limit costs, reduce interaction with the
regulatory body, and seek the most effective (timely and simple) way to ensure that their
product is approved. The law establishing the approval process and the policies
determining how it is enforced send a tacit message about a regulator‟s priorities and
intentions. As noted earlier:
by defining the specific incentives, opportunities, and constraints within
which private sector groups operate and assert their interests, institutions
change the rules of politics and hence the context in which political power is
determined.810
We must be cognizant of the role that law and policy play in creating these realities for
good or bad when assessing the validity of regulatory and legislative structures. For new
drugs this means that science, policy, and law walk hand in hand in structuring the
system that guides new drugs to the market.

Prescription drugs in Canada are big business. It is estimated that 25.4 billion
dollars will be spent on prescription drugs over 2009-10 in Canada, with 11.4 billion of
this being spent by privately-funded health-care programs.811 Drugs represent the second
largest cost to the public health-care system after hospitals and Canadians pay more on
average (per capita $832 CAD) for prescription drugs than any other OECD country.812
In the past decade, expenditures have more than doubled, from $12 billion to $25
billion.813 The regulation and oversight of this system affect all Canadians and the overall
quality and functioning of our health-care system.
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As the regulator, Health Canada plays an important role in overseeing and guiding
the quality of the pharmaceuticals that are available in Canada. Yet as this thesis has
demonstrated, there are significant gaps in the law overseeing the generation of scientific
information. It is essential that in the review of new health products the regulator take
into account as a primary policy consideration that these products be safe, efficacious,
and of high quality. Only then should other considerations such as the product‟s market
value, the potential for innovation, and the speed of drug review be considered.

Whither the Regulator
Each year all government departments are required to produce a report of their
planned activities and performance on those activities called a Report on Plans and
Priorities (RPP). The RPP serves to “describe departmental priorities, expected results
and the associated resource requirements [to inform] parliamentarians and Canadians of
departmental plans”.814 Basically, the RPP serves as the outline for a department‟s plans,
priorities, and intended activities over the coming next three years. In the 2002 RPP,
Health Canada defined its role as “guardian/risk mitigator and information provider
through the generation of shared knowledge”.815 In Health Canada‟s 2009-10 RPP, it
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identified its core responsibilities as “a regulator, service provider, funder”816 and newly
as a “catalyst for innovation and information provider”.817

In the 2009-10 RPP, Health Canada has reaffirmed its intention to “update the
regulatory system to address new realities in science and technology and the global
economy”.818 While there is no specific plan to re-introduce Bill C-51, Health Canada
continues working on a new regulatory system largely based on the Canadian Consumer
Safety Action Plan:
The Department will build on the initial thrust of the Action Plan and
undertake a number of initiatives in each of the three pillars: active
prevention to address as many potential problems as possible before they
occur; targeted oversight so the government can keep a closer watch over
products that pose a higher risk; and rapid response to enable government
to take action more quickly and effectively.819
These three new pillars for any drug regulatory system can rightly be observed as a shift
to limited regulatory oversight pre-market against a priori identified risks in favour of
responding when unforeseen risks occur.

This shift is core to how the government of Canada has begun to perceive its role as
a provider of health services, from active participant to more of a third party facilitator of
drug marketing. While it still regulates several product lines, it now conceives of this
role as working to “generate and share knowledge and information on which personal
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decision-making, regulations and standards, and innovation in health rely”.820 This
reflects what was announced by TPD in its own Business Transformation Strategy, to:
speed up the regulatory process for drug approvals, to move forward with a
smart regulation strategy to accelerate reforms in key areas to promote
health and sustainability, to contribute to innovation and economic growth,
and to reduce the administrative burden on business.821
As Lexchin suggest, this new role is one where the regulator‟s “main function is to
facilitate industry‟s efforts to develop new products and to approve them as quickly as
possible… and the regulatory authority exists to provide a service to industry”.822

There is much promise in the model envisioned in Bill C-51 and Progressive
Licensing, but there are also dangers. Under the life-cycle model greater monitoring and
real-world information on drugs use would be generated, yet it remains unclear whether
this will be at the expense of allowing products to be marketed with lower evidential
(SEQ) standards, and based on a host of non-scientific policy risks or benefits. The
question becomes, what will be the form of this new regulatory and legislative regime?
As has been echoed throughout this thesis, when science is used it must be employed
correctly. Creating a regime that in any way exchanges safety of the drug-consuming
public for unproven measures of predictive safety based on risk modeling is fraught with
peril.
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Ultimately it is up to Health Canada and the government to decide how they will
formulate this new regime. At its core government needs to compel better research and
data provision by industry and strengthen the power of the regulator to enforce postmarket research. Yet it must be cautious that in so doing it does not adopt a model that
has greater policy and regulatory gaps. The new regime must be crafted to incorporate
updated legal requirements for manufacturers and clinical researchers, but also fully
articulate in law and regulation the new mechanisms (pharmacovigilence and risk-benefit
analysis) that it proposed to adopt. If these mechanisms become an afterthought of the
legislative and regulatory drafting, it is likely that they will not manifest as effective
regulatory tools, and in the end lead to new drug failures.

We are left with the question: If Health Canada does not oversee the safety,
efficacy and quality of these products, then who does? While imperfect, the present
regime, and that envisioned by Progressive Licensing, represents an essential layer of
protection for the drug consuming public. What is truly needed is a commitment from
Health Canada and the Government to create a robust, adaptable, and evidence based
drug regime that places the health and safety of Canadians above any other policy
considerations.
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